VOEGELIN -- RESEARCH NEWS 
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Volume VI, No. 1                                         February 2003 
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Note from the editor: 
 
After a long absence, during which there were many changes in our  
lives, we are back.  It is our desire to resume publication of  
VOEGELIN -- RESEARCH NEWS in a manner consistent with the standards  
set in the past.  We open with a refereed article by Dr. Jerry Day.  
Dr. Day's article is part of a soon to be published work by the Univer-
sity of Missouri Press entitled _Eric Voegelin and the Schelling 
Renaissance: The Schellingian Orientation in Voegelin's Later Works, 
1952-1985_.  

Since Professor Geoffrey L. Price is no longer part of the V--RN team,
I, for the time being, will assumed responsibility for producing up-
dates to the Voegelin bibliography begun by Professor Price.  In this 
respect, I would appreciate hearing from anyone who may have a contri-
bution to make to the up-dates.  
 
Maben Walter Poirier 
Concordia University 
Loyola Campus 
MONTREAL, Quebec 
 
                      ___________________________ 
  
  
VOEGELIN'S PUBLISHED REMARKS ON SCHELLING:  VARIATIONS AND THEMES.1  
 
Jerry Day, Ph.D.  
Montreal (Quebec) Canada  
 
Many books on the philosophy of Eric Voegelin, perhaps even most of  
them, have but one type of reference to F.W.J. Schelling in their  
indices. They cite either the point in _Autobiographical  
Reflections_, pertaining to Schelling's role in Voegelin's decision  
to abandon his early work on the _History of Political Ideas_, or  
they cite some of the many possible references to Schelling as a  
quasi-Hegelian intellectual, which are found throughout Voegelin's  
published works. In the following article, I bring both types of  
references together in a chronologically ordered presentation of all  
that Voegelin had to say about Schelling in print. I thereby attempt  
to indicate that his reception of Schelling was a good deal more  
complex than scholarship has tended to acknowledge in the past.  
  
Voegelin publishes considerable praise for Schelling at the beginning  
of his career and in the last four years of his life; but he  
criticizes him severely in the intervening decades, from 1951 to  
1981, usually by appealing to the Hegelian or "gnostic" character of  
Schelling's thought. Gnostic thinkers, at least in Voegelin's use of  
the term, claim either to have achieved, or assume that it is  
possible to achieve complete knowledge of the intractable mysteries  
of life, death, the nature of the divine and the meaning of world  
history. Gnostics claim to possess, or claim to have the method for  
eventually possessing the saving knowledge that results from the  
eradication of these mysteries--the knowledge that others have  
attributed to God alone. More specifically, gnostics attempt to  
replace knowledge based on religious faith or philosophical  
hypothesis with knowledge based on claims to certainty; and often the  
alleged overcoming of faith is announced as an apotheosis. Since  
Voegelin consistently argues that divine knowledge cannot be attained  
by human beings, one would not suspect that Schelling, if he were a  
gnostic, could ever have provided any significant guidance for  
Voegelin's own understanding of philosophy, the nature of human  
consciousness and the broader sense of order that the latter  
manifests in history. But the published praise of Schelling at the  
beginning and end of Voegelin's career indicates otherwise. It allows  
for three periods to be distinguished in the complex history of  
Voegelin's estimations of Schelling: (1) the period of moderate  
praise and acknowledged dependency, from 1933 to 1947; (2) the period  
of general criticism, from 1951 to 1981; and (3) the last years of  
Voegelin's life, from 1981-1985, when he offers high praise of  
Schelling in public conversations, while repeating his gnosticism  
critique in published writings.  
  
  
1.  The Period of Moderate Praise (1933-1947)  
  
Voegelin first encountered the works of Schelling in graduate school,  
at the University of Vienna, while working under the supervision of  
Othmar Spann.2  It is clear that Spann held Schelling's thought in  
high esteem. In several of his works from the early 1920s, Spann  
draws on Schelling--along with Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Meister  
Eckhart--to develop an account of the "inner" unity and  
"religiousness" that he considers a prerequisite for understanding  
the philosophical history of all religions, including the cardinal  
role they play in the formation of distinct peoples. Several decades  
later, Spann published a work on the philosophy of religion, inspired  
by Schelling's _Philosophy of Mythology_ and _Philosophy of  
Revelation_, which Manfred Schroeter, the editor of one collection of  
Schelling's _Works_, considered to be the fulfillment of Schelling's  
entire program.3  
  
_Race and State_.   There are no references to Schelling, nor any  
clear indication of his signature guidance, in Voegelin's first book,  
_On the Form of the American Mind_(1928). Voegelin begins to discuss  
Schelling only in his 1933 book, _Race and State_. In the context of  
an attempt to reach a critical understanding of the emergence of race  
consciousness in "particularist communities," Voegelin says that  
"Schelling's doctrine of myth as the ground of being of all peoples  
or nations seems to us the first profound insight into the religious  
nature, in the broadest sense, of all community formation." Schelling  
argues that a people does not create its mythology. Rather, the  
reverse is true: a people emerges when a common, inner movement of  
the spirit creates the basis for a shared mythology. This mythology,  
in turn, is what yields the consciousness that a particular people  
has come to stand apart from humanity, presupposed as an original  
unity. "A people's or nation's ground of being [_Seinsgrund_] and its  
unity is its myth. Simply living together in an area does not unite  
individuals into a people; nor do they become a people by virtue of  
their shared pursuit of agriculture and trade or by a common legal  
order. What makes a people and sets it apart is 'community of  
consciousness,' 'a common world perspective,' a shared 'mythology.' A  
people or nation is not given its mythology in the course of history;  
instead, its mythology determines its history. In fact, for  
Schelling. . . . mythology _is_ history itself."4  
  
The impulse that eventually creates a people or nation "does not come  
from outside." It is a common movement in the consciousness of  
individuals who eventually declare themselves to be a distinct  
people. Thus, Voegelin also credits Schelling with making "the first  
contribution to the psychology of particularist communities  
separating themselves from humanity. [Schelling] speaks of the barb  
of internal unrest, the feeling of being no longer all of mankind but  
only a part of it, of no longer belonging to the absolute One but to  
have fallen prey to a particular god." As well, Schelling speaks of a  
"spiritual crisis" that is necessary to break the consciousness of  
unity and to drive individuals apart into nations. In remotest  
antiquity, he imagines, the absolute unity of humanity "was effected  
by a spiritual power," and all later separations from this original  
unity were "caused by new spiritual powers springing up. The  
principle binding people into unity was _one_ God." The original  
religion of humanity was monotheistic, according to Schelling's  
speculation, and "the means of separating [peoples] is polytheism."5  
Schelling's focus on the "inner," divine motivation for the  
development of mythical symbols in history likely played a  
considerable role in persuading Voegelin to discount more common  
reasons given for the formation of new peoples and their myths--for  
example, natural disasters, trading practices and other types of  
cross-fertilization between cultures.6 Schelling's elaborate account  
of divine "potencies" or powers actualizing themselves in human  
consciousness, and thus creating the discernable epochs in its  
history, seems to persuade Voegelin, as it did his teacher Othmar  
Spann,7 that the primary motivation for community formations in  
history is religious, not pragmatic.8  
  
_Political Religions_.   Voegelin commends Schelling briefly in his  
1938 study of _Political Religions_. He credits Schelling with  
raising the "radical metaphysical question: Why is there Something;  
why is there not Nothing?" The ability to raise this question, which  
Voegelin laments as the "concern of few," indicates that Schelling is  
beyond the purely temporal and scientistic understanding of the world  
as mere "content" or sheer fact. Schelling has transcended the  
understanding of reality that is shared by "the large masses" who  
engage in little more than "political religiosity." He has attempted  
to understand the world in its spiritual "existence."9 The point of  
the reference is clear enough; but it is odd that Voegelin should  
attribute this "radical metaphysical question" to Schelling. In his  
later works, Voegelin more frequently attributes this question to  
Leibniz. There is at least one important consequence to the later  
change. Schelling asked this question in the context of his thoughts  
on God's transcendent freedom from, and initial ability to create the  
"necessary" powers (_Potenzen_) of nature. And Schelling's thoughts  
on divine freedom in existence, beyond the essence of divine  
necessity in nature, contributed greatly to his critique of Hegel.10  
By shifting attention away from Schelling in his later references,  
Voegelin avoids discussion, perhaps unintentionally, of a potentially  
serious problem with his critique of Schelling's gnosticism.  
Schelling, like Voegelin himself, became a staunch critic of Hegel.  
But Voegelin never mentions in print that he is aware of Schelling's  
existential critique of Hegel's idealism. His awareness of this  
critique is to be found only in his unpublished "Last Orientation."  
  
"Plato's Egyptian Myth."   The period in which Voegelin publishes  
moderate praise for Schelling draws to a close in his 1947 article,  
"Plato's Egyptian Myth."11  By this time, Voegelin had emigrated to  
the United States and had become an American citizen. His  
understanding of Schelling begins to show some changes. He draws on  
Schelling's philosophy of consciousness and mythology in his  
interpretation of a section in Plato's _Timaeus_(17-27b). But  
Schelling is mentioned only in a general way in the concluding "Note"  
to this article. This bibliographical irregularity, along with a  
curious claim made in the Note, may reveal the beginning of  
Voegelin's reticence to be associated with Schelling in his  
interpretation of Platonic myth, philosophy, and its historical  
significance.  
  
The article's concluding Note begins with the following statement:  
"We have conducted the analysis of the Egyptian myth on the basis of  
Plato's work only." This claim is curious because it is only partly  
true. In the third section of his article, Voegelin writes: "we have  
to remember that the _Timaeus_ is not the report of a historic event  
but the work of a poet and philosopher; we have to take our position  
outside the dialogue and to inquire into the meaning which the work  
has as a creation of Plato." Indeed, Voegelin seeks ultimately to  
interpret the entire dialogue as an historic event, as "a drama  
within the soul of Plato." He writes of Plato's poetic ability to  
"find Atlantis" through a recollective (anamnetic) investigation of  
"the collective unconscious which is also living in him."12  But  
Plato's text is not the only basis for Voegelin's interpretation.  
Plato does not tell us in any of his dialogues about dramas in his  
soul-- not to mention investigations of a "collective unconscious."  
He simply does not write in this way. This point leaves readers to  
wonder what informs Voegelin's external reading of the _Timaeus_ and  
_Critias_. The second sentence of the concluding Note provides an  
answer: "The problem of the idea [of a novel myth] and of its  
relations to the unconscious could be clarified considerably through  
a comparison with the work of the other great philosopher who  
struggled with it, that is through a comparison with the work of  
Schelling." Voegelin admits that a comprehensive account of how Plato  
and Schelling struggled to understand the same phenomenon,  
experiencing the need for new myths, "would require an extensive,  
preliminary presentation of Schelling's philosophy" which, in turn,  
"would burst the framework of this article."13  Voegelin is likely  
thinking of his own research on Schelling, which would soon lead to  
the writing of his "Last Orientation" (mid1940s), the text in which  
he provides the suggested presentation of Schelling's philosophy  
required for understanding the inner origin of mythic symbols. In  
this manuscript, if not in the article, Voegelin reveals the extent  
of his knowledge of Schelling's account of the birth of mythical  
symbols through what he calls "protodialectic experiences" and  
"anamnetic" explorations of the "unconscious." These terms refer  
simply to the claim that genuine symbols arise beyond the conscious  
control of a symbol-maker. They arise from powerful experiences in  
the human soul and, so to speak, call out for names. A symbol-maker  
then "recollects" these experiences and gives them names--_e.g._,  
Prometheus, Sisyphus, Oedipus, and so on. Such is the account of  
symbol formation that Voegelin takes to be thematic in Schelling's  
work. Thus it may turn out to be that Schelling, not Plato, is the  
principal guide to Voegelin's understanding of "recollection"  
(_anamnesis_), both in its personal and historical dimensions.14  
  
  
2.  The Period of General Criticism (1951- 1981)  
  
_The New Science of Politics_.  In 1951, Voegelin gave the  
prestigious Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago. These  
lectures were published the following year as _The New Science of  
Politics_. At this point in Voegelin's thought, criticism begins to  
outweigh praise in his published remarks on Schelling. Both the tone  
and substance of these remarks change greatly in the _New Science_.  
Schelling is mentioned only twice: once in relation to Hitler and a  
second time in relation to Hegel. The two citations are related by  
the general theme of gnosticism. The fact that Schelling is not  
exempted from Voegelin's criticism should now come as a surprise,  
given the character of the remarks found in the previous period. The  
fact that Voegelin begins to criticize Schelling for gnosticism may  
also appear as a perplexing development for readers already familiar  
with his later works, where Schelling is eventually credited with  
coining one of the central terms--namely "pneumopathology"--with  
which Voegelin diagnoses gnosticism as a "spiritual disease." In the  
_New Science_, Voegelin criticizes gnostic thinkers as  
"pneumopathological," but he does not call attention to Schelling as  
the one responsible for coining this term.15 He classifies Schelling  
only among the ranks of the spiritually sick. And later readers are  
left to wonder how Schelling could have been a gnostic thinker when  
he was also the one who coined a term central to Voegelin's critique  
of gnosticism. This ambiguity first appears in Voegelin's _New  
Science_, and it remains throughout the rest of his published works.  
  
Given the appreciation of Schelling evident in Voegelin's earlier  
writings, the portrayal given in his _New Science_ is shocking.  
First, Schelling is related to Hitler. In the context of his  
discussion of gnosticism as the general nature of modernity, Voegelin  
writes: "Hitler's millennial prophecy [concerning the Third Reich]  
authentically derives from Joachitic speculation." This remark refers  
to the historical speculation of Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202), for  
whom the order of history was understood as a progression along three  
distinct ages, each governed successively by the Father, Son, and  
Holy Spirit of Christian trinitarian symbolism. Voegelin suggests  
that Hitler's progressivism derives from a distinctively Christian  
type of historiography, albeit one which has been "mediated in  
Germany through the Anabaptist wing of the Reformation and through  
the Johannine Christianity of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling." Note  
well that Schelling is now placed in a direct line of progressivist  
historical speculation that leads right to the comparatively "flat  
and provincial" selfunderstanding of the National Socialists. The  
Third Age of Christian speculation has simply been replaced by the  
_Dritte Reich_, as propagandists are said to have acquired this  
symbol through "dubious literary transfers" from Moeller van den  
Bruck's tract of the same name.16 Voegelin does not explain this  
provocative link in further detail. Instead, he leaves one to wonder  
how these "dubious literary transfers" relate to Hitler's "authentic"  
derivation of a millennial prophecy from a twelfth-century Italian  
monk. More to the point, it is odd that Schelling should be placed in  
this lineage, since scholars are now in a better position to know  
that Voegelin drew explicit distinctions between the historiography  
of Schelling and Joachim, distinctions based on solid exegetical  
grounds, in his "Last Orientation."17  
  
Voegelin does have more to say about the particular character of  
Schelling's gnosticism in the _New Science_. He argues that "gnostic  
experiences" are characterized by "an expansion of the soul to the  
point where God is drawn into the existence of man." People who "fall  
into these experiences" tend to "divinize themselves by substituting  
more massive modes of participation in divinity for faith in the  
Christian sense." It is possible to distinguish "a range of Gnostic  
varieties according to the faculty [of the human soul] which  
predominates in the operation of getting this grip on God."  
Schelling's particular variety of gnosis is described as "primarily  
intellectual" and "contemplative." He is joined explicitly in this  
regard by the company of Hegel.18  Voegelin's brief dismissal of  
Schelling raised no objections from any of his contemporaries. It was  
well in keeping with the conventional understanding of Schelling as  
an "Hegelian" idealist.19  But it is odd nonetheless for Voegelin to  
equate Schelling's thought with Hegelian gnosis. Unlike many of his  
American contemporaries, Voegelin knew and appreciated the works in  
which Schelling was most critical of Hegel. Indeed, they provided  
significant grounds for the celebration of Schelling's philosophical  
achievements in the "Last Orientation." But the attempt to dismiss  
Schelling as a gnostic intellectual in the _New Science_ would seem  
to indicate that Voegelin has changed his mind considerably about  
Schelling. Such is the strong implication, at least, although one  
that is impossible to substantiate further on textual grounds; for  
Voegelin's comments are impressionistic and vague, rather than openly  
exegetical. At most, one can say that he now seems content to dismiss  
Schelling in a conventional way, despite his apparently novel remarks  
on gnosticism.  
  
_Order and History_I-III.   Voegelin reproduces this impression of  
Schelling's gnosticism throughout most of _Order and History_.  
Schelling is not mentioned in the first volume, _Israel and  
Revelation_(1956), but is said to be a gnostic in the second volume,  
_The World of the Polis_(1957). Schelling's _Ages of the World_, a  
relatively early work, is said to contain mythic speculation that  
resembles Cabbalistic and theosophic forms of gnosis. Voegelin makes  
this suggestion in a footnote located in the broader context of his  
distinction between polytheistic and monotheistic types of myth in  
history. "While this is not the place to develop the problem  
further," he writes, "the suggestion may be thrown out that gnostic  
speculation, when it appears as demythization of the world is not an  
unbroken process; there may break through again, in the monotheistic  
phase of religiousness, a desire for remythization on the highest  
level of intellectual speculation. This certainly was the case of  
Schelling's _Weltalter_."20 Voegelin never develops this suggestion  
further, at least with respect to Schelling's own "remythization" of  
philosophy. He says only that Schelling's turn to myth is a  
"reversion" in contrast to Hesiod's comparatively free invention of  
mythic symbols. Within the context of his larger study, this remark  
suggests that Schelling's turn to myth is historically regressive.  
Hesiod was free to write myths about the presence of divinities in  
the world, without being criticized as a gnostic, since he lived  
before the first true experience and symbolization of God's radical  
transcendence from the world, which, according to Voegelin at this  
time, occurs only with the historical advent of Judaeo-Christian  
revelation. But Schelling lived in the Christian era, a time when  
myth is ultimately subordinate to philosophy and revelation as the  
highest expressions of existential truth. Accordingly, Schelling's  
high regard for myth in his _Ages of the World_ could appear to  
Voegelin as a nostalgic return to natural theology, albeit one "on  
the highest level of intellectual speculation," but which nonetheless  
tends to leave Schelling's thought open to the charge of being  
historically pedestrian.  
  
The question of a philosopher's freedom to create mythic symbols  
resurfaces in the third volume of _Order and History_(1957). Voegelin  
writes of Plato's "freedom toward the myth" and Schelling's relative  
lack in this regard. "[Plato] evokes the new myth of the soul; but he  
preserves an ironic tolerance toward the old myth, even in those  
instances where quite probably it has become unintelligible to him,  
because there is a truth in it even if it is no longer quite  
understood."21  Like Hesiod, as one who lived before Judaeo-Christian  
experiences of divine revelation, Plato was free to create mythical  
symbols for human experiences of the divine. Yet, unlike Hesiod,  
Plato is said to have lived during a transitional time in history,  
when philosophy flourishes as a symbolic form between myth and  
revelatory theology. His historical position thus helps him not to  
hold onto particular myths in an improperly literal way:  
  
"Plato knows that one myth can and must supersede the other, but he  
also knows that no other human function, for instance 'reason' or  
'science,' can supersede the myth itself. The myth remains the  
legitimate expression of the fundamental movements of the soul. Only  
in the shelter of the myth can the sectors of the personality that  
are closer to the waking consciousness unfold their potentiality; and  
without the ordering of the whole personality by the truth of the  
myth the secondary intellectual and moral powers would lose their  
direction."22  
  
What may be true of Plato in this summary is certainly true of  
Schelling. It is Schelling, not Plato, for whom the origin and  
historical succession of myths becomes a thematic concern. It is  
Schelling who devotes, throughout his _Philosophy of Mythology_ and  
_Philosophy of Revelation_, explicit attention to elucidating how the  
"sectors of the personality," or potencies (_Potenzen_) of the soul,  
unfold their potentiality in historical succession. Plato does not  
write in this way, at least in his own name. Nonetheless, Voegelin  
has little more than criticism for Schelling in _Order and  
History_III. In contrast to Plato's "freedom toward the myth," he  
accuses Schelling of the supposition that all mysteries of the divine  
may be overcome one day through dialectical philosophy:  
  
"The coincidence that the creator of a myth is at the same time a  
great philosopher who knows what he is doing, as in the case of  
Plato, is unique in the history of mankind. Even in the case of  
Schelling, who ranks next to Plato as a philosopher of the myth, his  
achievement is marred by the gnostic inclination to intellectualize  
the unconscious and to reduce its movements to the formula of a  
dialectical process. Schelling cannot be quite absolved of the charge  
levelled by Irenaeus against the gnostics of the second century A.D.:  
'They open God like a book' and 'They place salvation in the gnosis  
of that which is ineffable majesty.'"23  
  
This is an odd charge to bring against Schelling. Throughout his  
_Philosophy of Mythology_ and _Philosophy of Revelation_, he  
frequently makes a point of distinguishing between the types of  
knowledge that can be conveyed by mythical symbols and Christian  
revelation. He makes his case clearly: myths, which he tends to  
deprecate as pagan, cannot reveal God's "ineffable majesty." Mythic  
symbols can reveal, at most, how the powers or "potencies" of nature  
form the mysterious basis of human consciousness--nothing more and  
nothing less. In other words, a myth can open only the book of  
nature, partially divine though it is, and reveal how it is  
experienced in the human soul. But nature, for Schelling, is not  
simply equivalent to God's "ineffable majesty." Rather, he maintains  
that God's freedom from the world is what constitutes the true  
essence of divinity, since freedom is thought to be more divine than  
necessity, and does not claim that any myth or philosophical system  
can lay bare the transcendental majesty of divine freedom.24  
  
These points could not have escaped Voegelin, since his "Last  
Orientation" study of Schelling's thought reveals that he knew the  
_Philosophy of Mythology_ and _Philosophy of Revelation_ quite well.  
Nonetheless, without reference to either of these works, Voegelin  
continues his critical contrast of Plato and Schelling in an  
important passage from _Order and History_III:  
  
"The difference in the attitudes of the two philosophers is perhaps  
most clearly revealed in Schelling's criticism that Plato had to use  
the myth for expressing the fundamental relations of soul and cosmos  
because dialectical speculation could not yet serve him as the  
instrument for sounding the abyss [_i.e._, of the unconscious ground  
of consciousness]. The criticism characterizes as a shortcoming in  
Plato, though as one that was conditioned by his historical position,  
precisely what we consider his greatest merit, that is, the clear  
separation of the myth from all knowledge that is constituted in acts  
of consciousness intending their objects."25  
  
Aside from being an amplification of the earlier point, it is  
interesting to note here that Voegelin takes no exception to  
Schelling's account of Plato's "historical position." This is because  
Voegelin, like Schelling, thinks that Plato's mythology only  
"prefigures" the superior distinction between divine transcendence  
and cosmological immanence, which is gained only with the advent of  
Judaeo-Christian revelation.26 Yet, when all of these points are  
taken into consideration, Voegelin's interpreters are left to wonder  
how he can truly praise Plato's free use of myth as his "greatest  
merit" when, in tacit agreement with Schelling and other Christian  
historicists, he suggests that Plato's historical position left him  
no other choice but to be free in this way. Voegelin offers no  
textual references pertaining to where he thinks Schelling is guilty  
of interpreting myths in an improper way. In a later essay, however,  
he makes a similar contrast--this time between Platonic and Hegelian  
interpretations of myth--and provides textual references and  
arguments in support of the claim that Hegel improperly transforms  
mythical symbols into the concepts of his objectifying reason.27 This  
point may help to explain Voegelin's curious treatment of Schelling  
in the earlier text. It seems that, in the third volume of _Order and  
History_, he simply continues to conflate the thought of Schelling  
and Hegel in a manner consistent with the conventional understanding  
of these thinkers, at least during the time period of this  
publication.  
  
A final point needs to be considered. Voegelin criticizes Schelling's  
understanding of the significance of myth for philosophy, but he does  
so while continuing to use the distinguishing features of Schelling's  
philosophy of the unconscious. This point can be supported by  
consideration of the broader context in which his critical remarks on  
Schelling have been found. Immediately before his critique of  
Schelling, for example, Voegelin conveys the principles of his own  
philosophy of mythology:  
  
"[T]he conscious subject occupies only a small area in the soul.  
Beyond this area extends the reality of the soul, vast and darkening  
in depth, whose movements reach into the small area that is organized  
as the conscious subject. The movements of the depth reverberate in  
the conscious subject without becoming objects for it. Hence, the  
symbols of the myth, in which reverberations are expressed, can be  
defined as the refraction of the unconscious in the medium of  
objectifying consciousness. . . . Before a philosopher can even start  
to develop a theory of the myth, he must have accepted the reality of  
the unconscious as well as of the relation of every consciousness to  
its own unconscious ground; and he cannot accept it on any other  
terms than its own, that is, on the terms of the myth. Hence, a  
philosophy of the myth must itself be a myth of the soul. That  
ineluctable condition is the chief obstacle to an adequate philosophy  
of the myth in an age in which the anthropomorphic obsession has  
destroyed the reality of man."28  
  
This is an excellent summary of the principles guiding Schelling's  
philosophy of mythology. Voegelin's focus on the unconscious origin  
of mythic symbols, the relation of consciousness to its unconscious  
ground, and the critique of anthropomorphism are all distinctive  
features of Schelling's philosophical interpretation of myth. In his  
"Last Orientation," Voegelin reveals that he is clearly aware that  
these points are thematic concerns in Schelling's thought, but he  
neglects to relate them to Schelling in _Order and History_III.  
Instead, the Schellingian interpretation of myth published in  
"Plato's Egyptian Myth" (1947) is reproduced almost verbatim in  
_Order and History_III, in the pages immediately preceding the  
critical remarks just considered.29  In _Order and History_III,  
however, Voegelin drops the concluding "Note" in which he formerly  
alluded to the Schellingian presuppositions guiding his reading of  
Plato. Criticism replaces here the acknowledgment of dependency from  
the earlier article, but Voegelin's interpretation of Platonic myth  
and its historical position remains the same--that is, Schellingian.  
Thus, critical remarks notwithstanding, it is clear that Voegelin  
continues to draw upon Schelling's philosophy of mythology in his  
interpretation of Platonic myth. But why he does so without reference  
to Schelling in _Order and History_ remains, at present, unclear.  
  
_Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis_.   In 1958, Voegelin left his  
position at Louisiana State University and accepted an offer to  
establish the new Institute for Political Science at Ludwig-  
Maximilian University (Munich). The first major publication resulting  
from this move--_Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis_--appears one year  
later. This text is an expanded version of Voegelin's inaugural  
lecture to the University. He refers to Schelling only once, in a  
passing remark on the gnostic character of Schelling's "philosophy of  
nature" (_Naturphilosophie_). The comment is important, however,  
because it reveals one of Voegelin's principal sources for his  
understanding of Schelling's gnosticism: what he calls the  
"monumental" work of Ferdinand Christian Baur, _Die christliche  
Gnosis, oder die Religions-philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen  
Entwicklung_(1835). In Baur's work, Voegelin contends, "[t]he  
speculation of German idealism is correctly placed in its context in  
the gnostic movement since antiquity."30  Following Baur, Voegelin  
includes a surprisingly broad range of movements and thinkers under  
the heading of "German idealism": Boehme's theosophy, Schelling's  
nature-philosophy, Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith and Hegel's  
philosophy of religion. Yet Voegelin's reliance on Baur is surprising  
in another respect.31  Baur published in 1835, roughly seven years  
before Schelling had completed his _Philosophy of Mythology_ and  
_Philosophy of Revelation_ and publicized these studies in his famous  
Berlin lectures. In these lectures, Schelling delivers a strong  
criticism against idealistic speculation in philosophy, precisely the  
type of thinking he once shared with Fichte and Hegel. Baur knew of  
and discussed only the earliest of Schelling's writings, those in  
which he is indeed more easily classified with "speculative  
gnostics." Accordingly, it is not surprising that Baur's portrayal of  
Schelling drew no criticism from contemporaries to whom only the  
early works were known. But Voegelin's reliance on Baur is surprising  
because he had access to all of Schelling's later writings, and even  
profited from Schelling's critique of idealism in his "Last  
Orientation." Voegelin's decision to use an outdated secondary source  
to support his public dismissal of Schelling remains an inexplicable  
feature of the increasingly odd way that he presents Schelling's  
thought.  
  
By this point in his career, the frequency of Voegelin's critical  
remarks against Schelling may suggest that he has left his guidance  
well behind. But such is not the case. Voegelin continues to use the  
Schellingian adjective _pneumopathischen_ (pneumopathological) in his  
own diagnosis of gnosticism, and he continues to do so without  
reference to Schelling.32  Despite the confusion that stems from this  
practice, however, one point has started to become clear. Voegelin's  
conflicting accounts of Schelling may have much to do with the  
tension that arises between his own, sympathetic reading of  
Schelling's later works and the portrayal of him that he is partially  
compelled to accept from the most respected secondary interpreters at  
the time.  
  
"Religionsersatz."   In 1960, Voegelin published a short essay in  
which he contends that the gnostic massmovements of his time are  
pseudo-religions.33  He refers to Schelling twice in this essay.  
First, in his discussion of "gnostic ideas" that divide history into  
three progressive phases, he says that "Schelling, in his speculation  
on history, distinguished three great phases of Christianity: first  
the Petrine, followed by the Pauline, which will be sealed by the  
Johannine phase of perfect Christianity."34 This brief remark  
immediately follows an equally brief list of three-phase histories  
elaborated by Biondo, Turgot and Comte, Hegel, Marx and Engels--with  
no discussion of differences between any of these intellectuals and  
their systems. This practice is by now typical of the casual manner  
in which Voegelin places Schelling in the company of such dubious  
thinkers as Hitler. A few pages later, however, he acknowledges for  
the first time in print that it was Schelling who coined the term  
"pneumopathology" in order to diagnose the spiritual disease that  
Voegelin calls gnosticism. The remark in question occurs in the  
context where Voegelin wonders why Thomas More would have written his  
_Utopia_, when More himself knew his perfect state to be impossible  
in the world:  
  
"[More's _Utopia_] opens up the problem of the strange, abnormal  
spiritual condition of gnostic thinkers, for which we have not as yet  
developed an adequate terminology in our time. In order, therefore,  
to be able to speak of this phenomenon, it will be advisable to use  
the term 'pneumopathology,' which Schelling coined for this purpose.  
In a case like More's, we may speak, then, of the pneumo-pathological  
condition of a thinker who, in his revolt against the world as it has  
been created by God, arbitrarily omits an element of reality in order  
to create the fantasy of a new world."35  
  
Pneumopathological thinkers arbitrarily deny one aspect or another of  
reality in order to fantasize about new and perfect worlds, which  
they occasionally attempt to build. They are not "realists," to use a  
term that Voegelin employs elsewhere to describe Schelling.36  
  
  
The Problem of "Pneumopathology"  
  
Voegelin's first reference to Schelling's coinage of the term  
"pneumopathology" should have caused him, at least, to question the  
extent of Schelling's gnosticism. Clearly, Schelling could not have  
been so much at variance with reality's order if he was able to  
criticize spiritual sickness in much the same way as Voegelin  
criticizes gnosticism. So how are we to explain this tension in  
Voegelin's reading of Schelling? The task of finding a satisfactory  
answer to this question is greatly complicated by the fact that  
Voegelin does not provide any textual references to any of  
Schelling's works in any of his published writings. This means that  
he provides no references to where Schelling allegedly coined the  
term pneumopathology.37 It is clear that Voegelin first used the term  
in his _History of Political Ideas_(1945), since it appears several  
times in the chapters published from this work under the title _From  
Enlightenment to Revolution_(1975).38  In 1976, Theo Broerson  
wondered about Voegelin's use of pneumopathology and asked him where  
he had found it. Voegelin replied by letter, saying that he could not  
remember exactly where he had found it. He recalls first encountering  
the term some thirty years earlier, during his intensive studies of  
Schelling for the "Last Orientation," but he writes that he is now  
unable to locate it in Schelling's works: "I refer to it only,  
because I do not want to be accused by some Schelling scholar of  
having pinched the term without acknowledging its authorship."39  
  
Working from the published references alone, it is possible to  
determine that the specific term pneumopathology was of more  
importance to Voegelin than it was to Schelling. This is not to say  
that what the term signifies was unimportant to Schelling. On the  
contrary, there are several places in his _Works_ where he discusses  
the problem of "spiritual sickness"--essentially a revolt against  
God's ordering of reality--which Voegelin, at least, calls  
pneumopathology. But Schelling seems to have preferred other terms  
for his description of this condition. For example, as early as 1797  
Schelling writes: "_Mere_ reflection is . . . a spiritual sickness  
[_Geisteskrankheit_] of man."40  These words foreshadow his later  
preoccupation with criticizing German idealism, what he calls  
"negative" or purely "rational" philosophy. To this end, Schelling  
elaborates a philosophy of consciousness that seeks to remind his  
interpreters that life experience always presents us with more than  
can be accounted for by rational systems of philosophy based  
exclusively upon reflective consciousness--what Voegelin eventually  
calls _intentionality_. Schelling also maintains that consciousness  
is always grounded by an unconscious depth over which reflective  
consciousness can exercise no ultimate control. He even wins great  
acclaim from Voegelin, at least in his unpublished "Last  
Orientation," for this account of how consciousness is related to its  
transcendent ground.  
  
In 1810, only three years after the publication of Hegel's  
_Phaenomenologie des Geistes_, Schelling begins to develop his  
critique of purely reflective systems of philosophy. He contends that  
an "illness of the temperament [_Gemuethskrankheit_]" will emerge if  
a proper understanding of relations between human beings and God  
breaks down: "For it is the soul [_viz._, something broader than the  
conscious mind] through which man establishes a rapport with God, and  
no creature, especially no human being, can ever exist without this  
rapport."41 Schelling speaks of a "rapport" here, not of a  
constructed or reflective identity with the divine. According to the  
philosophical anthropology developed in his _Stuttgart Seminars_,  
Schelling would have thought it incorrect to speak of  
psychopathologies (_Seelenkrankheiten_). For he takes the soul to be  
what is most "impersonal" in humanity, and thus closest to the  
divine. Only the spirit or conscious mind (_Geist_) can become ill,  
because it occupies a potentially confusing and volitional,  
middleposition between the soul and its passions. When the human  
spirit turns properly toward the divine ordination of the soul it  
becomes virtuous; when it turns toward the passions--especially  
nostalgia--it becomes vicious or corrupt. Thus, Schelling understands  
"spiritual sickness" as a perversion of the human spirit. In one  
instance, he describes this condition as the "consumption of the  
spirit [_Verzehrung des Geistes_]." This condition may result, for  
example, from excessive reflection on the idea of infinite progress,  
"the most distressing and empty thought of all."42  This  
"consumption" may be closest to what Voegelin has in mind when he  
says that Schelling coined the term pneumopathology in critical  
opposition to "the progressivism of his time."43  But what of the  
specific term? Since Voegelin could not remember where he found it,  
and Schelling discusses equivalent states of spirit with the terms  
_Geisteskrankheit_, _Gemuethskrankheit_ and _Verzehrung des Geistes_,  
it is likely the case that "pneumopathology" is Voegelin's coinage  
for this range of critical terms used by Schelling.  
  
_Anamnesis_.   In the 1966 publication of _Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der  
Geschichte und Politik_, Voegelin's German readers learn for the  
first time of his general agreement with Schelling's process  
theology. Schelling's theology attempts to describe how the same God  
allows himself to be experienced differently by human beings at  
different times in history. Voegelin's understanding of this theology  
is found in passing comments in a letter (dated November 1943) to his  
friend, Alfred Schuetz, the phenomenologist. The letter has been  
published in _Anamnesis_ under the title "On the Theory of  
Consciousness." Even though the references to Schelling are brief,  
they reveal how he helped Voegelin to balance the conflicting aspects  
of Hegel and Kant's thought. More specifically, Schelling helped  
Voegelin to appreciate the enduring legitimacy of "ontological  
speculation" (_Die ontologische Spekulation_), while continuing to  
accept the basic restrictions on human knowledge of divine  
transcendence developed in Kant's critical philosophy. The fact that  
Schelling raised and addressed the fundamental question about the  
universe--"Why is Something, why is there not rather Nothing?"--is  
once again mentioned by Voegelin. Schelling's freedom to ask this  
question indicates to him that something in the human soul is always  
capable of transcending the logical determinations of thought that  
lead to the Kantian antinomies. Voegelin explains:  
  
"Ontological speculation is a legitimate philosophical undertaking,  
founded in precisely describable experiences, which it interprets  
with the means of 'understandable' [_verstehbarer_] categories of  
process. The formalized Something as an alternative to Nothing is a  
correctly formed ontological concept. It is antinomic in Kant's  
sense, but the idealization of reason that leads to the antinomies is  
not 'nonsense' [_Unsinn_], its problems are not 'false problems'  
[_Scheinproblem_]. Schelling's 'Something' is a symbol as much as is  
a logical or cosmological 'infinite,' a symbol justified inasmuch as  
it renders transparent the meditatively experienced real ground of  
being in finite language. . . . Schelling's question is significant  
insofar as it refers to the problem of process in the ground of  
being, the assumption of which seems to me to be an unavoidable  
requirement of system in a consistent interpretation of the  
ontological experience complex."44  
  
Voegelin makes the further claim that process theology  
(_Prozesstheologie_), which he finds particularly in Schelling's  
_Potenzenlehre_, is the "only meaningful systematic philosophy." He  
understands process theology as "a matter of developing a symbolic  
system that seeks to express the relations between consciousness, the  
transcending intraworldly classes of being [Schelling's divine  
potencies (_Potenzen_) of nature], and the worldtranscending ground  
of being [what Schelling refers to as God's transcendent freedom from  
the world]." Process theology expresses these relations "in the  
language of a process constructed as an immanent one." Voegelin  
commends Schelling's process theology for attempting, successfully it  
would seem, to describe experiences of divine transcendence with a  
"comprehensible" language of consciousness accessible "from within"--  
that is, from the concrete experiences of a human soul.45  These  
statements indicate that, already in the early 1940s, Voegelin  
thought of Schelling as a helpful guide beyond certain perceived  
extremes in the thought of Kant and Hegel. The "negative" (rational  
and essential) and "positive" (historical and existential) aspects of  
Schelling's philosophy allow Voegelin to appreciate the insights  
gained by Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_, while avoiding its  
alleged inability to account for the historical aspects of human  
existence. Schelling's _Potenzenlehre_ also allows Voegelin to avoid  
the obfuscation of boundaries between the human and the divine-- for  
example, in Hegel's appeals to "absolute knowledge"--precisely  
because of Schelling's greater ability to provide a reasonable  
account of God's transcendent freedom from the world.  
  
Schelling elaborated the _Potenzenlehre_, his doctrine of divine  
potencies, over several decades in several works, the most important  
being his _Ages of the World_, _Philosophy of Mythology_ and  
_Philosophy of Revelation_. Summarized briefly, the _Potenzenlehre_  
describes all of reality in terms of a tensional process of divine  
powers or potencies, consisting of divine immanence (natural  
necessity) and divine transcendence (freedom) as its fundamental  
poles. This process, according to Schelling, can never be abolished  
by human will or thought. What is more, since reality is experienced  
as a process, it is always said to remain mysterious. God's freedom  
always transcends human understanding and control, Schelling  
maintains, and is properly approached by the interpretation of grace-  
experiences rooted in "faith."46  
  
All of these points return in Voegelin's criticisms of Hegel, who  
allegedly attempted to destroy the intractable mystery of the divine  
in human consciousness. Against Hegel, and in agreement with  
Schelling, Voegelin argues that human beings are akin to the divine,  
but nothing more. He maintains that the knowledge of how we are both  
like and unlike the divine is gained in an historical process of  
divine revelations, but he sees no humanlywilled end to the process  
of history. These points of Schellingian realism become some of the  
consistent features of Voegelin's later thought, but it takes the  
better part of two decades before he again refers favorably to  
Schelling--and only in relatively informal, public talks. The  
publication of _Anamnesis_ marks the last time that Voegelin reveals  
anything significantly new in his appreciation of Schelling's  
thought.  
  
_Order and History_IV.   In _Order and History_IV (1974), Voegelin  
returns to writing primarily for an English audience. His standard  
criticism of Schelling also returns. He reproduces the claim that  
Schelling was a Johannine gnostic, the point first suggested in _The  
New Science of Politics_. By this time, however, Voegelin has  
encountered some resistance to his claim that German idealism, in  
particular, should be understood as a form of gnosis, making claims  
to perfection similar to those found in the ancient gnosis of, say,  
Valentinus. Accordingly, Voegelin finds it necessary to distinguish  
between "the essential core and the variable part of a Gnostic  
system. The essential core," he continues, "is the enterprise of  
returning the pneuma [spirit] of the Beyond through action based on  
knowledge. Moreover, the god of the Beyond to whom the Gnostic  
speculator wants to return must be identical, not with the creatorgod  
but with the god of the creative tension 'before there was a  
cosmos.'"47  Voegelin warns that to exclude German idealism from this  
essential core of gnosticism one "must ignore the fact that the  
modern Gnostics do not appeal to Valentinus or Basilides as their  
ancestors but to the Gospel of John. One must ignore, for instance,  
that Schelling has developed a law of three phases for Christian  
history: The Petrine Christianity was followed by the Pauline of the  
Reformation; and the Pauline will now be followed by the Johannine  
Christianity of the German speculative systems."48  Once again, the  
summary seems to be accurate, and certainly in keeping with generally  
accepted notions of how some German intellectuals carved up history's  
order, but the matter becomes slightly more complicated once we  
return to the texts in which Schelling presents these thoughts.  
  
Schelling's discussion of the three phases of Christianity occurs in  
Lecture XXXVII of his _Philosophy of Revelation_. He says nothing  
about his teaching as a "law" of Christian history that is "now" to  
be fulfilled by "German speculative systems." Rather, he appeals to a  
Johannine phase of Christianity, not as something to be forced into  
existence by the will of a human speculator, but as a _bona fide_  
eschatological symbol, much like Voegelin's own account of the  
historical emergence of "universal humanity," found in the conclusion  
of _Order and History_IV. According to Schelling, Johannine  
Christianity is equivalent to "philosophical religion." It is the  
type of religion that will come about when God brings history as we  
know it to an end, a time when humans will no longer feel the need to  
distinguish between the real and the ideal, the inner and the outer,  
and other such dichotomies. Human consciousness will be reconciled to  
its God. Schelling maintains clearly that this type of religion does  
not yet exist. His appeals to philosophical religion describe his  
hope of being reunited with God beyond history as we know it, nothing  
more and nothing less. He does not say that speculative philosophy  
can bring about this transfigured state of human existence. It will  
have a divine cause and will complete God's work in creation.  
Schelling links the Johannine phase of Christianity with the biblical  
vision of the "new Jerusalem" (Rev. 21:9ff.): "John is the apostle of  
the Church to come, the only truly universal Church; he is the  
apostle of this second and new Jerusalem, which he himself saw  
descending from the heavens."49 Schelling wonders if "Church" is  
still the right word for a divinely transfigured "city of God [_Stadt  
Gottes_]" in which Jews, Pagans and Christians all live united in the  
presence of the divine, that is to say, without needing to  
distinguish themselves along the lines of their former religions. But  
he is clear about when this phase of Christianity is supposed to  
ensue: "[T]he Apostle [John] poses this time as being the end [_das  
Ende_], and even this ultimate being-all-in-all of God [_dieses  
letzte alles in allem Seyn Gottes_] will not be in the manner of a  
pure theism, in the sense of our theists and rationalists; on the  
contrary, it will be a theism which presupposes and contains in  
itself all the path [_i.e._, the history and natural unfolding] of  
God."50 The "function of saint John," in other words, the period of  
Johannine Christianity, "begins with the time of Christ's return,  
therefore with the last time of the Church." Schelling realizes that  
this time has not yet come. "This Church is, to speak truthfully, yet  
still to come [_noch immer zukuenftig_], since until now the two  
elements [Jewish and Pagan] are still discernable."51  
  
These passages indicate that any attempt to find the end of history  
in Schelling's positive philosophy will be questionable indeed. I  
have emphasized the time and transcendent manner in which Schelling  
expects history to end because these and similar points are clearly  
known by Voegelin in his "Last Orientation," ignored in his published  
remarks, and speak against his treatment of Schelling as a modern  
gnostic comparable to Hegel. But what of the God with whom Schelling  
longs to be reunited? Perhaps Schelling's understanding of God is  
consistent with the theology that Voegelin ascribes to gnostics.  
Voegelin's claim that gnostics seek a God who is "identical, not with  
the creator-god but with the god of the creative tension 'before  
there was a cosmos'" recalls the well-known point that ancient  
gnostics despised nature and its god; they sought perfection in a God  
who had nothing to do with the creation of this world. But a  
fundamental point speaks against including Schelling in such company.  
Schelling's early fame arose from his Nature-philosophy  
(_Naturphilosophie_), precisely the style of thinking that also  
contributed to charges against his pantheism. But the gnostics  
alluded to by Voegelin were not pantheists in any sense of the term.  
They acknowledged only the aspect of divinity that completely  
transcends the world. Schelling held nature itself to be divine, not  
an aberration created by a pseudo-divinity. And he maintained this  
view of nature throughout all of his mature works, despite the fact  
that the focus of his thought changed with the 1809 publication of  
his philosophical investigations into the nature of freedom. The  
later Schelling accepted various accounts of nature as fallen. But a  
closer look at his account of the Fall reveals that his thought was  
closer to orthodox Christianity than to gnosticism.  
  
Schelling's account of the Fall is found in Lectures XVI and XVII of  
his _Philosophy of Revelation_. Unlike ancient gnostics, he says that  
God's creation is essentially good, that the tensional powers of  
nature (matter, spirit, and self-consciousness) are unified in the  
beginning and at rest in a divine Sabbath.52  In these claims, he is  
attempting to follow traditional, Christian readings of the seventh  
day of creation in Genesis. He says that God ordained "original man"  
to preserve the unity of divinity and creation, while giving him the  
freedom to accept nature's harmonious tensions, with God as their  
cause, or to rebel against the divine ordination of creation by  
attempting to proclaim humanity as the ultimate cause of all  
things.53  In accordance with traditional readings of Genesis,  
Schelling accepts the notion that humans eventually fall. They do so  
by attempting to arrogate God's freely creative powers to themselves.  
Their fall does not occur all at once. It is a process in which they  
increasingly posit the world "outside God, not simply _praeter_, but  
_extra Deum_"; they begin to think of God's world as the creation of  
their own wills.54 When humanity revolts against God's creation in  
this way it sets in motion a new tensional process, one that causes  
the original unity of God and creation to be divided into divine  
transcendence (the God of conventional theology) and divine immanence  
(the divinities of nature in pagan theologies). Schelling explains  
the consequences of this divide as follows: "between this new  
tension, which survives in human consciousness, and the original one,  
which was in the creation, there is a great difference: the original  
tension was created by the will of God; the second is created by man;  
man has therefore put himself in the place of God and, to speak  
truthfully, in place of the God who was the _cause_ of the tension  
and whom we have called the _Father_. Man usurps in this way the  
rightful majesty of God [_das Majestaetsrecht Gottes_]." The  
specifically Christian elements in Schelling's thought increasingly  
reveal themselves; he claims that "[t]he tension caused by man has  
separated the Son [the demiurgic creator of the world] from the  
Father [the substance of creation]."55  And herein one finds a  
circumscript version of the basic presupposition behind Schelling's  
account of the entire history of the world: True progress in history  
is spiritual; it amounts to the gradual overcoming of the Fall, the  
Son's return to the Father. In other words, history is Christ writ  
large, a drama of salvation in which all of creation shall eventually  
be restored to the Father.56 Thus, it would seem that Schelling's  
gnosticism is not beyond dispute. He understands all of creation,  
before and after the Fall, as an order of divine tensions. The God  
with whom he longs to be reunited is the creator of the originally  
harmonious tensions of nature--the "Son" of Christian theology, the  
one who suffers from human rebellion, not the gnostic god "before  
there was a cosmos." Schelling does not strive to know only the  
transcendental aspect of divinity. He does not indulge in the  
fantastic desire to be anything more than a creature, either now or  
in the transfigured creation toward which he directs his  
eschatological hopes. At least this much can be stated by way of  
reopening the question of Schelling's gnosticism. Further treatment  
of the problem lies beyond the scope of this article.  
  
_From Enlightenment to Revolution_.   In 1975, Voegelin allowed John  
Hallowell to edit and publish considerable portions of his abandoned  
_History of Political Ideas_, under the title _From Enlightenment to  
Revolution_. Schelling is mentioned herein several times, always in a  
favorable light, and is specifically credited with solving the  
problem of phenomenalistic science. With his "_Potenzenlehre_ and the  
philosophy of the unconscious," teachings that interpret both matter  
and spirit as substantial aspects of reality, the All, Schelling  
exposes the superficiality of scientific communities that attempt to  
limit themselves to the discussion of phenomena as though they were  
appearances of nothing substantial. Voegelin also mentions the  
problem of the three-stage philosophies of history, but this time he  
says that they developed "in the wake of Schelling." He distinguishes  
Schelling's progressive historiography from positivist accounts of  
history's necessary march toward a human perfection of humanity:  
  
"The construction of Turgot-Comte was defective because in the  
concept of the third stage [of history] the problem of [natural]  
substance was not shown in a further phase of development, but was  
simply excluded from consideration. If we do not exclude it, but  
conscientiously continue the line of thought initiated in the  
description of the first phase, the question will arise: what becomes  
of the problem of substance once it has passed beyond the stage of  
anthropomorphic symbolism? We know the answer given by Schelling in  
his philosophy of the theogonic process and in the new roles assigned  
to the protodialectic experiences and their dialectical elaboration.  
But we also know Schelling's ultimate dissatisfaction with a type of  
philosophical speculation that is a poor substitute for the forceful  
imagery of mythology, a dissatisfaction that leads him to expound the  
necessity for a new myth of nature. When it comes to the  
symbolization of substances, the myth is a more adequate mode of  
expression than a critical concept which can only clarify our  
experience but cannot incarnate the substance itself."57  
  
This passage, written in the early 1940s, reveals the general tone of  
Voegelin's "Last Orientation." It reveals his early contention that  
Schelling's critical philosophy properly addresses the problem of  
substantial speculation ignored by positivism. Second, and in direct  
contrast to the claims made in _Order and History_III, it reveals  
Voegelin's understanding of Schelling's sensitivity to myth. There is  
no intimation in the preceding passage that Schelling suffered from  
an inclination to "intellectualize the unconscious," reducing its  
manifestations in consciousness to the machinations of a dialectical  
formula. To be sure, Voegelin's willingness to publish these comments  
in 1975 hardly amounts to a retraction of his former criticisms of  
Schelling. But it does reveal that he may have known better than to  
dismiss Schelling in accordance with conventional accounts of his  
idealism. Voegelin continues by stating that a philosopher's response  
to "the destruction of the myth, to the dedivinization  
(_Entgoetterung_) of the world," can take either "contemplative or  
activist" forms. He praises Schelling's contemplative response to the  
destruction of myth by modern science. He finds a similar effort in  
Henri Bergson, whose _Deux sources de la morale et de la religion_ is  
described as having been written "strongly under the influence of  
Schelling." These contemplative responses to the destruction of myth  
are praised in sharp contrast to the "pneumopathology" of activist  
responses in Saint-Simon and Comte.58  Voegelin suggests that the  
contemplative response can best be found "in Schelling's _Philosophie  
der Mythologie und der Offenbarung_," that is to say, his _Philosophy  
of Mythology_ and _Philosophy of Revelation_. No specific references  
are given to these texts, but Voegelin summarizes his understanding  
of their content as follows:  
  
"The spiritual process in which the symbols of myth and dogma are  
created is recovered [by Schelling] from the unconscious through  
_anamnesis_ (recollection), and the symbols actually created in the  
course of human history are interpreted as meaningful phases of the  
theogonic process [_i.e._, process theology], manifesting itself in  
history on rising levels of spiritual consciousness. In this  
contemplative attitude the myth of the past need not be abandoned as  
the aberration of an undeveloped intellect but can be understood as a  
necessary step in the expression of spiritual reality. It can be  
superseded historically but not invalidated in its own place by  
subsequent fuller and more differentiated symbolic expressions."59  
  
This is an excellent summary, both of Schelling's latest  
historiography and of Voegelin's own. It indicates how each thinker  
attempts to balance the discovery of permanent truths in historical  
experience with the considerable changes that also emerge in their  
symbolic expressions. To be more specific, one finds herein the  
Schellingian seeds of Voegelin's notion of experiential and symbolic  
"equivalents" in history, a notion which first appears in  
_Anamnesis_(1966) and is further elaborated in the article,  
"Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History" (1970).  
  
Finally, in _From Enlightenment to Revolution_, Voegelin defends both  
Schelling and Hegel against Bakunin's suggestion that German  
idealists have brought about the same revolution in the intellectual  
world that Napoleon brought about in the socio-political world.  
Voegelin draws a clear line between the "derivative Christianity of  
Hegel and Schelling," on the one hand, and the "revolutionary  
speculation of Bakunin" on the other: "Hegel's and Schelling's  
interpretations of history were contemplative in the sense that the  
understanding of history was for them the most important cathartic  
exercise in clarifying and solidifying their own existence. However  
far their ideas diverged from orthodox, dogmatic Christianity,  
however far they went in the direction of Gnosis, they still remained  
substantially Christian thinkers and were concerned about the order  
of their souls."60 Voegelin's later appraisal of Hegel, as previously  
suggested, diverges widely from these relatively charitable remarks.  
He eventually criticizes Hegelian philosophy, using his favorite  
Schellingian term of critique, as a "pneumopathological" flight from  
the actual world of experience to the imaginary construction of a  
"Second Reality."61  However, Voegelin never develops the same type  
of critique against Schelling. Instead, some of his work begins to  
reveal greater signs of the importance of Schelling to his own  
philosophical development.  
 
 
3.  Acknowledging the Importance of Schelling (1981-1985)  
 
Autobiographical Remarks.   In the last four years of his life,  
Voegelin begins to acknowledge the extent of Schelling's guidance in  
his own philosophical development. He does so in the context of  
autobiographical reflections on his decision, several decades  
earlier, to abandon his projected _History of Political Ideas_.  
Schelling was not mentioned in Voegelin's first published account of  
this decision, in a 1966 Memorial to Alfred Schuetz.62 However, in  
1973, Voegelin discussed Schelling's significance for his work during  
the course of a two-week series of interviews granted to a former  
student, Ellis Sandoz. Most of the comments from these talks were  
then published at various places throughout Sandoz' book, _The  
Voegelinian Revolution_(1981). Voegelin recalls the time when he was  
engaged in the research and writing of his _History of Political  
Ideas_. He says: "While working on the chapter on Schelling, it  
dawned on me that the conception of a history of ideas was an  
ideological deformation of reality. There were no ideas [in history]  
unless there were symbols of immediate _experiences_."63 Schelling's  
role in this insight is somewhat unclear from this remark. It is  
initially uncertain whether Voegelin's realization was brought on by  
insights conveyed through Schelling's works or through his discovery  
of their fundamental errors. Some help in clarifying this ambiguity  
comes in 1983, when Voegelin comments further on the matter. In his  
"Autobiographical Statement At Age Eighty- Two," he says that his  
history of ideas "crashed" when he studied Schelling's philosophy of  
mythology. He describes Schelling as "an intelligent philosopher"--no  
longer as a gnostic intellectual--and recalls how he was affected by  
his studies of Schelling in the mid-1940s: "[W]hen I studied the  
philosophy of the myth, I understood that ideas are nonsense: there  
are no ideas as such and there is no history of ideas; but there is a  
history of experiences which can express themselves in various forms,  
as myths of various types, as philosophical development, theological  
development, and so on. . . So I cashiered that history of ideas,  
which was practically finished in four or five volumes, and started  
reworking it from the standpoint of the problem of the experiences.  
That is how _Order and History_ started."64  This remark indicates  
clearly that Voegelin's re-reading of Schelling had much to do with  
his decision to rework the structure of the largest part of the  
project that eventually became his great work. However, since  
Schelling is only criticized in _Order and History_, it remains  
unclear how Voegelin was able to rework his _History of Political  
Ideas_ on Schellingian grounds, while consistently criticizing the  
man whose thought served as the major catalyst for this  
reorientation. Fortunately, there are more autobiographical comments  
that shed some light on this problem.  
 
After mentioning to Sandoz the role Schelling played in the  
reorientation of his thought, Voegelin relates that it took some time  
before _Order and History_ emerged as we know it. He says: "I would  
characterize the five years between 1945 and 1950 as a period of  
indecision, if not paralysis, in handling the problems that I saw but  
could not intellectually penetrate to my satisfaction. . . . [O]n the  
whole it was a period of theoretical paralysis with mounting problems  
for which I saw no immediate solutions." Voegelin says that his work  
did not stop during this five-year period. Specifically, he recalls  
being elected by his department at Louisiana State University to  
teach courses in Chinese government. This election meant that he had  
to begin learning Chinese and to study Chinese history.65  And these  
studies may well have helped him to overcome his period of  
theoretical paralysis, for they provided him with an opportunity to  
reflect on one of the central problems encountered by Schelling's  
philosophy of history: what Schelling takes to be the relative lack  
of historical development in Chinese symbols.  
  
The cornerstone of Schelling's historiography is his attempt to argue  
that human consciousness differentiates or "unfolds" in a relatively  
homogeneous pattern throughout all civilizations in world history. He  
goes to great lengths to find similar patterns of emerging self  
consciousness in the West, the ancient Near East, and India. He is  
able to show, with varying degrees of success, that mythological  
consciousness begins in all of these civilizations with the  
symbolization of the Sky, the Earth and the Sea--the principal gods  
who exercise a considerable measure of control over human life. He  
also finds that roughly contemporaneous "spiritual crises" occur on  
civilization-wide bases, leading their members to the next phase of  
historical differentiation. Ancient mythologists gradually become  
aware of the role played by their own consciousness in the  
symbolization of various divinities. Their symbols "unfold," or show  
greater signs of self-consciousness, as they begin to reflect on the  
precise nature of differences between humanity and divinity. But  
Schelling is unable to demonstrate that Chinese symbols unfold in  
accordance with the pattern he finds in other civilizations. Chinese  
symbolists seem to retain a compact way of thinking, specifically  
because they do not attain consciousness of world-transcendent  
divinity on their own. This notion is brought to them only much  
later, he argues, by people from the West. Schelling acknowledges the  
problem that this difference in the nature of Chinese symbolism  
presents to his otherwise universal account of emerging consciousness  
in world history, and he attempts to resolve it by using Chinese  
symbolism as a counter- measure against which the unfolding  
civilizations can be understood as having attained higher levels of  
consciousness. But this solution seems to have persuaded no one  
completely, at times not even Schelling himself, and leaves  
unresolved the problem of what appears to be a Eurocentric bias in  
his thoughts on the development of consciousness in world history.  
This problem was certainly one that Voegelin also had to face while  
recasting his philosophy of history on Schellingian grounds, and it  
likely contributed to his period of theoretical paralysis. But the  
full extent to which he might have struggled with such problems,  
because he found them in Schelling, cannot be determined with greater  
precision here. It is a matter that needs to be addressed by further  
scholarship. Suffice it to say, at present, that Voegelin's  
interpretation of Chinese consciousness as a manifestation of a  
separate, "Chinese ecumene"66 bears traces of the same problems  
encountered by Schelling.  
 
_Order and History_V.   On two occasions, in 1969 and 1971, Voegelin  
sent outlines to his publisher for the manuscript of _Order and  
History_ V. Both of these outlines reveal a surprising plan that  
ultimately did not materialize: the "Last Orientation" chapter on  
Schelling from the abandoned _History of Political Ideas_ was to be  
included in the last volume of _Order and History_. This is a most  
interesting point; for Voegelin also says that only stylistic  
revisions were necessary before the chapter could be published.67 Had  
he published this chapter substantially intact, he would have  
overturned the estimation of Schelling given in the preceding volumes  
of _Order and History_. The reasons why he ultimately decided not to  
remain unknown. But this much is clear: Voegelin concludes _Order and  
History_ with one of his most perplexing estimations of Schelling's  
significance in the history of modern philosophy.  
  
Schelling is mentioned only once in the fifth volume of _Order and  
History_. Voegelin writes: "As we know from numerous statements by  
Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schiller,  
the actors of the event," _i.e._, the German revolution in  
consciousness, "interpreted it as the German variant of the general  
revolution that was taking place on the pragmatic level in America,  
France, and the Netherlands (Batavian Republic of 1795). They derived  
the intenseness of their fervor from the sense of participating in a  
world-historic revolution of consciousness."68  This is the last of  
Voegelin's published references to Schelling, now placing him in the  
company of German idealists and blurring the lines more than ever  
between thinkers who were and continue to be distinguished by  
scholarship.69 Once again, Voegelin's comment implies that he accepts  
the once-unquestioned account of Schelling as an Hegelian idealist.  
This impression is reinforced by the volume's editor, Paul  
Caringella, Voegelin's personal secretary at the time. Caringella  
adds a footnote to Voegelin's remark and cites M.H. Abrams' _Natural  
Supernaturalism_ for "representative statements" by Schelling and  
others.70 Abrams' work provides no new grounds for thinking that  
Schelling remained an idealist. It reproduces the conventional  
account of Schelling by focusing its discussion almost exclusively on  
his earliest, most idealistic writings, when he was closely  
associated with Fichte and Hegel. Abrams, like Voegelin in _Order and  
History_, does not distinguish between periods in Schelling's  
philosophical development. Consequently, he neglects to mention that  
Schelling became an important critic of both Fichte and Hegel. As one  
may learn from detailed references in the "Last Orientation,"  
Voegelin knew better than Abrams about Schelling's critique of Hegel,  
even if his reasons for not calling attention to it remain, for the  
moment, unclear.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The subject matter of Voegelin's use (and perhaps transformation) of  
some distinctive traits of Schelling's thought is, of course, too  
complex to treat comprehensively within the confines of a single  
article. Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion has allowed for a  
number of helpful questions to emerge, all of which call for further  
treatment elsewhere. Despite the confusing mix of opinions expressed  
by Voegelin's published remarks on Schelling, one point has become  
quite clear: Voegelin consistently criticizes Schelling only in  
_Order and History_, a project written primarily for an English  
speaking audience, while he offers increasingly sympathetic  
references to him in German publications, articles, and public talks.  
Why is this so? Furthermore, how can one understand Schelling as the  
gnostic thinker targeted by Voegelin's critical remarks, when he also  
appears to have been one of the principal guides for Voegelin's  
critique of gnosticism as a "pneumopathological" disorder? In light  
of this critique, could one sustain the argument that Voegelin's  
philosophical anthropology differs significantly from Schelling's?  
Given that both philosophers attempt to recover what they understand  
to be a generally Platonic account of human existence and a  
mythological sense of order, does Voegelin's understanding of  
_anamnesis_ and the way in which mythological symbols rise to  
articulate speech differ significantly from Schelling's? Finally,  
given Plato's relative lack of concern for what has come to be known  
as the historicity of consciousness, what role might Schelling's  
philosophy of history have played in helping Voegelin to understand  
the historical dimension of philosophical truth?  
  
These questions have arisen from conflicts in Voegelin's published  
remarks on Schelling. Scholars who read nineteenth-century German  
with ease are currently in the best position to respond to these  
questions; for many of the Schellingian texts that Voegelin found to  
be most important for his own philosophical development have yet to  
be translated into English.  
 
 
_Zurueck zu Schelling_!  
 
 
ENDNOTES  
 
1.  Portions of this article have been reprinted from the manuscript  
copy of _Eric Voegelin and the Schelling Renaissance_, by Jerry Day,  
used by permission of the University of Missouri Press.  
 
Standard abbreviations for the works of Voegelin are used throughout  
this article: _Anam._ = _Anamnesis_. Edited and translated by Gerhart  
Niemeyer (Available Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990);  
_Anam.GER_ = _Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und  
Politik_(Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1966); _AR_ =  
_Autobiographical Reflections_. Ellis Sandoz, ed. (Baton Rouge:  
Louisiana State University Press, 1989); _CW_ = _The Collected Works  
of Eric Voegelin_. Edited by Paul Caringella, Juergen Gebhardt,  
Thomas A. Hollweck, Ellis Sandoz. (in 34 volumes) (Available  
Columbia: University of Missouri Press); _FER_ = _From Enlightenment  
to Revolution_. Edited by John H. Hallowell (Durham: Duke University  
Press, 1975). "LO" = "Last Orientation," title of the last completed  
Part of the _History of Political Ideas_, typescript located in the  
Hoover Institution Archives (Stanford University), Voegelin Papers,  
Box 59, folder 7: 126-244; now published in _CW_25: 173-250; _NSP_ =  
_The New Science of Politics_ (University of Chicago Press, 1952);  
_OH_ = _Order and History_ (in five volumes) (Available Columbia:  
University of Missouri Press, 1999). A typical reference to one of  
these volumes might read _OH_V: 22, where the respective numbers  
indicate volume and page: Vol. I. _Israel and Revelation_, 1956, Vol.  
II. _The World of the Polis_, 1957, Vol. III. _Plato and Aristotle_,  
1957, Vol. IV. _The Ecumenic Age_, 1974, Vol. V. _In Search of  
Order_, 1987.  
 
All of Schelling's texts are cited from the following source: _Werke_  
= Schelling's _Saemmtliche Werke_ published by his son, K.F.A.  
Schelling, in 1856 and the following years. The pagination from this  
edition is still retained by most other editions and scholarly  
studies. There are fourteen volumes in this work, divided into two  
Parts (_Abtheilungen_). Thus, a typical reference might read  
_Werke_I,6: 152, where the respective numbers account for Part,  
volume: page. All translations are my own, except where indicated  
otherwise.  
  
2.  _Cf._, Voegelin, _AR_, 1-4. Also see Barry Cooper's Introduction  
to Voegelin's _Political Religions_, T. J. DiNapoli and E. S.  
Easterly III, trans. (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986),  
vi.  
  
3.  _Cf._, Othmar Spann, _Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher  
Grundlage_ (Wien: Gallus-Verlag, 1947). For a list of other works by  
Spann and Schroeter's assessment of the religion-philosophy, see  
William Petropulos, "Eric Voegelin and German Sociology," in  
_Manchester Sociology Occasional Papers_, Peter Halfpenny, ed., 50  
(February, 1998), 3, and notes 9-14.  
  
4.  Voegelin, _CW_2: 150-51, 149. Voegelin is interpreting one of  
Schelling's latest works, the "Historical-critical Introduction" to  
his _Philosophie der Mythologie_, _Werke_II,1: 65 (Manfred Schroeter  
edition with page numbers from the original K. F. A. Schelling  
edition).  
  
5.  Voegelin, _ibid._, 149, 151, 150. Schelling, _ibid._, 207.  
  
6.  _Cf._, _OH_I: 14, 126, 409, 412; _OH_II: 1-14, 18687; _OH_IV: 3,  

5. In these passages Voegelin emphasizes the "inner" origin of  
mythical symbolization and the impossibility of certain cultures  
influencing each other's symbols across vast distances. In doing so,  
he leaves behind a common practice among social scientists, which  
attempts to find socio-economic causes for all hierophanic symbols.  
  
7.  Voegelin, _CW_2: 113.  
  
8.  _Ibid._, 150. Voegelin concludes his 1933 remarks on Schelling by  
noting (_Ibid._, 153 n. 17) that "[t]he significance of Schelling's  
philosophy of mythology for the theory of community is gradually  
becoming clear," for example, in Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of  
Symbolic Forms (1925) and Gerbrand Dekker's work on Schelling's  
return to myth in _Die Rueckwendung zum Mythos: Schellings letzte  
Wandlung_(1930).  
  
9.  Voegelin, _Political Religions_, _op. cit._, 58.  
  
10.  Schelling's most concentrated critique occurs in the "Hegel"  
chapter of _Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_. For summary  
discussions of this critique see Bernard M. G. Reardon, "Schelling's  
Critique of Hegel," _Religious Studies_ 20 (1984): 543- 57; Andrew  
Bowie, "Translator's Introduction," _On the History of Modern  
Philosophy_(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 23-37; and  
Voegelin's "Last Orientation," _CW_25: 213ff.  
  
11.  Voegelin, "Plato's Egyptian Myth," _The Journal of Politics_9/3  
(August, 1947): 307- 24.  
  
12.  _Ibid._, 323, 315, 316.  
  
13.  _Ibid._, 323.  
  
14.  See, for example, Voegelin's sections on "The Anamnetic  
Dialogue" and "Anamnesis and History" in his "Last Orientation,"  
_CW_25: 211-13.  
  
15.  For Voegelin's further uses of the term "pneumopathological,"  
see _NSP_, 139, 169, 186.  
  
16.  Voegelin, _NSP_, 113.  
  
17.  _Cf._, "LO," 231, 233-34, 237.  
  
18.  _NSP_, 124.  
  
19.  For discussion of Schelling's reputation, which arose largely  
from works published in his youth, see Emil L. Fackenheim, _The God  
Within: Kant, Schelling, and Historicity_, John Burbidge, ed.,  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 50-3, 92-3; and Victor  
C. Hayes, "Schelling: Persistent Legends, Improving Image," in _The  
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy_ 3 (1972): 63-73.  
  
20.  Voegelin, _OH_II: 136 n. 2. Schelling develops his own critique  
of theosophy, which nonetheless retains a measured respect for its  
manifestation in Jakob Boehme. Schelling describes Boehme as "a  
miraculous apparition in the history of humanity," words which remind  
us of Voegelin's own summary of Schelling in his "Last Orientation,"  
but Schelling distinguishes the historical and scientific nature of  
his own "positive philosophy" from the thoroughly mystical  
speculation of Boehme. See Schelling's _Philosophie der Offenbarung_,  
_Werke_II,3: 119-26; and the chapter on Boehme and theosophy in _Zur  
Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_. This latter work has been  
translated by Andrew Bowie as _On the History of Modern  
Philosophy_(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. pp.  
164-85.  
  
21.  _OH_III: 191. Voegelin takes the notion that every myth has its  
truth from Plato's _Epinomis_(_Cf._, _OH_I: 11; _OH_III: 191; and  
_CW_12: 93).  
  
22.  _OH_III: 186.  
 
23.  _Ibid._, 193. This criticism, that Schelling tended to  
intellectualize the unconscious depth of the soul, reappears in the  
1970 essay "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History"  
(_Cf._, _CW_12: 130). Schelling himself appears to have sensed the  
potential for this criticism of his philosophy of consciousness. At  
two points in his latest work he qualifies the formula used in his  
historical discussion of tensions between unconscious and conscious  
dimensions of the soul, saying that this language is merely  
hypothetical, a presupposition used to account for the present order  
of consciousness. See Schelling, _Philosophie der Mythologie_,  
_Werke_II,2: 523; and _Philosophie der Offenbarung_, _Werke_II,4: 8.  
  
24.  A similar point, calling attention to God's ineffable majesty,  
is also made in Schelling's _Ages of the World_. Even when the  
historical differentiation of spiritual truth reaches its apex in  
Christian revelation, Schelling argues, "[t]hat highest spirituality  
and ineffability of God cannot be changed into intelligibility and  
comprehensibility, as water was changed into wine at the Galilean  
wedding" (_Die Weltalter_, _Werke_I,8: 256). This statement does not  
indicate limitations pertaining only to Christian symbolizations of  
the divine; it suggests fundamental limitations in theological  
symbolization per se, limitations that must be faced by philosophers  
well beyond the experiences that led to Christian types of faith.  
  
25.  Voegelin, _OH_III: 193-94.  
  
26.  _Ibid._, 92-3, 96, 226-7.  
  
27.  See Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery," _CW_12: 232-33.  
This essay was originally published in 1971 as an extended version of  
a conference paper that was given in 1969.  
  
28.  _OH_III, 192, 193.  
  
29.  _Cf._, _OH_III: 171-80.  
  
30.  Voegelin, _Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis_, (Muenchen: Koesel-  
Verlag, 1959), 9. The English edition consulted is _Science, Politics  
and Gnosticism_, William J. Fitzpatrick, trans., (Washington, D.C.:  
Regnery Gateway, 1990), 3.  
  
31.  This reliance is not simply occasional. It resurfaces later for  
a similar purpose (_Cf._, _OH_V: 53). Voegelin also credits Baur, not  
Schelling, with helping him to understand Hegel as a gnostic  
intellectual (_Cf._, "Response to Professor Altizer" [1975], _CW_12:  
296).  
  
32.  Voegelin, _Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis_, _op. cit._, 47,  
69; English, 36, 57.  
  
33.  Voegelin, "Religionsersatz: Die gnostischen Massenbewegungen  
unserer Zeit," in _Wort und Wahrheit_ 15/1 (1960): 5-18. This essay  
has been translated as "Ersatz Religion: The Gnostic Mass-Movements  
of Our Time" and appended to the English edition of _Science,  
Politics and Gnosticism_.  
  
34.  Voegelin, _Science, Politics and Gnosticism_, _op. cit._, 95.  
  
35.  _Ibid._, 101.  
  
36.  _Cf._, "LO," 199.  
  
37.  Neither are there any references to this term in the following,  
standard referencing sources: the analytical table of contents to  
Schelling's _Werke_, the _Historisches Woerterbuch der Philosophie_,  
and the _Encyclopedia of Philosophy_(Macmillan and Free Press, 1967-  
1972).  
  
38.  _Cf._, _FER_, 117, 259, 263, 276. Schelling is not mentioned as  
the term's author in any of these early references.  
  
39.  Letter from Voegelin to Broerson, dated February 24, 1976 (Eric  
Voegelin Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 8, file 44).  
Voegelin's comments to Broerson have been reproduced by the editors  
of volume 31 of his _Collected Works_(_Cf._, _CW_31: 101 n. 35).  
  
40.  Schelling, _Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur_, _Werke_I,2:  
13.  
  
41.  Schelling, _Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen_, _Werke_I,7: 469. The  
Pfau translation has been used here. See Thomas Pfau, _Idealism and  
the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F.W.J. Schelling_(New York:  
State University of New York Press, 1994), 232.  
  
42.  Schelling, _Philosophie der Offenbarung_, _Werke_II,4: 13.  
  
43.  Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," _CW_12: 278;  
_Anam._, 102.  
  
44.  Voegelin, _Anam.GER_, 53-4; _Anam._, 29- 30.  
  
45.  _Anam.GER_, 50-1; _Anam._, 26-7. My comments in brackets reflect  
the understanding of Schelling's Potenzenlehre that is found in  
Voegelin's "Last Orientation" (_Cf._, _CW_25: 208-09).  
  
46.  Schelling's mature understanding of faith is complex, but its  
central features tend not to depart greatly from Christian orthodoxy.  
See, for example, his discussion of the faith required to interpret  
seriously the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, Resurrection and  
Ascension (_Philosophie der Offenbarung_, _Werke_II,4: 153-221). In  
his "Last Orientation," Voegelin offers a mixed account of  
Schelling's understanding of faith, based mainly on passages from  
relatively early works: _Ueber das Verhaeltnis der bildenden Kuenste  
zu der Natur_, _Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit_ and _System der  
gesamten Philosophie_. On the one hand, Voegelin praises Schelling's  
ability to regain "the existential meaning of faith against the  
decadent Christianity of the enlightened middle class. Faith is not a  
belief that something is true; that was Voltaire's conception of  
faith, and this faith succumbed to the attack of rational and  
historical critique. For Schelling there is no merit in such belief.  
Faith [rather] has to be restored to its original meaning (_fides_)  
as trust and reliance on the divine that excludes all choice." On the  
other hand, Voegelin questions the fleeting nature of the experience  
of grace, the "flash of immanent happiness" that allows for faith,  
which is also said to characterize Schelling's "Promethean"  
understanding of the limitations of faith as a distinctively human  
experience ("LO," 222).  
  
47.  Voegelin, _OH_IV: 20.  
  
48.  _Ibid._, 21.  
  
49.  Schelling, _Philosophie der Offenbarung_, _Werke_II,4: 328.  
  
50.  _Ibid._, 321, 328, 333.  
  
51.  _Ibid._, 331, 327.  
  
52.  _Ibid._, 365.  
  
53.  _Ibid._, 357, 349.  
  
54.  _Ibid._, 352. Schelling has Fichte's ego- based dialectics in  
mind here.  
  
55.  _Ibid._, 366, 371.  
  
56.  _Ibid._, 375ff. Voegelin eventually makes the same claim about  
history ("Immortality: Experience and Symbol" [1967], _CW_12: 78),  
but he does so in the context of a discussion of how Thomas Aquinas  
came to understand the historical Christ as the Lord of all humanity.  
  
57.  Voegelin, _FER_, 115, 116.  
  
58.  _Ibid._, 117. There are several other references to  
"pneumopathology" and "spiritual disease" in this volume (_Cf._, 259,  
263, 276). These references indicate that Voegelin knew of the term  
already in his History of Political Ideas--though, curiously, it does  
not appear in the Schelling chapter of this work.  
  
59.  _Ibid._, 116-17.  
  
60.  Voegelin, _FER_, 197, 199.  
  
61.  _Cf._, Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" (1971), _CW_12:  
236.  
  
62.  _Anam.GER_, 19-20.  
  
63.  Voegelin, quoted in Ellis Sandoz, _The Voegelinian  
Revolution_(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 77.  
This remark is reproduced in _AR_ [1989], 63. Here Voegelin mentions,  
in addition, that the original project for a small textbook also  
"exploded" due to his studies of the ancient Israelite and ancient  
Near Eastern texts that would have to be interpreted in a  
comprehensive study of political order in Western history. Despite  
these other, technical reasons for the collapse of his original  
project, Schelling is increasingly singled out as the major,  
theoretical catalyst for the change in program.  
  
64.  Voegelin, "Autobiographical Statement At Age EightyTwo," _op.  
cit._, 119.  
  
65.  Voegelin, _AR_, 64.  
  
66.  _Cf._, _OH_IV: Chapter 6.  
  
67.  See _CW_28: 241, 243, and 239 (for Voegelin's comment on the  
merely stylistic revisions needed for this chapter). The editors for  
this volume of the _Collected Works_ confirm that the proposed  
chapter on Schelling for the last volume of _Order and History_ was  
indeed the same one from the _History of Political Ideas_(_Cf._,  
_ibid._, xxiv, n. 11).  
  
68.  Voegelin, _OH_V: 50-1.  
  
69.  For example, see Paul Tillich, _Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in  
Schelling's philosophischer Entwicklung_(Guetersloh, 1912);  
_Mysticism and GuiltConsciousness in Schelling's Philosophical  
Development_. Victor Nuovo, trans. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University  
Press, 1974); and _The Construction of the History of Religion in  
Schelling's Positive Philosophy_. Victor Nuovo, trans. (Lewisburg:  
Bucknell University Press, 1974); Othmar Spann,  
_Religionsphilosophie: auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage_(Wien: Gallus-  
Verlag, 1947); Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr., trans. and ed., _The  
Ages of the World_(New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); J.  
Gutman, "Introduction" to _Of Human Freedom_.  J. Gutman, trans.  
(Chicago: Open Court Press, 1936); Walter Schulz, _Die Vollendung des  
deutschen Idealismus in der Spaetphilosophie Schellings_.  2nd Ed.  
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1975 [c. 1955]); X. Tilliette, _Schelling. Une  
philosophie en devenir_(Paris: Vrin, 1970); Victor C. Hayes,  
"Schelling: Persistent Legends, Improving Image," in _The  
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy_ 3 (1972): 6373; Bernard Reardon,  
"Schelling's Critique of Hegel," in _Religious Studies_ 20 (1984):  
543-57; and Emil Fackenheim, _The God Within: Kant, Schelling, and  
Historicity_.  John Burbidge, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto  
Press, 1996 [a collection of essays that were published mainly in the  
1950s]). In recent years, the ability of these earlier authors to  
distinguish Schelling's thought from German idealism has been  
confirmed by Andrew Bowie, "Translator's Introduction," _On the  
History of Modern Philosophy_(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1994); Edward Allen Beach, _The Potencies of God(s): Schelling's  
Philosophy of Mythology_(New York: State University of New York  
Press, 1994); Christian Danz, _Die philosophische Christologie F.W.J.  
Schellings_. Vol. IX, _Schellingiana_(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:  
frommann-holzboog, 1996); Slavoj Zizek, _The Abyss of Freedom_(Ann  
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); and Thomas Pfau,  
_Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F.W.J.  
Schelling_. Thomas Pfau, trans., intro. & ed. (New York: State  
University of New York Press, 1994).  
  
70.  _OH_V: 51 n. 2; M. H. Abrams, _Natural Supernaturalism_, (New  
York: 1971).  
  
        [Download a MSWord version of this article here.]

                    _______________________

                    Bibliography Update #14

                              by

                     Maben Walter Poirier

                    _______________________

NOTE:  There may be some overlap with Geoffrey Price's recently pub-
lished bibliography, at least, as regards entries prior to the year 
2001.

The entries are ordered first by date, then by author's surname, and
finally by title.


                     SUBJECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

               _Secondary sources:  Articles:_

Heilman, Robert Bechtold. "Eric Voegelin: Reminiscences." _The
Southern Review_ (B^aton Rouge, La) XXXII, no. Winter (1996): 147-65.

Allen, Wayne. "Eric Voegelin, Philosopher of Consciousness." _Modern
Age_ XXXIX, no. Spring (1997): 162-5.

Harter, Nathan. "Eric Voegelin on the Authority to Lead." _Modern
Age_ XXXIX, no. Winter (1997): 21-7.

Babin, James. "Eric Voegelin's Recovery of the Remembering Story."
_The Southern Review_ (B^aton Rouge, La) XXXIV, no. 2 (Spring) (1998):
341-66.

Sandoz, Ellis. "Voegelin's Philosophy of History and Human Affairs,
with Particular Attention to _Israel and Revelation_ and Its
Systematic Importance." _Canadian Journal of Political Science_ XXXI,
no. 1 (March 1998): 61-90.

Burchfield, Charles W. "Tensional Language: The Priestly and the
Prophetic." _Modern Age_ XLI, no. 2 (Spring) (1999): 132-40.

McMahon, Robert. "Eric Voegelin's Paradoxes of Consciousness and
Participation." _The Review of Politics_ LXI, no. 1 (Winter) (1999):
117-39.

Nordquest, David A. "Vogelin and Dogmatism: The Case of Natural Law."
_Modern Age_ XLI, no. 1 (Winter) (1999): 32-9.

Russell, Greg. "Hans Morgenthau and Eric Voegelin on the Ethics of
Modernity." _Modern Age_ XLI, no. 3 (Summer) (1999): 230-9.

Mackler, Aaron L. "Universal Being and Ethical Particularity in the
Hebrew Bible: A Jewish Response to Voegelin's _Israel and
Revelation_." _Journal of Religion_ LXXIX, no. 1 (January 1999): 19-
53.

Baird, Marie L. "Eric Voegelin's Vision of Personalism and Emmanuel
Levinas's Ethics of Responsibility: Toward a Post-Holocaust Spiritual
Theology?" _Journal of Religion_ LXXIX, no. 3 (July 1999): 385-403.

Allen, Wayne. "Eric Voegelin on the Genealogy of Race."
_International Philosophical Quarterly_ XXXIX, no. 2 (September
1999): 317-37.

"Eric Voegelin and Voegelin Scholarship." _The Review of Politics_
LXII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 707-830.

Cooper, Barry. "Surveying the Occasional Papers." _The Review of
Politics_ LXII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 727-51.

Henningsen, Manfred. "The Collapse and Retrieval of Meaning." _The
Review of Politics_ LXII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 809-16.

Kromkowski, John A. "History of Political Ideas:  Recovering the Text
and Discovering Eric Voegelin As Teacher." _The Review of Politics_
LXII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 777-93.

Maier, Hans, author., and Jodi Cockerill, ed and tr. "Eric Voegelin
and German Political Science." _The Review of Politics_ LXII, no. 4
(Fall) (2000): 709-26.

Porter, Jene M. "The Birth of Modernity." _The Review of Politics_
LXII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 795-808.

Schmitt, Hans A. "Reflections on Hitler:  A Review Article." _The
Sewanee Review_ CVIII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 639-48.

Syse, Henrik. "Karl Lowith and Eric Voegelin on Christianity and
History." _Modern Age_ XLII, no. 3 (Summer) (2000): 253-62.

Weiss, Gilbert. "Between Gnosis and Anamnesis:  European Perspectives
on Eric Voegelin." _The Review of Politics_ LXII, no. 4 (Fall)
(2000): 753-76.

Heilman, Robert, and Alexander Brock. "Erinnerungen an Eric
Voegelin." _Sinn Und Form: Beitrage Zur Literatur (SuF)_ 53, no. 5
(2001): 623-42.

Henry, Michael D. "Voegelin and Heidegger As Critics of Modernity."
_Modern Age_ 43, no. 2 (Spring) (2001): 118-27.

Opitz, Peter. "'Ordnung Und Geschichte,' Ein Unbekannter Klassiker."
_Sinn Und Form: Beitrage Zur Literatur (SuF)_ 53, no. 5 (2001): 611-
22.

Heilke, Thomas. "From Christendom to Crisis." _The Journal of
Religion_ 81, no. 1 (January 2001): 98-107.

Gerhardt, Volker. "Politik Und Existenz: Eric Voegelins Suche Nach
Der Ordnung in Uns Selbst." _Philosophische-Rundschau_ 48, no. 3
(September 2001): 177-95.

               _Secondary sources:  Books:_

Sandoz, Ellis, and Michael Henry. _The Voegelinian Revolution: A
Biographical Introduction_ (Second Edition). New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 2000.

Day, Jerry. _Eric Voegelin and the Schelling Renaissance: The
Schellingian Orientation in Voegelin's Later Works, 1952-1985_.
Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, forthcoming.

               _Secondary sources:  Reviews:_

Richert, Scott P. Review of _Revolt Against Modernity_, by Ted V.
McAllister. _The Review of Metaphysics_, L (March 1997): 675-6.

Holder, R. Ward, and Marc D. Guerra. Review of _History of Political
Ideas: Vol. IV: Renaissance and Reformation_, by Eric Voegelin. _The
Sixteenth Century Journal_, XXX no. 4 (Winter) (1999): 1181-3.

Heilke, Thomas. Review of _History of Political Ideas: Vol. I:
Hellenism, Rome, and Early Christianity_, by Eric Voegelin. _Journal
of Religion_, LXXIX no. 1 (January 1999): 136-8.

________. Review of _History of Political Ideas: Vol. II:  The Middle
Ages to Aquinas_, by Eric Voegelin. _Journal of Religion_, LXXIX no.
2 (April 1999): 291-2.

________. Review of _The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Vol. V:
Modernity Without Constraint: The Political Religions, The New
Science of Politics, and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism_, by Eric
Voegelin. _Journal of Church and State_, XLII no. 3 (Summer) (2000):
568-9.

Schmitt, Hans A. "Reflections on Hitler:  A Review Article." _The
Sewanee Review_ CVIII, no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 639-48.

               _Tertiary sources:  Articles:_

Burchfield, Charles W. "Tensional Language: The Priestly and the
Prophetic." _Modern Age_ XLI, no. 2 (Spring) (1999): 132-40.

               _Tertiary sources:  Reviews:_

Sills, Clarence F. Jr. Review of _Eric Voegelin and the Good
Society_, by John J. Ranieri. _The Journal of Politics_, LIX
(February 1997): 282-4.

McCarl, Steven R. Review of _Eric Voegelin and the Good Society_, by
John J. Ranieri. _The American Political Science Review_, 91 (March
1997): 177-8.

Richert, Scott P. Review of _Revolt Against Modernity_, by Ted V.
McAllister. _The Review of Metaphysics_, L (March 1997): 675-6.

Minogue, Kenneth. Review of _Eric Voegelin and the Foundations of
Modern Political Science_, by Barry Cooper. _The Times Literary
Supplement_ no. 5047 (December 24, 1999): 10.

Cockerill, Jodi. Review of _Eric Voegelin_, by Thomas W. Heilke. _The
Review of Politics_, LXII no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 817-20.

McAllister, Ted V. Review of _Eric Voegelin and the Foundations of
Modern Political Science_, by Barry Cooper. _The Review of Politics_,
LXII no. 4 (Fall) (2000): 820-3.

Rhodes, James M. Review of _Eric Voegelin and the Foundations of
Modern Political Science_, by Barry Cooper. _The American Political
Science Review_, 94 no. 1 (March 2000): 166-7.

McMylor, Peter. Review of _Consciousness and Transcendence: The
Theology of Eric Voegelin_, by Michael P. Morrissey. _Religion_, XXX
no. 4 (October 2000): 413-4.


                            _____//\_____
                                 \//


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Dr. M.W. Poirier                  | 
Dept. of Political Science        | 
Concordia University              | 
Loyola Campus                     | 
7141 Sherbrooke Street W.         | 
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