VOEGELIN -- RESEARCH NEWS

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Volume IV, No. 6                                         November 1998
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IN THIS ISSUE:  1. Munich Symposium: Postponement

                2. "War and the Crisis of Europe: Early Speeches
                   of Voegelin in the United States 1939-1942.
                   Part II: Democracy and the Individual."



                       ===========================

1. 3rd International Eric-Voegelin-Symposium, University of Munich
   Order and History Volume 1 Part 1
   
   Professsor Dr. Peter Opitz announces that this conference is
   _postponed_.  It will not now take place on 16-17 December as
   planned, but will be rescheduled for a date in June 1999.




2.                   _WAR AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPE_
    _Early speeches of Voegelin in the United States, 1939-1942_
                                                         
               Part II: "Democracy and the Individual"        
  
                          Geoffrey L. Price
                         
     The text that follows, which was too extensive for inclusion in
part I of these transcripts (_Voegelin -- Research News Volume 4 no. 
3, August 1998) is the record of a broadcast entitled "Democracy and 
the Individual", given on radio station NBC-WMAQ, Evanston, Illinois
on 7 July 1939, in the form of an interview.

     This broadcast was one of eight in a series "Democracy in 
Crisis", presented by the Institute of Democracy of Northwestern 
University, as a feature of the University Broadcasting Council in 
Chicago. 

     Both Voegelin's original typescript, and also the transcript of 
the interview in which he was prompted to present the argument 
of this typescript, have been preserved.  There are small but 
significant differences in wording between the two texts, and both 
are transcribed here.



_Democracy and the Individual_                     7-7-39. 
[Typescript]

    What is the role of the individual in a democracy?

    To answer this question we need not go into elaborate definitions 
as to what is  democracy and what it is not, but we just have to 
point at certain institutions which obviously require some action on 
the part of the individual. Our modern democratic system is based on 
the participation of the adult population in the creation of the 
organs of government. The citizens have to vote some of their number 
into government offices, and the some have to be ready to accept such 
office. We consider institutions to be highly democratic when 
practically all adult citizens, male and female, are permitted to 
vote, and when the offices are accessible to every citizen, usually 
with age-qualifications higher than the voting age.

    But, does voting alone make a democracy?

     We should note, however, that voting alone does not make a 
government democratic.  Dictatorial leaders, and not only of our own 
days, have been very skilful in transforming the free democratic 
elective process into a more or less subtle system of one-way voting. 
 They permit the population to vote, but only with yes or no; and woe 
to the man who says no. The actual decision as to who should have an 
office is taken by the group in power.  This system produces a 
practically one hundred percent consent of the people in dictatorial 
countries.  In order to make a voting system democratic it has to be 
complemented by institutions which make it possible for the citizen 
to form an opinion on issues and to make his opinion politically 
effective.  This end is served by the protection of the civil 
liberties, the rights of free speech, press, assembly and petition, 
the right to join a party, or, if the existing parties are not to 
your liking to get together with other people and form a new one. 

     The most delicate problem of democracy is that of the ruling 
class.  No political society can be kept stable when there is a rapid 
turnover in the group of people who govern, and a democracy is no 
exception to this rule.  There has to be a number of men who make 
politics their profession, who set the rules of the game, preserve a 
tradition, and initiate the new-comers and mould them into the 
traditional type.  They must not be a caste but have to regenerate 
themselves continuously from the different strata of society.  A 
delicate texture of social interrelatioins has to link the broad 
democratic basis of the citizens who form opinions with the governing 
group in order to make this group in the sentiment of the people 
truly representative, and at the same time to preserve that element 
of stability and continuity in the governing set which is essential 
for efficient and stable government.

    The problem of a working democracy can, then, be stated in an 
abbreviated form as being: a people, consisting of individuals, 
capable and willing to take an interest in political issues, to form 
well reasoned opinions on them, to take the pains to acquire the 
necessary information, and to make their opinion and will effective 
by choosing representatives; there must be furthermore always a 
sufficient number of individuals who are willing to enter the 
business of government itself and to perform in such a way that the 
regenerative contact with the opinion-forming multitude remains 
undisturbed. 

    The dangers which threaten democracy can be brought on a similar 
formula: a democracy is in danger when the individual citizens are, 
for one reason or another, either incapable or unwilling to be well 
informed, reasoning, arguing, debating citizens forming opinions and 
making them effective by speech, writing, association etc.; or, when 
the citizens do not produce any more out of their midst a sufficient 
number of individuals who are ready to assume political 
responsibility in a democratic temper.  The two dangers are closely 
interrelated.  When the great mass of the people shirk their 
democratic duties, it will be increasingly difficult to have a 
democratic ruling class and democratic leaders, because the reservoir 
from which they can be drawn dwindles down, and the remaining lose 
the resonance in the broad mass of individuals and do not appeal to 
them any more.  The German case is very instructive in this respect.  
Opponents of the regime sometimes create the naive impression that a 
people has been overpowered and stripped of its institutions by a 
minority of cunning devils.  It is sometimes forgotten that long 
before the National Socialists came into power the German democratic 
system had become unworkable because the two anti-democratic parties, 
the Communists and the National Socialists, had a so-called blocking 
majority.  That means, that the two parties held together the 
majority of seats in the Reichstag, and together could and did block 
any governmental action. And this strict anti-democratic majority in 
Parliament was elected by a majority of voters under strictly 
democratic institutions. The majority of German citizens had given 
up, or never obtained, the status of individuals with well-reasoned 
opinions, but preferred instead to have convictions.  To sum up this 
argument: a democracy is in real danger when the individuals do not 
want to be democratic citizens.  The problem of the democracy is, 
therefore, to keep the individuals in a democratic state of mind.

    The following type-study of the situations and motives which may 
change a democratic individual into an individual which prefers 
dictatorship is largely based on the Central European experiences.  I 
think the European developments of the last years are the best 
experimental laboratory a student of social problems can desire - 
even when the state of things may seem undesirable to him.  The 
numerous factors which have combined in Central Europe to turn a 
majority of individuals into anti-democrats have been and are at work 
everywhere in the Western world today.  And when they do not reach a 
combined force which make them a serious danger in the older 
democracies, every single one of them constitutes a danger spot in 
itself which needs special attention.  I shall now try to classify 
the danger spots, because only when they are clearly envisaged, they 
may be attacked singly by proper therapeutic methods - just as the 
dictatorial parties seeing them clearly make use of them in order to 
destroy democracy.

    The classic idea of democracy, as represented e.g. by John Locke, 
or by the ideas underlying the constitution of these United States, 
is the idea of the individual as a reasonable being, having a scope 
of experience covering his personal problems, having sufficient 
intelligence to form an opinion on them, and enough realistic will 
power to advocate and press them.  The social reality at the end of 
the eighteenth century corresponded roughly to these conditions.  
While there was considerable conflict of interests between 
independent farming, plantation farming, industry and banking, the 
situation was such that most of the individuals concerned could 
clearly see what their interest was and form opinions on a desirable 
policy.

    Today, social reality has undergone considerable changes compared 
with the late eighteenth century.  I shall classify at first certain 
external changes in the situation of the individual.

    It is generally recognized that the technological development of 
the industrial revolution has brought into existence vast classes of 
society which were not absent in the earlier period but have 
increased in the last century so enormously that they have changed 
the social structure essentially.  The new classes are in Europe the 
bearers of the anti-democratic revolution; they are the industrial 
workers and the lower middle-classes.  The significant point in 
question is that they cannot make an independent living as producers 
or professional men, as e.g. a small farmer, but are dependent for 
their working possibility on large technical establishments or 
organizations which offer them jobs.  The large industrial plant or 
the big business have taken the destiny of the modern working 
individual to a large extent out of his hands.  He is dependent for 
his job on human decisions on which he has practically no influence 
whatever.  The success or failure of an individual who runs his own 
business in a small way could be attributed formerly either to him 
personally or to circumstances beyond his control which, however, as 
e.g. a bad harvest could not be attributed to action of another 
individual.  When a modern factory closes down and the workers lose 
their jobs, there is always the possibility to attribute the 
disaster, rightly or wrongly, to a failure in management.  The 
situation of the dependent job-holder has on the one side become more 
exposed, and in addition a misfortune has received the unpleasant 
colour of being due to somebody's action. It is not ideologically 
inevitable, but "something could be done about it". This type of 
dependence of the individual has permeated modern industrial 
societies to such a degree that practically the greater part of a 
nation finds itself in it.  The industrial worker is the most obvious 
case, the clerical employee another one; but in the same category 
fall all employees of modern private and public administrations, the 
job-holder of a trust company, as well as the street-car conductor or 
the civil servant.  And with the increasing government interference 
in economic matters through protective tariffs, price regulations, 
subventions etc., the producer classes, industrial and agricultural, 
are drifting at a rapid pace in the same direction.  This structure 
of modern society has been called by European political scientists 
the specifically totalitarian structure; meaning a structure which 
puts the control of the economic existence of the individuals into 
comparatively few hands.  This structure touches not only the money-
earning capacity of the individual, but, at least for the urban 
population, every detail of the private life.  Men are dependent for 
their supply of gas, water, electric current, fuel, etc., on 
centralized agencies.  And an outstanding theorist of totalitarian 
possibilities has already visions of future control over discontented 
or reluctant people by cutting whole sections of the people from the 
supplies on which they are dependent.  The general effect of this 
structural change may be summed up as to be a serious diminution, a 
narrowing down of the personal sphere of the individual; the 
individual todayis not as much of an individual as it was one hundred 
and fifty years ago; large sections of his realm have become 
socialized.  

    The internal, psychological situation of the individual has 
changed correspondingly.  The great modern organization require[s] 
less of personal responsibility and initiative, and more of 
discipline and exactness in obeying orders.  Political thinkers have 
early become aware of these new psychic forces of modern society and 
have set their hope on them for a reconstruction of an increasingly 
difficult democratic situation in a totalitarian direction.  The most 
obvious instances of the new disciplines have been the modern armies, 
based on general national conscription.  The Franco-Prussian War of 
1870 has given rise, for the first time, to ideas of national 
regeneration, not in terms of new initiative, but of new discipline.  
Ernest Renan greatly admired the discipline of the Prussian army and 
flirted with the hope of similar achievements in France. The Russo-
Japanese war had the same effect on Italian political thought; 
Corradini's idea of regeneration by national discipline was inspired 
by the success of the Japanese army.  About the same time, the French 
syndicalist philosopher Georges Sorel built his hope on [sc. for] the 
future of the labour movement on the discipline to which the 
industrial worker has to submit in his factory.

    While the hierarchical element in modern organizations makes for 
new forces of discipline and collective submissive action, the 
general feature of dependence creates a feeling of exposure and non-
participation in realistic, responsible action which produced a 
peculiar belief in the redeeming power of the planful activity of 
vast comprehensive organizations in general.  We are living in a 
period which may be styled a period of plan-mysticism. The Russian 5-
year plan, the German 4-year plan, the French 3-year plan, are the 
outstanding examples of the belief in collective solution of problems 
by centralized planning activity.  The German and Russian plans, at 
least, are not supposed to end with the periods indicated in their 
names, but are permanent plan-institutions.  The "plan" has become in 
the minds of millions of people the solution of their existential 
problems.  Not a plan made by themselves, but a plan made by somebody 
else.

    The attitude of submission to a plan is facilitated by the fact 
that the complications of modern economic problems have far outgrown 
the intellectual possibilities of the average citizen.  The mass of 
individuals is not in a position to participated with their 
understanding in the public problems which affect so intimately their 
personal affairs.  The combined effect of these internal factors - 
the new discipline, the mystical belief in collective planning, the 
impossibility to participate intellectually in the daily problems - 
is a kind of destruction of the rational active personality.  The 
realistic element in the life of a man has dwindled down the the 
small duties of his job, to a number of family affairs, to activities 
of his leisure hours.  The larger part of his personality is 
unoccupied realistically, and is exposed, therefore, to day-dreaming, 
emotional reaction, neurotic deviation, etc.  

    The general correctness of this analysis can be demonstrated by 
glancing over the social groups which in Central Europe are most 
inclined to become totalitarian, and the others who are not.  
Typically totalitarian and anti-democratic have proved to be the 
lower ranks in organized society: post officials, railroad-officials, 
lower and middle ranks of the civil service and of private employees, 
and school teachers.  Another typical group is furnished by the 
applied sciences: such as engineers, physicians, veterinarians, 
dentists, chemists, graduates from agricultural colleges.  They are 
not intellectually active scientists, but are trained in professions 
which teach them what to do about things.  They hugely enjoy doing 
things and are typically in favour of men who tell them that they 
will become active and stop a messy situation by doing something 
about it.  They are the ideal human material to submit to a political 
organizer.  They are happily joined by groups who are democratically 
indifferent because they lead a life of discipline, such as army 
officers; and by classes which are in economic danger-positions such 
as small craftsmen, unemployed youth, and - in Central Europe, by 
dissatisfied middle-class groups who have lost their economic 
position in the post-War inflation.

    Equally interesting are the centres of resistance.  They are 
represented to a large extent by the peasant population insofar as 
they can still make a comparatively independent living and do not 
like too much regimentation; partly because they peasant has stronger 
church-affiliations and the Christian personality idea does not very 
well agree with collectivism.  This brings us to the Churches as 
great centres of resistance - the Catholic as well as the Protestant 
where they still are firmly rooted.  It is well worth noting that the 
European countries who are least afraid of anti-democratic movements 
are Holland and Switzerland, the two countries of strong religious 
culture.  And, finally, the industrial workers have been rather 
reluctant, not because they dislike collective society but because 
they believe already in another brand of it.

    When the experience of exposure and insecurity destroys the 
personality power of the individual, the social institutions have to 
be shaped in such a way that a modicum of security is restored to the 
individual.  The details need not concern us here, the general type 
of measures are well known: insurance against disease, temporary 
unemployment, old-age infirmity, etc.; relative job security; 
safeguards against abuse of job-security; governmental interference 
in the economic system.

    An important [sc. step] in this direction will have partly as its 
cause, partly as its effect, a change in the general outlook on 
politics.  Once it is realized, that the standard of living is not 
the most important problem in human life, but that security of status 
comes first, the greater percentage of all problems which are 
political today will be reduced to the emotional insignificance of 
technical details which can and have to be worked out by 
administrative experts, such as the actual wage level, price level, 
rate of accumulation of capital, etc.  

    This basic change of the institutional structure, while restoring 
status and security, will at the same time relieve the individual 
from taking a stand concerning economic measures which he does not 
understand anyway.  The representative institution should have the 
function of outlining and debating policies and making laws which 
concern the ethical structure of society, such as civil and criminal 
laws, as they did in the middle of the nineteenth century, while the 
factual basis for the outline of policies and the technical detail of 
working them out has to be left to the experts in the administration. 


                               Interview


DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS
Friday, July 7, 1939
5.00 - 5.15 P.M. (CDST)
NBC-WMAQ

                          DR. ERICH VOEGELIN

                    Department of Government at Harvard University
                    Former Professor of Political Science, 
                        University  of Vienna

WHEATLEY: (OPENING): What is your job and my job in making our 
democracy work? Dr Erich Voegelin of the Department of Government at 
Harvard University, formerly Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Vienna, and visiting professor of the Institute of 
Democracy at Northwestern University, will discuss the role of the 
individual in a democracy.  Dr. Voegelin speaks with us in the series 
"Democracy in Crisis", which is presented by Northwestern in 
cooperation with the University Broadcasting Council and the National 
Broadcasting Company.

    Dr. Voegelin, what is the "individual" in a democracy ?

VOEGELIN: In a modern democracy like these United States the 
underlying idea of the individual is that he is a reasonable being, 
having a scope of experience covering his personal problems, having 
sufficient intelligence to form an opinion on them, and enough 
realistic will power to advocate and champion them.  The social 
reality in the eighteenth century corresponded roughly to these 
conditions.  There was considerable conflict of interest between 
independent farming, plantation farming, industry and banking to be 
sure, but the situation was such that most of the individuals 
concerned could clearly see what their interests were and formed 
opinions on a desirable policy to achieve their goals.

WHEATLEY: Much simpler than the world situation today.

VOEGELIN: Certainly. _Today_ social reality has undergone 
considerable changes when compared with the late eighteenth century. 
The technological development of the Industrial Revolution has 
brought into existence vast classes of society which although not 
absent in the earlier period, have increased in the last century so 
enormously that they have changed the entire social structure.  These 
new classes are in Europe the bearers of the anti-democratic 
revolution; they are the industrial workers and the lower middle 
classes.  The significant point is that they cannot make an 
independent living as producers - such as small farmers - or as 
professional men, and so on, but are dependent on large technical 
establishments or organizations for their jobs.  The large industrial 
plant, or the big business or banking enterprise have taken the 
destiny of the modern working individual to a large extent out of his 
own hands.  He is dependent for his job on human decisions on which 
he has practically no influence.  Formerly the success or failure of 
an individual who ran his business in a small way could be attributed 
either to him personally or to circumstances beyond his control.  But 
when a modern factory closes down and the workers lose their jobs, 
there is always the possibility that the disaster may be blamed 
rightly or wrongly on the failure of management.  The misfortune has 
received the unpleasant colour of being due to the action of a 
responsible person.  The greater part of a modern nation finds itself 
in this dependent position. The industrial worker is the most obvious 
case, the clerical employee another; but all employees of modern 
private and public administration - the job-holder of a trust 
company, as well as the street-car conductor or the civil servant, 
are in the same situation. And with the increasing government 
interference in economic matters through protective tariffs, price 
regulations, and such, the producer classes, industrial and 
agricultural, and drifting at a rapid pace in the same direction.  
This structure of modern society has been called by European 
political scientists the specifically totalitarian structure; meaning 
a structure which puts the control of the economic existence of the 
individuals into comparatively few hands.  This structure touches no 
only the money-earning capacity of the individual, but, at least for 
the city population, every detail of the private life.  Men are 
dependent for their supply of gas, water, electricity, fuel, etc., on 
centralised agencies.  And an outstanding theorist of totalitarian 
possibilities already has visions of future control over discontented 
or reluctant people by cutting off whole sections of the population 
from these supplies.  The general effect of this structural change 
may be summed up as a narrowing down of the personal sphere of the 
individual; the individual today is not as much of an individual as 
he was 150 years ago; large sections of his realm have become 
socialized. 

WHEATLEY: This external change has altered the internal life of the 
individual too, has not it, Dr. Voegelin?

VOEGELIN: Yes, the psychological situation of the individual has 
changed correspondingly.  The great modern organizations require less 
personal responsibility and initiative, and more discipline and 
exactness in obeying orders.  Political thinkers have early become 
aware of these new psychic forces of modern society and have hopes of 
reconstructing the democratic situation in a totalitarian direction, 
that is, in the direction of discipline. The most obvious instances 
of this trend are seen in the modern armies, based on general 
national conscription. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 gave rise, for 
the first time, in France, to ideas of national regeneration, not in 
terms of new initiative, but of new discipline.  Similar ideas 
developed in Italy under the impression of the Russo-Japanese war.  
At the same time the French syndicalist philosopher, Georges Sorel, 
built his hope for the future of the labour movement on the 
discipline to which the industrial worker has to submit in his 
factory.

WHEATLEY: Dr. Voegelin, do you think this development is desirable, 
or not?

VOEGELIN: Although new forces of discipline and collective obedience 
exist, there is also a feeling of exposure and non-participation in 
realistic, responsible action. This dwindling of faith in individual 
effectiveness produces a peculiar belief in the redeeming power of 
the planful activity of vast comprehensive organizations in general.  
We are living in what may be called a period of plan-mysticism.  The 
Russian five-year plan, the German four-year plan, the French three-
year plan, are the outstanding examples of the belief in collective 
solution of problems by centralized planning activity.  The German 
and Russian plans, at least, are not supposed to end with the periods 
indicated in their names, but are permanent plan-institutions. The 
"plan" has become in the minds of millions of people the solution of 
their problem of existence.  Not a plan made by themselves, but a 
plan made by somebody else.

WHEATLEY: Why this blind, unreasoning belief in plans, Dr. Voegelin?

VOEGELIN: One reason is that the complexities of modern economic 
problems have far outgrown the intellectual possibilities of the 
average citizen. Individuals are not able to participate in the 
public problems which affect so intimately their personal affairs.  
The combined effect of these internal factors - _the new discipline_, 
the _mystical belief in collective planning_, the _impossibility to 
participate intellectually in the daily problems_ is a kind of 
destruction of the reasoning and acting personality. The realistic 
element in the life of a man has dwindled down to the small duties of 
his job, to a number of family affairs, to activities of his leisure 
hours.  The larger part of his personality is not occupied 
realistically, and so is exposed, to day-dreaming, emotional 
reaction, neurotic behaviour and other similar psychological 
responses.  

WHEATLEY: What is the evidence for this observation, Dr. Voegelin?

VOEGELIN: Look at Central Europe - at the people most inclined to 
become totalitarian in their outlook, and the others who are not.  
The lower ranks in organized society in Europe - post-office 
officials, railroad-officials, lower and middle ranks of the civil 
service and of private employees, school-teachers - have proved to be 
typically totalitarian and anti-democratic.  Another typical group is 
in the applied sciences - engineers, physicians, veterinarians, 
dentists, chemists, graduates from agricultural colleges.  They are 
not intellectual active scientists, but are trained in professions 
which teach them what to do about things.  They enjoy doing things, 
and are typically in favour of men who tell them that they will 
become active, and stop a messy situation by doing something about 
it.  They are the ideal human material to submit to a political 
organizer.  And they are happily joined by groups who are 
democratically indifferent because they _already_ live a life of 
discipline - army officers, and classes which are in economic danger-
spots, such as small craftsmen, unemployed youth - and - in Central 
Europe - by dissatisfied middle-class groups who have lost their 
economic position in the post-War inflation.

WHEATLEY: Where are the centers of resistance, Dr. Voegelin?

VOEGELIN: In several areas. One, in the peasant population, insofar 
as they can still make a comparatively independent living, and do not 
like too much regimentation.  This is due partly to the peasant's 
stronger church-affiliations.  The Christian personality ideas does 
not very well agree with collectivism. This brings us to the Churches 
as great centers of resistance - the Catholic as well as the 
Protestant, where they are still firmly rooted.  It is well worth 
noting that the European countries who are least afraid of anti-
democratic movements are Holland and Switzerland, the two countries 
of strong Calvinistic religious tradition.  Finally, the industrial 
workers have resisted this totalitarian trend, not because they 
_dislike_ collective society, but because they already believe in a 
_different brand_ of it.

WHEATLEY: Seeing the dangers, means seeing the remedies.

VOEGELIN: Yes. When the experience of exposure and insecurity 
destroys the personality power of the individual, the social 
institutions have to be shaped in such a way that some measure of 
security is restored to the individual.  The details need not concern 
us here, the general type of measures are well known: insurance 
against disease, temporary unemployment, old-age infirmity, etc. On 
the other hand, the individual needs relative job security; 
safeguards against _abuse_ of job-_security_, and governmental 
interference in the economic system.

WHEATLEY: If these can be provided, and made to work - what then?

VOEGELIN: A change in the general outlook on politics will result. 
Once it is realized, that the _standard_ of living is not the most 
important problem in human life, but that _security_ of status comes 
first, the greater percentage of all problems which are political 
today will be reduced to the emotional insignificance of technical 
details. These details can and should be worked out by administrative 
experts - such details as the wage level, price level, rate of 
accumulation of capital, and so on. This basic change of the 
institutional structure, while restoring security, will at the same 
time relieve the individual from taking a stand concerning economic 
measures which he does not understand anyway.  The institutions in a 
Democracy, to which the people elect their representatives, would 
have the function of outlining and debating policies and making laws 
which concern the ethical structure of society, such as civil and 
criminal laws. This procedure was followed in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Meanwhile the factual basis for the outline of 
policies and the technical detail of working them out has to be left 
to the technical _experts_ in the administration.  

WHEATLEY: But, Dr. Voegelin, experts disagree amongst themselves, and 
are not infallible in carrying out their ideas.

VOEGELIN: I do not think that the experts will do a perfect job.  
They will make mistakes which probably will cost the nation billions. 
 But private enterprise is not wholly constructive either but also 
probably wastes billions of social wealth by bad or speculative 
investment, bad financing techniques, bad management.  And I do not 
see why the destruction of social wealth should be a privilege of 
private individuals; let government experts have a hand at it, too.  
Anyway, it will be the price which has to be paid for creating a 
society with security of status for the individual. 

WHEATLEY: Will this structure of Democracy really give the individual 
this responsible activity you have suggested that he needs?

VOEGELIN: Yes, indeed. Within the general framework of comparative 
safety, there is ample room for public problems which can keep a 
democracy busy and the individual active. Nobody can predict them in 
details but they will arise, as they have always done in the history 
of mankind, out of the basic attitude of individuals towards life.  
When this attitude exhausts itself in the search for pleasure the 
public life will be rotten, there will not be much of a democracy and 
that not for long.  When the attitude is religiously well-founded, 
the implications of a basic creed will furnish a wealth of problems 
concerning the organization of social life.  I have mentioned that 
the European countries of strong, extensive, unified religious 
culture are fairly safe against anti-democratic movements.  But that 
is a problem beyond the control of human organizational power.  The 
Spirit of the Lord blows where it will; let us hope that it blows at 
the right time and in the right direction.

WHEATLEY: Dr. Voegelin, would you recommend some reading on the role 
of the individual in a democracy?

VOEGELIN: Yes, I would like to suggest several books which will 
reveal the precarious situation of the individual in the period of 
suspense between democracy and dictatorship: 
Konrad Helden's _A History of National Socialism_; _Dictators and 
Democracy_ by Calvin Bryce Hoover, also Mr. Hoover's _Germany Enters 
the Third Reich_ and Hermann Rauschning's _The Revolution of 
Nihilism_, soon to be published in English.

WHEATLEY: Thank you Dr. Voegelin. [Broadcast continuity follows]
 

                              _____/\\_____
                                   \\/


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---------   Archive Address:  vax2.concordia.ca/~vorenews   ----------
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Dr. M.W. Poirier                  | Dr. Geoffrey L. Price
Dept. of Political Science        | Dept. of Religions and Theology
Concordia University              | University of Manchester
Loyola Campus                     | MANCHESTER M13 9PL
7141 Sherbrooke Street W.         | United Kingdom
MONTREAL, Quebec                  |
H4B 1R6                           |
E-Mail: poirmw@Vax2.Concordia.Ca  | E-Mail: g.price@manchester.ac.uk
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