Volume III, No. 1                                        February 1997

In this issue:  1.  A review of Michael Franz's work _Eric Voegelin 
                and the Politics of Spiritual Revolt:  The Roots of 
                Modern Ideology_ by Eugene Webb.

                2.  A Voegelin lecture outline from November 1962.

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Item Number 1.

Review of Michael Franz, _Eric Voegelin and the Politics of Spiritual
Revolt: The Roots of Modern Ideology_ by Eugene Webb, University of

In almost every area of thought and political life we are now feeling the
effects of the end of the Cold War.  This is clearly the greatest change
to have taken place since the end of the First World War, and it calls
for a rethinking of many of our basic orientations.  We find ourselves
transplanted from a world centered on the military confrontation of the
two superpowers and the clash of the ideologies that inspired and sup-
ported them to one in which it is a real question whether there can be
any effective center at all.  Scarcely any area of thought does not feel
the pressure of this fundamental shift.  The thought of Eric Voegelin may
offer us valuable assistance in reorienting ourselves in the new decen-
tered world we are all trying to find our bearings in, but it will also
find itself confronted with questions about how it can best play a help-
ful role in a world as strange to it as to the rest of us.

From the present vantage point Voegelin must seem very much a voice of
the Cold War era.  Some of his works (such as _Science, Politics, and
Gnosticism_, for example) would be scarcely imaginable outside it.  But
there are also aspects of his thought that transcend that context alto-
gether and even seem to speak especially to our situation today.  Of
particular pertinence is his focus on human spiritual universality,
especially in his later work, with its shift from what in _The Ecumenic
Age_ he called a "unilinear history," culminating in the centrality of
the West, to a  "disturbingly diversified field of spiritual centers," "a
plurality of centers of meaning in the field of history" (pp. 3, 7).

Michael Franz's brilliant new study, _Eric Voegelin and the Politics of
Spiritual Revolt: The Roots of Modern Ideology_ (Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1992, $27.50) would be of interest quite apart from its
bearing on these questions (and the questions themselves could lead to a
discussion of much broader scope than Franz's book tries to undertake),
but it _is_ relevant to them.  I would like in what follows first to
sketch the main lines of Franz's analysis of Voegelin and then to make
some connections between that and the larger question of how Voegelin
needs to be reread and reassessed today.

The problem Franz sets out to explore is the validity of Voegelin's
interpretation of historical movements of "spiritual revolt"--especially
the question of their continuity and its basis.  He begins with the idea
that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been an "age of ideo-
logy," that is, one characterized by the rise of political mass movements
based on intellectual systems.  (He lists Hegelianism, Marxism, fascism,
progressivism, and positivism as examples.)  These cannot be entirely
explained, says Franz, in terms of particular historical conditions
special to the late  modern period.  Nor are the phenomena associated
with such movements exclusively modern.  Norman Cohn's _Pursuit of the
Millennium_ shows similar phenomena in the Middle Ages.  Voegelin traced
them back even further, to antiquity, and interprets them as reactions
not to particular circumstances but to the human condition itself, which
he saw as universally characterized by a sense of imperfection longing
for fulfillment.  Ideological consciousness, that is, is a modern variant
of the "closed" or "pneumapathological" consciousness that can be found
throughout history from the time of the rise of the great universal
religions, which, as Franz explains, Voegelin believed exacerbated the
fundamental human experience of "existential tension" that, in its dis-
ordered expressions, can give rise to unrealistic hopes for relief from
that tension through a radical transformation of the world.  It is this
philosophical insight that Franz thinks was Voegelin's major contribu-

At the same time, however, he thinks Voegelin's analysis of particular
phenomena and their historical continuity are more vulnerable to criti-
cism than his philosophical conception.  Much of Voegelin's work was
devoted to arguing that there is a basic equivalence between the ancient
expression of this sort of unrealistic hope in various types of apocalyp-
ticism or "parousiasm" (the hope that divine presence will enter the
world massively and transform it altogether) and the mass movements that
have so disturbed the modern world.  Franz finds that argument both
profoundly true and at the same time problematic.  It is problematic when
it argues for actual influence leading from one thinker to another. 
Voegelin traced a line running from ancient Gnosticism through Joachim of
Fiore and then through Thomas Muntzer, the contemporary of Martin Luther
who tried to lead the Reformation in the direction of a political revolu-
tion of the peasantry in Germany against the nobility, and from all of
these to such modern ideologists of world transformation as Marx, Auguste
Comte, the Nazis and others.  Franz suggests that Voegelin's argument is
at its weakest when it tries to claim direct historical connections be-
tween such figures and ancient Gnosticism, since the evidence is
inherently questionable and since Voegelin himself made little effort to
marshal it carefully.  

"Despite the importance of the concept of gnosticism in his work," says
Franz, "Voegelin's discussions of the historical Gnostics and their
writings do not amount to more than a few pages.  Later in life Voegelin
attributed great importance to magic, hermeticism, and alchemy, and yet
he provided virtually no explicit treatment of these traditions or of
their specific points of connection to modern ideology."  Similarly,
Voegelin's discussion of "metastatic faith" (belief in direct divine
intervention in historical affairs) is developed from a discussion only
of the prophet Isaiah's demand that King Ahaz place his trust in Yahweh
rather than  in military preparations for the clash with the Northern
Kingdom and Syria (see _Israel and Revelation_, p. 477).  Voegelin does
less, Franz also points out, than Norman Cohn in linking radical Puritans
to modern political movements.  Generally he questions whether Voegelin
ever succeeded in actually showing the connection he claims between sci-
entism and gnosticism, hermeticism, alchemy, and sorcery.  On this point,
he concludes that "those who may wish to establish connections between
modern ideological consciousness and specific traditions from the past
will discover not only that they must move beyond Voegelin's accounts to
the original sources, but that they must also go beyond the materials
mentioned by him."  (He mentions David Walsh, Robert G. Waite, and
Stephen A. McKnight as some working in the Voegelinian tradition who do

Franz's own suggestion for a better approach is that "one can do much
more in the way of corroborating Voegelin's basic thesis if the analysis
is conducted at the level of patterns in consciousness than at the level
of specific traditions and movements in history."  Or as he puts it in
another place, "the key to the discovery and confirmation of continuities
in the history of disordered consciousness is to find such continuities
at the level of experience rather than literary expression"--the experi-
ences in question being those "of contingency, uncertainty, and aliena-
tion, along with the corresponding longings for absoluteness, final cer-
tainty, and control."  "It is the hubristic revolt against the human
condition and the will to power in a transfigured reality," says Franz,
"that unite modern ideologies--and that unite ideological consciousness
with metastatic faith, prometheanism, and parousiasm."

This is not to say that Franz thinks Voegelin does not look for the
continuities on the level of experience.  On the contrary, he says that
"to have penetrated beneath the intellectual history of ideologies to the
inner workings of the ideological mind was one of his greatest achieve-
ments, and by developing an analysis of ideological consciousness that
can encounter it on the deepest levels of human experience, Voegelin may
have provided the first truly philosophical approach to the phenomenon of
ideology," thus making it possible "to account for the specifically mod-
ern aspects of ideologies...while also accounting for their perennial
elements of alienation, closure, chiliasm, and hubristic will to power." 
He only thinks that the argument for historical continuity is tenuous if
it tries to trace the connection between such movements to historical
influences instead of seeking what unites them by going to their root in
what he calls "pneumapathological consciousness."

This leads to an especially interesting point that can itself issue into
a number of other questions about how Voegelin's heritage needs to be
reassessed and reappropriated in today's world.  Voegelin is well known,
for good or ill, for his adoption of the concept of gnosticism as the
paradigm of metastatic derailments in the spiritual history of mankind. 
Thomas Altizer once accused Voegelin, as Franz mentions, of finding
"everything to be Gnostic."  This points to two problems.  One is
Voegelin's concept of what constitutes gnosticism.  The other is his
tendency toward a polemical style.  It is one of the major values of
Franz's book that he addresses the problem of gnosticism directly.

The major problem with Voegelin's concept of gnosticism is that it was
formed rather early, well before the Nag Hammadi documents began to give
us a window on the ancient world Gnosticism was born into, which had been
lost from view for many centuries.  (These began to be published as a
corpus in both Coptic and English only in the 1970s.)  We now are able to
see that ancient Gnosticism was a much more diverse phenomenon than
Voegelin's concept could encompass.  Another problem is that his concept
was simply too broad.  Franz says, for example, that "the metastatic
faith of Isaiah could be termed `gnostic' only by invoking a very liberal
poetic license; there is something problematic about speaking of gnostic
tendencies prior to the advent of historical Gnosticism, and even if the
game of suggesting chains of literary influence can be made to work with
Marx, it will certainly not work with Isaiah."

This was a problem I addressed myself, but rather feebly, I must admit,
in my 1981 book, _Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History_, with the
suggestion that it might be helpful to capitalize the term Gnosticism
when it is used to refer to the ancient movement (I would have done
better to say ancient "movements") and to leave it uncapitalized when
referring to Voegelin's broader conception.  Franz quotes me quoting
Voegelin as saying in 1978 that he would probably not use the term if he
were starting over again, and he makes the very sensible suggestion that
it be dropped and replaced with something more precise.  His own sug-
gested alternatives are "pneumapathological consciousness" or "disorien-
tation" (he generally uses the former).  He acknowledges that these are
"rather inelegant neologisms," but they are the kind of terms Voegelin
used himself, and their very oddness has the advantage that readers are
unlikely to assimilate their meanings to more familiar ones (as they
probably would with "psychopathological," a term Voegelin also used, but
in his own special way).

Pneumapathological consciousness, as Franz describes it, originated in
the ancient world but has expressed itself in many forms, among them
modern ideologies, and it has a special, rather problematic relation to
religion.  One of the most interesting features of Voegelin's thought
--and one generally overlooked by those who think of him as a cultural
conservative--is that he saw religion as a deeply ambiguous phenomenon. 
It articulates symbols of cosmic and spiritual order that can serve to
orient its followers toward truth, but the religions of the Biblical
tradition in particular have tended also to stimulate feelings that can
easily lead to pneumapathological consciousness or disorientation, to use
Franz's terms.  As he puts it himself, "The tensions that lie behind
pneumapathological disorientation first arise from the awareness that one
exists in a de-divinized world that is incomplete and imperfect in es-
sence; this condition becomes especially problematic when its recognition
is accompanied by the experience or promise of participation in a trans-
cendent realm of being."  This gives rise to two possible forms of
escapism:  flight from the world or into it.  The former tended to be
characteristic of the Gnostic movements in the ancient world.  The latter
can take the forms of either metastatic faith or parousiasm.  Franz sees
modern ideologies generally as expressions of the latter sort of flight
from existential tension rather than the former--another reason he thinks
the term Gnostic does not fit them very well.

Franz is somewhat less direct about the problem of Voegelin's polemical
style.  He notes that this can be a problem, as when he says, "...there
is a very real danger that less cautious polemicists will invoke
Voegelin's categories without troubling themselves over the difficulties
involved in establishing the presence of spiritual disease in the objects
of their ridicule."  He generally accepts, however, Voegelin's tendency
to characterize thinkers he disapproved of as"ideologists" and "spiri-
tually diseased," even if this often led him, as Franz notes, to avoid
detailed refutations of them because he viewed their errors as deliberate
rather than as serious attempts to understand and because he also (per-
haps rather inconsistently) considered their theories merely symptoms of
their disease.  The metaphor of "illness" is used very widely, probably
much too widely, in our culture to explain all sorts of thinking and
behavior that one disagrees with or disapproves of, but we also usually
distinguish between what is due to such supposed illness and what is
morally culpable.  Voegelin tended to lump them together.  This is not to
say his characterizations may not in many cases have had a point, but he
also had a tendency to be rather sweeping in the way he applied them.

The critical underlying issues are whether the term "disease" is appro-
priate in such a context and whether it tends to advance understanding. 
Franz thinks it is appropriate because he thinks Voegelin succeeded in
developing "critical standards for the designation of manifestations of
spiritual health and unhealth."  I do not myself wish to suggest that
Voegelin's discussion of these points is essentially wrong, but I do
think that, like many other elements of his thought, they are incom-
pletely worked out, especially with regard to what constitutes "healthy"
consciousness.  And I also suspect that he was himself unwittingly drawn
into an uncritical involvement in the widespread medicalizing tendency of
twentieth-century intellectual culture.

[Note:  This medicalizing tendency is a point I discuss at some length in
_The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France_
(1993).  The question of what constitutes sound or adequate consciousness
is the main theme of my _Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi,
Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard_ (1988).]

The question of moral culpability for unsound theorizing is a distin-
guishable issue.  Again, I do not wish to suggest that Voegelin does not
have a point here; on the contrary, the point is important: ideas have
consequences, and the thinker is responsible for those consequences.  And
in the context of the Cold War it may have been appropriate to refuse to
engage in serious debate with ideologues, if, as Voegelin said, to argue
over their supposed theories would be to play into the hands of a mani-
pulator.  But in the world we now find ourselves in there is less need to
fear manipulation by ideological opponents than there is to be cautious
about defining as an enemy people we are somehow going to have to find
ways to live with and who may even have valid points of their own to
argue.  Voegelin often called for a dialogical mode of discourse, [Note: 
See my essay, "Faith, Truth, and Persuasion in the Thought of Eric
Voegelin," in John Kirby and William M. Thompson, eds., _Voegelin and the
Theologian_.] but he also often tended to fall away from that himself
into a monological polemic, dismissing the opponent in debate as beyond
rational persuasion so that he should be regarded not as a partner in
discourse but merely as an "object of scientific research" (_Autobio-
graphical reflections_, p. 50).

[Note: For a discussion by a contemporary Catholic thinker of the import-
ance of the distinction between dialogical and monological discourse, see
David Tracy, _Plurality and Ambiguity_, especially chapter two.]

Again, there may have been some justification for that in the circum-
stances Voegelin lived in and through, but in ours the need is urgent for
dialogue that respects and listens seriously to the points of view of
others, and a serious dialogue between Voegelinians and all the schools
of thought of modernity and postmodernity is overdue.

This is a topic one could obviously take some time over.  In the interest
of brevity, I will mention just one pattern of thinking Voegelin dis-
missed rather casually as an "ideology" (a categorization Franz seems to
concur in): constitutionalism.  (It is worth reflecting on the possibi-
lity that the term "ideology" may be as problematic in its own way as the
term "gnosticism.")  According to Franz, Voegelin considered "constitu-
tionalism" an ideology because he agreed with Socrates that "the goodness
of a _polis_ originates not from its institutional pattern but from the
psyche of the founder or ruler who will stamp the pattern of his soul on
the institutions."  The establishment of states with constitutions that
can help prevent a collapse into anarchy, warlordism, or Bonapartism is
currently a critical need in the countries that have recently emerged
from the former Soviet empire, and it would hardly be helpful today to
dismiss concern with institutional order as an ideological blunder or
even a symptom of spiritual disease.  Rather we would do well to remember
Reinhold Niebuhr's point that a political system must have institutions
designed to protect civil order against the effects of disordered souls,
since one must realistically expect there will always be such souls.  The
idea that an actual state could be formed and maintained by the order in
the soul of its founder or ruler would be akin to Isaiah's metastatic
faith in divine intervention that Voegelin criticized.  Voegelin was
aware of the parallel and took it into account--largely by discounting
the possibility of its realization in practice--but it would have been
appropriate for him to give more serious consideration to the need for
institutions designed to minimize the damage that will inevitably be
caused by disorder in the soul rather than simply to dismiss questions
about concrete political arrangements, as Franz acknowledges he had a
tendency to do.  Of course in a world that seemed locked for the
foreseeable future in a standoff between two superpowers, this may have
been an understandable attitude.  But not today, when real change and new
political development are not only possible but urgent.

What can we take from Voegelin today, then, that can help us to deal with
the problems that face us now?  I still think, as I did when I wrote my
essay on "Faith, Truth, and Persuasion in the Thought of Eric Voegelin"
(noted above), that Voegelin's theory of discourse and his concept of
"open existence" are inherently dialogical in a way that can guide us
helpfully in our own efforts at mutual understanding, even if in practice
he was often drawn by his situation into monological polemics.  In a
world that is increasingly threatened with a fall into warring cultural,
political, and religious particularlisms, Voegelin remains invaluable for
his philosophical articulation of a conception of human universality and
the historical studies in which he brought its outlines into view.  Even
as we need institutions that can help us to live together with some
degree of tolerance, we also need explorations such as Voegelin's to help
us to think about what a larger conception of human community might be
that could be founded on an understanding of what we all share in the
fundamental structure of our existence.  Few thinkers have looked so
deeply into that question than Eric Voegelin, and Michael Franz is an
excellent guide to this and other aspects of his thought.

Eugene Webb
University of Washington


Item Number 2.

The following is an outline of a lecture delivered by Professor Voegelin
at the University of London on the subject "Ancient Gnosis and Modern
Politics."  The lecture was given in November 1962.  The outline is pre-
ceded by a stage-setting note from Professor G.L. Price.


                 Ancient Gnosis and Modern Politics
Voegelin was invited in April 1962 by the Senate and Academic Council of
the University of London, to give a lecture on a subject of his choice,
which would be of interest primarily to advanced students of political
science.  He replied offering the following three titles as possible

    a) The Discovery of History
    b) Ancient Gnosis and Modern Politics
    c) Reason, Spirit and Power: The Foundations of Western Freedom.

The notes of explanation he offered are of interest:

    "a) Recently I was occupied with the parallel origins of historio-
graphy in Hellas, Israel and China. The lecture would give the results
concerning the motivations of historiography and the type of political
events  considered worth[y] of historican recording 

    b) The finding of the Gnostic Library in 1945 has made it possible 
to formulate theoretically the problem of Gnosis with result of inter-
esting parallels in modern political theory since Hobbes.

    c) The system of checks and balances between Reason, Spirit and 
Power is a constant Western topic since the Patristic age. The lecture
would give a survey of its variations to the present."

The Academic Registrar then consulted the University of London Board of
Studies in Economic and Political Science, concerning the subject to be
chosen.  Within a fortnight, he wrote again saying that "Ancient Gnosis
and Modern Politics" was the subject selected.  The lecture was given on
22 November 1962. Michael Oakeshott wrote to present his apologies for
being unable to be present, and invited him to lunch on the following day
to meet the Director of the London School of Economics, Sir Sidney Caine.

Voegelin was already well-known to both men. In the summer of 1959, Sir
Sidney Caine had expressed in correspondence, his own support, which
Michael Oakeshott shared, for the planned School of Political Science at
Munich.  This letter followed conversations which Sir Sidney had had with
Voegelin when on a visit to Munich.  In November 1959, Sir Sidney invited
Voegelin to give the Stevenson Memorial Lecture of the London School of
Economics and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1961.  In
his letter of acceptance, Voegelin requested that he stay on in London
for a few days, to discuss the work of the school and the prospects for 
inviting members of the London School of Economics to deliver lecture 
courses in Munich. 

Geoffrey L. Price



_Ancient Gnosis and Modern Politics_       London, November 22, 1962

_Introductory Remarks_

Gnosis:     a constant problem since antiquity

            not merely a question of comparing ancient and modern
            types as a matter of historical interest

            essentials in common, but historically unique          

            phenotypically widely differing --unawareness of the
            common features and hence of the constancy of the problem

            present state of consciousness rapidly shifting

_I. Political Science and Gnosis_

    (1) State of Political Science

        Classic Politics: a science of order, including spiritual and 
        intellectual, of man in society

                     : Plato's anthropological principle

                     : Plato: philosophy - philodoxy
                            : a science of Doxa -- spiritual and 
                              intellectual errors

        Today:  No science of the Doxa

                dissociation into Institutionalism, History of Ideas, 
                Philosophy of Politics, that has no definite position
                against doxa                          

                probable cause  : Separation of Church and State

                                : restriction of PS to temporal 

                consequences, according to tactical position:

                        a. Philodoxy elevated to the rank 
                           of Philosophy and Theory                   

                        b. Philosophy reduced to one Doxa among 
                           the others: "pluralistic Society."
        Disintegration of Philosophy: no means to analyse 
        contemporary political movements under the aspect of Doxa.

    (2) Consciousness of Gnosis

        a). Christian Gnosis of Antiquity -- little attention since 
            the victory of the Great Church

        b). Continuity of sectarian movements -- legal history -- 
            Constitutions of Frederick Barbarossa.

        c). 18. cent: History of hereticism (Mosheim, Arnold) 
                enters the horizon again; at the same time, at which 
                Gnosis becomes virulent again, in Enlightenment

        d). 19th cent.: a. Information on Ancient Gnosis:  Matter 

                        b. consciousness that German idealism is a 
                           Gnosis:  Baur

                        c. Some effects:  Flaubert -- Schopenhauer.

        e). late 19th and early 20th cent.:  Impasse of interpretation 

                                acute Hellenization -- Harnack

                                Egypt - Reitzenstein - Poimandres

                                Iran - Bousset - Reitzenstein

                                Babylonian -- Indian sources

    (3) Parallel - State of 1930

        Methodological helplessness with regard to both Ancient and 
        Modern Gnosis
        Cause -- Concentration on Symbolism, not on experience.
                 Advance of Gnosis to the point where the critical 
                 function of philosophy has been destroyed
        Result -- modernity becomes even more "modern" -- 
                  gulf between antiquity and modernity
                  modern mass-movements cannot be interpreted in 
                  terms of classical and Christian politics -- no 
                  science of Doxa
_II. Development since 1930_
    (1).    Material information:
            a. Nag Hammadi - 1945

            b. Qumran - 1947

            Monographs: Jonas - Puech - Doresse - Eranos Jahrbuch   

    (2). Philosophical Improvement

        a. Jonas -- Heidegger -- Affinity of Existentialism and Gnosis
        b. Puech:  Gnosis -- anti-Hellenic (Philosophic) --anti --
        c. Gebhardt:  Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx; _Politik und 
             Eschatologie_ (anti-Semitic)

_III. What is Gnosis?_

        (1). Conception of man - soma-psyche-pneuma
        (2). Thrown into the World - Geworfenheit -- a stranger in 
             a foreign world

        (3). Demiurge creates the World -- consequences of a 
             [d]ramatic fall in the divine region

        (4). Yahweh - The Demiurge

        (5). The true divine origin -- description of the Eternal 
             Light in Apocryphon of John
        (6). Saviour -- brings the Gnosis of the state of imprisonment 
             and the means of escape

        (7). Gnosis -- realization of the escape through Gnosis -- 
             above Faith
        (8). the Elect or Perfect -- superior to Matter -- Asceticism -

_IV. From Rhythm to Apocalypse_

        (1). Rhythmical Renewal of Order.
             New Year Festivals, Coronation Rituals
             Eliade: Time the Cause of Disorder
                     Order something out of Time
                     Struggle against the destructiveness of Time

        (2). Judges -- Defection and Return -- strong element of 
             cosmic rhythm 
        (3). Am Yahweh -- Day of Glory-Day of Wrath.
             Prophetic appeal to true existence in the present

        (4). Isaiah -- _Metastasis_ -- transfiguration of the world
        (5). Daniel -- Apocalypse of Empire
        (6). Modern Cases:  a. Berkeley -- American Apocalypse
                            b. Hegel -- Imperial Apocalypse --
                               Voltaire's Parallel Histories --
                               Enlightenment Apocalypse

_V. Exodus_

    (1). Abraham from Ur

    (2). Moses from Egypt: Constitution of Israel

    (3). Isaiah -- the Remnant

    (4). Deutero-Isaiah -- Exodus of Israel from Itself, into Mankind

    (5). St. Augustine -- Exodus as the Structure of Human Existence

    (6). Institutionalization of the Exodus in the Church

    (7). Modern Exodi: from the Church -- Reformation

                       from traditions -- the various national
                       from Western Civilization -- Communism and
                       National Socialism

_VI. A-Historism -- A-Cosmism_

    (1). Gnosis -- A-Historic, A-Cosmic

    (2). Antecedents in Judaism
                a. Apocalypse of Daniel -
                        no existential participation in history
                        waiting for the miraculous end
                b. Ecclesiasticus --
                    history transformed into Memory of a great past
                    Peace of Mind

    (3). Later cases --
                a. Parousia -- non-occurrence- Church
                b. St. Augustine -- _saeculum senescens_ -- crisis 
                   with Joachim of Flora
                c. Transition from Hegel (History completed) to
                   Marx (History proper begins)
                d. Communism -- no withering away of the state
                                no transfiguration
                                no perishing of capitalists and 

    (4).  General Problem
                 a. The Chosen People unemployed
                 b. Apocalyptic speculation -- gnostic element even
                   in Israel
    (5).  The Escape Absolute --
                 a. Revolution as Transfiguration
                 b. Cult of Violence -- French Revolution, Lenin, 
                   Sorel, Rightist Activists
                 c. Cult of Death -- Revolution and Destruction of
                   Self and World -- Hitler -- The Atomic Threat
_VII. Anti-Philosophism_

    (1).  Philosophy -- Balance of Existence between Immanence and
    (2).  Gnostic Anthropology -- the sensorium of transcendence
                objectified as a pneumatic substance to be liberated
                from the world 
                man minus Pneuma belongs to the world
                Pneuma belongs to the other Aion 
     (3). Two Possibilities of Salvation:
                a. Pneuma as part of an Aeonic Drama
                        Fall from, and Liberation into, - the 
                        Pneumatic Aion beyond the World
                        Mythological Drama of Ancient Gnosis
                b. Pneuma as Part of an Historical Drama
                         Pneumatic Realm of Perfection will 
                         supersede "alle bisherige Geschichte"
                         Gnostic "Philosophies" of History

Eric Voegelin
London School of Economics                   November 22, 1962


Dr. M.W. Poirier                  | Dr. Geoffrey L. Price
Dept. of Political Science        | Dept. of Religions and Theology
Concordia University              | University of Manchester
Loyola Campus                     | MANCHESTER M13 9PL
7141 Sherbrooke Street W.         | United Kingdom
MONTREAL, Quebec                  |
H4B 1R6                           |
E-Mail: poirmw@Vax2.Concordia.Ca  | E-Mail: g.price@manchester.ac.uk