Interorganizational Networks in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief: 
An Institutional Theory Perspective

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I. Introduction

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions require the efforts of an impressive range of very different organizations, including various IGOs, NGOs, powerful state actors, national militaries, local civil society actors, and even parties to the conflict. These organizational actors have different, sometimes conflicting, missions and organizational cultures, and face different organizational pressures. However, their individual missions depend in part on other organizations, as with humanitarian relief NGOs relying on militaries for protection. Thus, extensive coordination and adjustment is required and the interaction between sets of very different organizations that must work together on a regular basis is critical to the success of peace operations. Yet there is a relative dearth of systematic research on factors that may enable or inhibit such coordination.

Organization theory offers analytical tools for investigating interactions among organizations within interorganizational networks. In particular, the sociological branch of organization theory known as institutional theory specializes in organizational such as those found in the peacebuilding field: dense networks of regularly interacting but loosely coupled organizations and organizational units, all involved in a common enterprise, and facing sometimes conflicting institutional, political, and technical pressures. Known in the international relations literature as sociological institutionalism, institutional theory focuses on the effects of cognitive-cultural scripts that establish standards that define appropriate conduct for organizations in the field.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are activities that take place in an environment defined and structured largely in terms of collectively understood concepts, norms, and understandings. These sometimes conflicting standards include norms of sovereignty, human rights and humanitarianism, democratization, and, more broadly, liberalism. Peacekeeping depends heavily on perceptions of legitimacy, which is defined in terms of conformity to such norms. Peacebuilding, as Roland Paris has demonstrated, is a practice by which a liberal international order is projected. Organizations in the fields of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian relief must adhere to the normative standards of these fields in order to secure the support and resources from their environment necessary for the survival.

Thus, these organizations exist in what institutional theorists call an institutional environment, in which they are evaluated according to conformity with collectively legitimized standards and norms as well as their efficiency and effectiveness in performing tasks and producing outputs. Institutional theory was developed for the study of interorganizational networks in institutional environments, and offers promise for

shedding light on the particular dynamics found in the peace operations and humanitarian relief fields.

This paper presents a preliminary exploration of the applicability of concepts drawn from institutional organization theory to problems of coordination in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief in complex humanitarian emergencies. The next section consists of an overview of institutional theory. Following that, two influential institutionalist perspectives—organizational field theory and organized hypocrisy—are applied to aspects of complex humanitarian emergencies, especially civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine and practices. I conclude with a discussion of tasks for future research.

II. Institutional Theory

Under the label of sociological institutionalism, institutional theory has become increasingly influential in International Relations research in recent years. Closely identified with constructivism among IR theorists, the approach was originally developed among sociological organization theorists challenging the emphasis of earlier organizational analysis on rationality and efficiency. In the open systems perspective on organizations adopted by sociological institutionalists, “Organizations are portrayed as being deeply embedded in, and constituted by, the environments in which they operate.” Institutionalists explain the adoption of standard organizational and bureaucratic forms and processes across vastly different contexts in terms of common cognitive-cultural factors in the organizational environment. Institutional theory holds that organizations often develop formal structures and processes to conform to legitimized standards in the cultural environment, which shape to cognitive frameworks through which social reality is understood. Organizational form and process thus follows a logic of appropriateness as well as a logic of consequences.

Institutional vs. Technical Environments

The distinction between institutional and technical environments is a key concept of institutionalist analysis. In technical environments, organizations are selected for their effectiveness, according to technical efficiency criteria such as profit-loss margin or market share. In institutional environments, organizations are relatively insulated from such efficiency criteria, and are instead selected for legitimacy criteria. As Steven Weber

7 Farrell 1996, 124.
8 Scott 1998, 134. Italics in original. Scott writes “We employ the hyphenated concept to emphasize that we are not referring to individual mental constructs but to common symbolic systems and shared meanings that undergird much of the stability and order in social life.” (134-135) Throughout this paper, I use the term “institutionalist” and “institutional theory” to refer to sociological institutionalism and its proponents. The term sociological institutionalism is used among IR scholars to refer to what sociological organization theorists call institutional theory or the “new institutionalism.” In IR, the adjective “sociological” is added to distinguish this approach from rationalist, or neoliberal, institutionalism, advocates of which have recently adopted the label “institutionalist.”.
has put it, institutional environments “are characterized by relationships built on noneconomic and nontechnical standards of legitimacy that have less to do with efficiency than with the structure of extant organizations in the environment.”

According to W. Richard Scott, “In institutional environments, organizations are rewarded for establishing correct structures and processes, not for the quantity and quality of their outputs.” Isomorphism in these environments is due primarily to adoption of those features accorded collective legitimacy. This tends to be particularly the case among nonprofit organizations such as hospitals, public schools, and government agencies, upon which institutionalist research has focused. Institutionalist researchers have come to see the technical-institutional environment as more of a continuum than a dichotomy, moving away from efficiency versus legitimacy debates to analysis of the effects of both rational-technical and institutional aspects of organizations’ environments. W. Richard Scott has cross-classified organizational environments in terms of the strength of output and process controls, associated with technical and institutional environments, respectively. This allows for organizational environments to be simultaneously highly (or weakly) technical and institutional rather than either-or. Thus, more recent research has argued that “institutional rules provide the context and frame within which effectiveness criteria are constructed.” While the technical-institutional environment distinction, however, is central to all strands of institutionalist theory, it plays different roles within different approaches.

Institutionalist Approaches

The branch of institutional theory best known to IR scholars is the world polity or world culture approach associated with John Meyer. This approach explains the adoption of common organizational structures and processes in different settings (such as the spread of Western style grade school curricula to widely divergent societies in developing countries) in terms of a modern global culture encompassing general, highly abstract principles such as progress and rationality. These principles constitute an institutional environment at the global level, and explains outcomes that are anomalous when evaluated in terms of technical efficiency criteria. Within the world polity, organizational features are often adopted not because they are the optimally efficient method of accomplishing tasks, but because they carry symbolic significance, representing compliance with shared norms and conferring legitimacy, or because they conform to cognitive scripts designating such factors as appropriate to the environment. Their adoption, in turn, reinforces and reproduces the cognitive scripts defining the relevant domains of activity. Thus, as Roland Paris has argued, peacekeeping both

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15 Scott 1998, 117.
16 Meyer, et. al., 1997; Finnemore 1996.
reflects and spreads global culture.  

The world polity approach, while useful in explaining patterns at a global level of analysis, is too general to be of much explanatory value in more restricted domains. As one institutionalist puts it, “Although Meyer often refers to the world polity as a single unified entity, it is in reality a loose grouping of numerous subfields, each of which has its own rules, resources, and legitimating myths.” And in fact, “most institutional work does not go on at this rarified level, but rather at the sector or organizational field level where the effects of particular rules and belief systems governing, for example, medical care systems are contrasted with those operating at a different time or in a different field.” Further, world polity research has tended to neglect the politics and causal mechanisms underlying global culture.

Other branches of institutional theory offer more promise for analysis of more bounded domains within international politics, as well as greater leverage regarding causal processes. Two such theoretical strands are organizational field theory and organized hypocrisy theory. Organizational field looks at communities of organizations involved in addressing a common functional problem. Organizational fields develop within institutional environments. One way of defining the relationship between world polity theory and organizational field theory is to treat the former as a subset of the latter. James Ron does this, writing that “Organizational field theory can apply even to states, some new institutionalists argue. They view nation-states as organizations embedded in the largest of fields: what John Meyer and his colleagues term the world polity or international society.” However, organizational field theory has developed as a relatively distinct research program in institutional analysis, focused largely on domestic phenomena at the level of communities, industries, or national societies. While extending organizational field analysis to the transnational level, I prefer to treat it as an approach closely related to, but distinct from, world polity institutionalism.

Organizational field theory suffers from blind spots relating to the limits to isomorphism, the effects of conflicting norms, and the persistence of technical pressures in organizational environments. However, other work in institutional theory, such as

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19 Ron 1997, 279.
20 Scott 1998, 137.
22 The term “organizational field theory” is Ron’s (1997). The organizational field concept was initially defined geographically, but later functionally. Scott 1991, 173.
23 Institutional theory is actually ambiguous regarding the relationship between organizational fields and institutional environments. However fields are generally regarded as one of several levels of analysis within institutional environments. I thank Mark Suchman for clarifying this point for me.
24 Ron 1997, 278.
25 Scott 1998, 220-225, describes organizational fields at the community, industry, and societal level. I develop an additional, transnational, level. This is suggested, though not explicitly, by Eyre and Suchman 1996, 110-112. Trubek, et. al. 1993 used the term “transnational legal field,” but their concept is only loosely related to that of organizational field and their work contains no citations to the institutional theory literature.
research into organized hypocrisy, addresses these problems. Organized hypocrisy theorists make such phenomena the focus of their analysis, arguing that organizations routinely face conflicts between institutional and technical elements of their environments. According to Brunsson and Olsen,

When environmental norms and perceptions do not coincide with what is required for effective action and production, we can expect organizations for which effective actions are important to develop two sets of structures, processes, and ideologies—one for each set of demands. For the organizations, it is important that these parallel sets do not disturb one another, and they therefore tend to be decoupled, separated, and isolated.26

This typically produces a formal organization, often represented by an organization chart, that serves symbolic purposes (for example, through the establishment of an office or department relating to some normative demand such as gender mainstreaming), while actual organizational decisionmaking and behavior takes place primarily through the informal organization of internal networks and relationships. While the organization is thereby able to resolve conflicting institutional and technical pressures, the decoupling produces a discrepancy between proclaimed norms and values and actual behavior: organized hypocrisy.

For organizations involved in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies, the interorganizational networks in which they operate constitute an organizational environment with significant technical and institutional pressures. At first cut, therefore, one would expect to see the dynamics identified by theorists of organizational fields and organized hypocrisy. The next section explores this possibility.

III. Institutional Theory and Complex Emergencies

1. A Peace Operations Organizational Field?27

The network of organizations involved in peace operations constitutes an evolving organizational field. This leads us to expect to see typical characteristics of such a field, including pressures to adopt standard structures and procedures that are seen as appropriate and legitimate.

A. Organizational Field Theory

The standard definition of an organizational field is “Those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products.”28 This definition reflects the concept’s origins in the study of industrial sectors. However, the field concept is broader than that. More generally, “The notion of field connotes the existence of a community of organizations that partakes of a

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27 I set aside consideration of a humanitarian relief organizational field due to lack of space. This section is based on my 2001 APSA Poster Presentation and Paper, “Transnational Organizational Fields and International Security Regimes: A Preliminary Comparison of Nonproliferation and Peacekeeping.
common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field.” The term is meant to “signify both common purpose and an arena of strategy and conflict.” The concept is flexible as “A field is always an analytical construct and how one defines it depends upon the phenomena in which one is interested.” Like the institutionalist approach of which it is part, organizational field theory focuses on the social and intersubjective aspects of organizational environments. As a prominent institutionalist explains,

Institutional theory emphasizes that organizations are open systems—strongly influenced by their environments—but that it is not only rational or efficiency-based forces that are at work. Socially constructed belief systems and normative rules exercise enormous control over organizations—both how they are structured and how they carry out their work.

Organizational field theory, then, centers on explaining convergence of organizational form and practice as the consequence of institutional, legitimacy-driven isomorphism within an organizational field. Organizational fields develop through a process of institutional definition, or structuration, the extent of which is conventionally assessed in terms of four elements: increased organizational interaction, development of intra-field structure, increased information load, and sense of a common enterprise. Field structuration occurs through the mechanisms of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. These roughly correspond to regulative power of authoritative institutions, imitation of culturally approved models, and standardizing effects of professionalization.

B. The Peace Operations field

The peace operations interorganizational network constitutes a transnational organizational field. The Peace Operations (PO) field is essentially the same as what the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, established by the Canadian government in 1994 to promote coordination and training related to

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30 DiMaggio 1983, 149.
31 DiMaggio 1983, 149.
32 The focus is on cognitive, as opposed to normative, aspects of organizational environments. DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 15; Scott 1995, 40.
33 Scott 1998, 117.
34 DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65. This is not necessarily an exhaustive list of dimensions of field structure. According to W. Richard Scott, “To these indicators others can be added, including extent of agreement on the institutional logics guiding activities within the field, increased isomorphism of structural forms within populations in the field, increased structural equivalence of organizational sets within the field, and increased clarity of field boundaries.” Scott 1995,106. According to Scott, DiMaggio and Powell take the concept of structuration from Giddens, but “define it more narrowly as referring to the degree of interaction and the nature of the interorganizational structure that arises at the level of the organizational field.” Scott 1995, 106.
peacekeeping, terms the “New Peace-keeping Partnership. The Pearson Centre defines this partnership as:

The term applied to those organizations and individuals that work together to improve the effectiveness of modern peace-keeping operations. It includes the military; civil police; government and non-governmental agencies dealing with human rights and humanitarian assistance; diplomats; the media and information specialists; and organizations sponsoring development and democratization programmes.\(^{36}\)

To this definition might also be added firms that supply goods and services used in peace operations (for example, commercial airlift).\(^{37}\) As John Mackinlay has written, “Peace Support Operations involve a growing community of participants…Collectively, these suborganizations or components can be thought of as a network.”\(^{38}\) Field-level institutions in this network include the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Pearson Centre, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.\(^{39}\) Cooperative endeavors such as the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) are also elements of the field. A number of nongovernmental actors—the International Peace Academy, Stimson Center, the Watson Institute at Brown University, for example, serve as “auditors,” monitoring the compliance of field organization such as the UN and NATO with accepted standards.

(1). Institutional and Technical Environments

Organizations whose outputs are difficult to measure tend to respond more to institutional features of the environment. Because outputs cannot be easily measured against technical criteria, institutional factors tend to take on greater significance in organizational evaluation.\(^{40}\) The institutional environment of peace operations is characterized by considerable uncertainty over the factors leading to operational success and failure. In fact, there is no consensus even on how to evaluate mission success or failure. Assessments of peacekeeping overall range from Morrison and Blair’s blanket statement that “peace-keeping is a success,” to the title of Dennis Jett’s recent book: Why Peacekeeping Fails.\(^{41}\) Diehl presents two criteria for evaluating peacekeeping success or

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\(^{36}\) Morrison and Blair 1999, 246.

\(^{37}\) Morrison and Blair (1999, 260) cite Brown and Root and Servair as members of informal peacekeeping networks. For a sense of the variety of such firms and organizations, see the list of exhibitors at a peacekeeping conference in Morrison1993, 219-243.

\(^{38}\) Mackinlay,1996, 231.


\(^{40}\) See Scott 1998, 138-139. However, as Scott points out, organizational environments can be weak in both technical and institutional pressures. Limited technical pressure facilitates, but does not guarantee, a strong influence by institutional factors.

\(^{41}\) Morrison and Blair 1999, 246; Jett 1999.
failure: limitation of armed conflict, and facilitation of conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{42} Bratt proposes adding mandate fulfillment, a criterion Diehl and others reject on the grounds that mandates are often vague and unrealistic.\textsuperscript{43} Others propose more comprehensive assessments, or other criteria.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, there is little agreement over how to systematically distinguish operational success or failure. Absent such a measure, there cannot be a clear understanding of how to achieve success or avoid failure. If organizational success cannot be unproblematically measured, organizations tend to adopt mimetic strategies to cope with the uncertainty, and institutional rather than technical controls will tend to predominate. Peacekeeping is, therefore, the kind of setting in which organizational fields responding to institutional criteria emerge. To what extent, then, can we observe developments along the different elements of field definition: intra-field interaction, structure, information flow, and sense of a common project?

(2). Structuration of the Peace Operations Field

\textit{a. Intra-field Interaction}

Actual peace operations are the most obvious form of interaction in the PO field. These increased dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with 25 missions launched between 1988 and 1995, compared with 13 in the prior 40 years.\textsuperscript{45} After Somalia, there was a period of disillusionment over UN peacekeeping, and the number of number of blue helmets deployed in the field declined significantly. However, in 1999 five new missions (UNAMET and UNTAET in East Timor, UNMIK in Kosovo, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congro, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone) were authorized, suggesting that declarations of the demise of UN peacekeeping were premature.\textsuperscript{46} There are currently 14 UN peacekeeping missions and 12 political and peacebuilding operations.\textsuperscript{47} All of these, of course, involve by definition an impressive degree of interaction among national governments and militaries, UN agencies, NGOs, the media, and others in the PO field.\textsuperscript{48} Morrison and Blair identify two types of informal peacekeeping networks: Type 1, defined in terms of contact between organizations and personnel, and Type 2, defined in terms of information exchange.\textsuperscript{49} These types closely correspond to the first and third elements of field structuration, respectively: intra-field interaction, and information load. As examples of Type 1 networks in the peacekeeping field, Morrison and Blair list “conferences, meetings, and seminars”; groups such as he International Associations of

\textsuperscript{42} Diehl 1994, 33-40.
\textsuperscript{43} Bratt 1997, 65-67.
\textsuperscript{44} Druckman and Stern 1997, Fortna 2002.
\textsuperscript{45} Prager 1995.
\textsuperscript{46} Jakobsen 2000, 171. In addition, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was authorized in July 2000.
\textsuperscript{48} And UNMIK is associated with KFOR.
\textsuperscript{49} Morrison and Blair 1999, 253-260.
Peacekeeping Veterans and The Soldiers of Peace International Association, and national peacekeeping veterans groups; and the IAPTC. Such interaction promotes the development of recognition of membership in a field, and shared understandings within a field. As a study of training for complex emergencies notes, NGOs do learn, often on the job, through cross-postings and seminars, budget workshops, and retreats. Learning takes place through the development of mission statements and strategies and through the evolution of organizational symbols, rituals, and stories that contribute to organizational culture. This ‘oral culture’ is perceived to be as important as formal training.

In addition to such informal interaction, which is significant but hard to measure accurately, there is also a great deal of interaction aimed at better coordinating the activities of different organizations involved in peace operations. Military exercises in preparation for multinational humanitarian and peace operations bring together national militaries, UN officials, NGOs, and civilian volunteers. Military personnel from SHIRBRIG participants routinely train together, and Partnership for Peace (PfP) members are involved with NATO training for operations in the Balkans. These illustrative examples demonstrate the development of an impressive level of interaction among actors in the peace operations field.

b. Structure

In Peacekeeping, the UN—and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—is clearly the central actor. Other UN agencies, such as the Department of Political Affairs, UNHCR, and the Security Council, also play critical roles. And particular states, such as Canada and the Nordic countries, have long played leading roles in the peacekeeping field. Canada’s creation of the Pearson Centre, and Denmark’s leadership in standardizing peacekeeping training, and in the creation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) available for rapid (15-30 days) deployment in the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission, illustrate these roles.

c. Information Flow

Although there is no quantitative measure of the total information flow relating to peacekeeping, it is clear that it is significant. One example is the Brahimi Report’s recent call for greater information management capacity in the UN Secretariat: The report proposes an Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) that “would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership.”

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50 Morrison and Blair 1999. 256.
51 Schoenhaus, 2002, 12.
52 See for example, the U.S. Army’s online “NGO Doctrine page” at http://call.army.mil/fmso/ngos/introduction.html.
As one UN expert has observed of the organization as a whole

Too much of the UN's work takes the form of providing documentation and facilities (including translation) for debates and decision making by the governments of the world. In the period 2000-2001, for example, a staggering 15,484 meetings were held and 5,879 reports issued, many translated into several languages. We need fewer meetings, simpler processes, and shorter documents. The same problem applies to major conferences held under the aegis of the UN—the international agenda has become overloaded and governments suffer from "summit fatigue." We need far fewer such gatherings.55 Kofi Annan’s most recent round of proposed reforms aims to reduce this burden. However, peacekeeping and peacebuilding clearly accounts for a substantial portion of this phenomenon.

Morrison and Blair’s “Type 2” informal peacekeeping networks are defined in terms of shared information not necessarily involving direct personal contact. “The World Wide Web, peace-keeping publications, and private organizations are examples of the second type of informal network.”56 Examples of peacekeeping publications include International Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping News, and Peacekeeping and International Relations, as well as reports and occasional papers put out by organizations such as the International Peace Academy and the International Crisis Group.57 Another example is Alertnet.org, a web site funded by the Reuters Foundation, which provides information to international disaster relief organizations.58

This brief, selective overview merely suggests the scale of the information flow that organizations in the PO field must manage. This aspect of an organizational field is highly developed in this area.

d. Common project

The most critical element of field definition is a sense of involvement in a common project among organizations in the field. While the exact nature of this project is somewhat amorphous in the PO field, and humanitarian NGOs would likely define it somewhat differently from military officers, such a sense clearly exists. One indication of this is the proliferation of studies emerging from the military, NGOs, and think tanks, with titles such as Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict), The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute), and Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (US Institute of Peace).59 The latter is a handbook to promote mutual understanding among member of organizations with very different missions and cultures that are thrown together during peace operations. The perceived need for such a book reflects a recognition that while “misconceptions and prejudices exist on all sides” involved in peace operations, they are

56 Morrison and Blair 1999, 258.
57 Morrison and Blair 1999, 259; Crisisweb.org; IPA web site.
nonetheless involved in a common enterprise and must work together to achieve the goals of each actor.\textsuperscript{60}

Another indicator of the recognition of involvement in a common project is the significant cross-referencing and cross-fertilization of peace operations doctrine since the end of the Cold War. British Retired Col. Philip Wilkinson--an author of British Wider Peacekeeping Doctrine, principal author of Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (Peace Support Operations) and NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine—has described the convergence of national doctrines for peace support operations across a number of countries.\textsuperscript{61} He notes that,

The latest UK, US, French, Swedish, NATO and FINABEL doctrines all start by defining a conceptual framework for PSO which makes the distinction between PSO and other more war-like operations, also conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, before offering guidance for the conduct of PSO.\textsuperscript{62}

More generally, the conventional use of terms such as peace operations and “complex humanitarian interventions” (CHEs) almost always encompasses actors including the military, humanitarian relief NGOs, and IGOs, demonstrating a widespread sense of common project within the field.

\textit{Consequences of Organizational Field Development: Institutional Isomorphism}

Isomorphism in the peace operations is not at all advanced, but can be observed to varying degrees in four areas: a shared conception of the nature and types of peace operations, represented especially in PSO doctrine; standardization of organizational practices such as the development of Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs); and standardization in training. Given the lack of standardization in much of the peace operations field, however, the following discussion is more speculative than conclusive.

\textit{a. Overall definition of problem}

One form of isomorphism observable in the PO field is an increased consensus on the overall conception of the problem. In addition to a near universal conception of peace operations as a broader category including peacekeeping and peace enforcement short of all-out warfighting, and involving political, humanitarian, and military dimensions, there has been a notable convergence of doctrines.\textsuperscript{63} Doctrines of national militaries and international organizations increasingly adopt a common framework for defining and addressing peace operations. As Philip Wilkinson observes.

\textsuperscript{60} See also Slim 1996.


\textsuperscript{62} Wilkinson 1998, unpaginated online document. FINABEL, a French acronym, refers to a group originally composed of France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany (Allemagne), Belgium, Spain (Espagne) and Luxembourg, with the later addition of Portugal and Greece.

A new doctrine of impartial PE has been designed around an international consensus to ensure that military forces do not become party to a conflict but use a combination of coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can build peace.64

This approach is evident in the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, and British, French, Swedish, and NATO doctrine, among others. It represents a shift from the British “Wider Peacekeeping” approach, developed in response to experiences in Bosnia.65 Wider Peacekeeping extended peacekeeping to environments in which consent was more problematic than in traditional peacekeeping missions. However, it distinguished between “operational” and “tactical” consent. Force might be used in the absence of tactical consent, viewed as ambiguous and changeable, as long as more formal operational consent was maintained. A loss of operational consent would mean a shift from (wider) peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and was to be avoided.66 It has been argued that “Had the US Army adopted a similar doctrine, then things might have been different in Somalia.” 67 Indeed, FM 100-23 did incorporate ideas drawn from Wider Peacekeeping.68 However, more recent doctrinal developments, based on a view of Wider Peacekeeping as itself flawed, have sought to draw clearer guidelines for “grey area” operations between peacekeeping and warfighting. As one of the authors of Wider Peacekeeping has since written,

The view now is that [the definition of Wider Peacekeeping] stretched traditional peacekeeping doctrine just too far and that PK forces which rely on consent should not be deployed into a civil war involving widespread human rights abuses. The curtailment of these abuses may risk a general loss of consent which is beyond the ability of the peacekeepers to manage and is therefore likely to risk the failure of the mission.69

The view that emerged was that, in addition to distinctions based on the level of consent, doctrine for gray area operations had to consider the level of force required and the extent to which impartiality could be maintained, in order to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.70 If the ability to maintain consent or impartiality is low, the mandate, force, and rules of engagement must be tailored for peace enforcement, not peacekeeping.71

This doctrinal cross-fertilization appears to be at least in part a product of mimetic isomorphism, or modeling under uncertainty. It could conceivably be argued that these developments represent optimal adaptation to output controls on organizational success or failure. However, there is still considerably ambiguity in current doctrine and, as

64 Wilkinson 1998, unpaginated online document.
68 Farrell 1995, 208; Farrell 1996, 133.
previously noted, there is no consensus on either how to evaluate peacekeeping success or failure, or what causes success or failure.\textsuperscript{72} Under such conditions, isomorphism is, to a significant degree, institutional.

\textit{b. Organizational Practices}

An example of isomorphism in organizational practices is the diffusion of the use of Civil Military Operations Centers, or CMOCs, in peace operations. The establishment of a CMOC is emerging as standard procedure among militaries deployed in peace operations. U.S. joint doctrine, for example, recommends their use by Joint Task Force commanders.\textsuperscript{73} CMOCs fall within the broader category of Civil-Military Cooperation (or Coordination), or CIMIC. As befits a practice that has emerged on an ad hoc basis tailored to specific situations, there is no standard definition or formula describing how to establish or manage one. Basically, though, a CMOC is a forum in which military, IGO, NGO, and PVO (private voluntary organization) personnel can come together—generally in daily meetings—to coordinate, exchange information, address requests by relief workers for military protection, notify other actors of intended actions, and so forth.

According to Michael Williams,

\begin{quote}
A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established [in Bosnia] in 1993 to share information and make coordination with other agencies, including NGOs, easier. The Centre was to prove a major innovation, and was copied in subsequent peace operations, among them the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) of 1993-95.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

The CMOC is presented as an option for U.S. commanders in FM 100-23 and the \textit{Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations}.\textsuperscript{75} While this appears to exemplify mimetic and normative processes of isomorphism, the fact that these manuals present the CMOC as an option rather than a normatively required standard practice suggests that this practice has not been fully institutionalized. Further, Wilkinson observes that,

\begin{quote}
While the new doctrinal consensus reflects the broader political, diplomatic, and humanitarian context of PSO, much that is stated on civil-military coordination remains an aspiration, not yet reflected in current practice.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

However, according to organizational field theory:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item For a critique of and proposed improvements to current doctrine, see Ruggie 1998, 243-253.
\item Williams 1998, 37.
\item Wilkinson 1998.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Early adopters of organizational innovations are commonly driven by a desire to increase performance...[But as] an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves performance.\textsuperscript{77}

There are some indications of such a progression in the development of doctrine regarding CMOCs. Along with similar coordination mechanisms—Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs)—CMOCs originated as ad hoc efforts to improve the specific efficiency peace and relief operations.\textsuperscript{78} Their perceived success, even in missions regarded as problematic overall, led to their promulgation as a model for complex emergencies in general. Eisenhour and Marks, however, point out that many complex emergencies differ in important respects from those in which the CMOC concept originated.\textsuperscript{79} And the US military is increasingly reluctant to intervene in the conflicts that most resemble the original context. While acknowledging that U.S. doctrinal publications present CMOCs as an optional tool, and one that must be tailored to the specific context, they argue that it tends to be seen as a mechanism for asserting military control.\textsuperscript{80} Thus, US CIMIC doctrine, regarded as more advanced and a model by other countries, may be promulgating a response that tries to impose too much control on other actors.\textsuperscript{81} This illustrates a potential consequence of the institutionalization of organizational fields: They may lead to the standardization of suboptimal practices that acquire the status of “best practices” for reasons of legitimacy rather than performance. Thinking in terms of organizational fields calls our attention to this danger, provides systematic framework for thinking about sources of dysfunction.\textsuperscript{82}

c. Training

Efforts to standardize training in peace operations demonstrate coercive and normative processes of isomorphism. Normative isomorphism is associated with common training and other efforts at professionalization.\textsuperscript{83} Coercive isomorphism is associated with the imposition—either directly or through authority—of structures or processes by a powerful organization in the field. The UN’s role in standardizing PSO training has coercive aspects, while the activities of organizations like the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the IAPTC are more normative.

In 1993, the UN set up a Training Unit (later renamed the Training and Evaluation Service) in DPKO to “coordinate and standardize training” among troop contributors.\textsuperscript{84} TES disseminates information about training programs, maintains a peacekeeping training database, provides common guidelines for national training, and

\textsuperscript{77} DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65.  
\textsuperscript{79} Eisenhour and Marks 1999.  
\textsuperscript{80} See Douglas 2002 for discussion of the relatively advanced and better resourced nature of US CIMIC doctrine and practice.  
\textsuperscript{81} Eisenhour and Marks 1999.  
\textsuperscript{82} Barnett and Finnemore 1999.  
\textsuperscript{83} Early 1990s initiatives to increase professionalization of peacekeeping would seem relevant here. See Hillen 1996. Hillen cites the 1993 USIP Study Project on Professionalization of Peacekeeping as an example of such efforts.  
\textsuperscript{84} Jakobsen 2000, 170.
administers workshops, seminars, and training exercises administered by UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs) drawn from member states. The UN has also established a system for peacekeeping correspondence courses through the UN Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (UNITAR POCI). To the extent that meeting common standards defined by TES is required for participation in UN peacekeeping, this represents coercive isomorphism. To the extent that it merely represents the dissemination of best practices and approved models, it is more normative. While the balance is difficult to evaluate without further research, the UN’s difficulty in obtaining troop contributions for recent missions suggests that its coercive capacity is limited in this area.

Another example of a common training effort is the U.S. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), in which U.S. Army instructors train African forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. According to a U.S. State Department fact sheet, “ACRI’s program is based on common doctrine and equipment, with emphasis on interoperable communications equipment enabling multinational units to work together.” In addition to training, ACRI also provides nonlethal equipment to participating nations. ACRI training is also coordinated with parallel British and French efforts, and with various UN agencies and NGOs. ACRI-trained troops from Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Senegal have participated in regional and UN peace operations. It is not clear to what extent ACRI training exhibits institutional or competitive isomorphism. However, in an institutional environment such as that of the PSO field, common training and personnel selection criteria (the latter is emphasized in the UN Guidelines for Training Military Observers, for example) are key mechanisms of normative isomorphism.

d. Implications of an Organizational Fields Perspective

Organizational field theory carries implications for peace and relief operations. It suggests that so-called “best practices” are not, in fact, always best. They may be adopted because they conform to cognitive scripts designating appropriate structures, processes, and behaviors, rather than because they have been shown to improve operational effectiveness. As organizational fields in peace operations and humanitarian relief become more institutionalized, we should expect the diffusion and adoption of standard practices.

86 <http://www.unitarpoci.org/>.
87 A related training activity that might be considered an instance of coercive isomorphism is SHIRBRIG—the Standby High Readiness Brigade. SHIRBRIG is an effort of 14 UN member states—not officially a UN project—to maintain a rapid reaction force available for deployment within 15-30 days in the startup phase of a UN peacekeeping mission. It has been criticized by developing countries for “excluding them from participation by setting standards for readiness, training and equipment that they cannot meet.” Jakobsen 1998, 119.
practices to have more to do with legitimacy and appropriateness, and less with evidence of effectiveness. This will especially be the case when clear criteria of effectiveness are missing or poorly defined.

2. Organized Hypocrisy

A. Inconsistent Environments and Decoupling

The term is taken from the work of the organization theorist Nils Brunsson, and refers to organizational responses to conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness, or between different norms of appropriateness, in which organizations “decouple” structures and processes established to satisfy the different requirements in conflict. As Brunsson puts it,

When institutional norms fail to agree with the requirements for action, organizations will often try to create two sets of structures and processes, one for each type of norm. These sets should not interfere with one another, but should be separated or 'decoupled.'

According to Brunsson, the establishment of these parallel structures results in dual sets of organizational structures and processes. Organizations develop both a formal organizational structure, typically depicted in organization charts, and an alternate, informal structure through which organizational activity actually takes place. Similarly, organizations will have one set of organizational processes for directing organizational action, and another that "is kept for purposes of demonstration or display to the outside world. These second processes can be defined as rituals." Thus, an organization can both proclaim and routinely violate or ignore a norm.

B. Open and Closed-System Organized Hypocrisy

Stephen Krasner has recently applied the concept of organized hypocrisy to international relations, arguing that sovereignty is organized hypocrisy, enduring as a norm yet frequently violated in practice, as a result of conflicting logics of consequences and appropriateness in domestic and international environments. Krasner suggests that the concept of organized hypocrisy should be widely applicable in international politics.

Brunsson and other organizational theorists who suggest that hypocrisy might be a normal state of affairs, have focused their attention on domestic political settings. The logic of these analyses suggests that organized hypocrisy will be even more prevalent in the international environment. There are more constituencies to manage, because domestic actors are joined by international ones. Norms of appropriateness emanating from the international environment could be inconsistent with those originating from domestic sources. The authoritative decision-making role often assumed by courts in a domestic setting,

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92 Brunsson 1989, 7.
93 Krasner 1999, 201. See also Steinberg 2002.
which can sometimes resolve conflicts between conflicting rules, does not exist in the international environment.\textsuperscript{94}

This should be especially true in a realm such as peace operations and humanitarian relief, in which the diversity of actors, and the pressures to which they must respond are so varied, including civilian and military, state and non-state, intergovernmental and nongovernmental, with differing and often inconsistent, but interdependent, mandates.\textsuperscript{95}

While the fundamentals of the organized hypocrisy concept—organizations cope with inconsistent norms and conflicting pressures by establishing separate, “decoupled” structures and processes to satisfy each—are unchanged in his analysis, Krasner’s adaptation of the concept to explain the persistence of sovereignty in the face of routine violations introduces some distinctive elements to the argument that are not inherent in the concept as originally developed in institutional theory. Krasner uses the concept of organized hypocrisy to argue that logics of consequences can always triumph over logics of appropriateness, or, in the concluding sentence of the book: “In a contested environment in which actors, including the rulers of states, embrace different norms, clubs can always be trump.”\textsuperscript{96} However, in Brunsson’s formulation, the argument is more about how logics of consequences and appropriateness coexist, with neither establishing supremacy.\textsuperscript{97} Krasner’s is, therefore, a distinctly realist conception of organized hypocrisy.

However Krasner diverges from standard realist approaches by abandoning state-centrism. For Krasner, individual rulers, not states, are the key actors and organized hypocrisy results from rulers’ attempts to retain power in the face of competing domestic and international demands.\textsuperscript{98} Nonetheless, Krasner’s rulers are rational, unitary actors, relative autonomous from societal influences.\textsuperscript{99} Thus Krasner’s adaptation of the concept of organized hypocrisy falls within the “closed, rational” systems approach to organization theory.\textsuperscript{100} Brunsson’s original formulation of the organized hypocrisy concept, however, corresponds to the open systems approach, which conceives of organizations as defined in terms of their interdependent relationships with their environments. This perspective sees the boundaries of organizations as porous and, to some extent, arbitrary, and regards organizations as non-unitary actors with loosely coupled components.\textsuperscript{101} In Brunsson’s conception of organized hypocrisy it is

\textsuperscript{94} Krasner1999, 66.
\textsuperscript{95} For a discussion of how these challenges play out in efforts at coordination, see Eisenhour and Marks 1999.
\textsuperscript{96} Krasner 1999, 238.
\textsuperscript{97} Similarly, in the institutional theory literature, institutional and technical aspects of organizational environments, which roughly correspond to logics of appropriateness and consequences, are seen as coexisting simultaneously, with neither dominating. Scott 1998,138-39.
\textsuperscript{98} Krasner 1999, 7, 9; See Cronin 2001.
\textsuperscript{100} Scott1998, 33-55. See also Sagan 1993, 17, 29, 43.
organizations, not rulers, that face the competing demands of inconsistent logics of consequences and action. These organizations, in turn, are not unitary actors in the way that Krasner’s rulers are. In fact, one of the hallmarks of organized hypocrisy is the development in a single organization of decoupled organizational units exhibiting behavior inconsistent with each other. An open-systems conception of organized hypocrisy is more appropriate for the analysis of interorganizational networks, as in the fields of peace operations and humanitarian relief.

C. Conditions for Organized Hypocrisy

Organized hypocrisy should be most evident in aspects of international relations characterized by organizations facing inconsistent norms and practical requirements, including a need to conform to standards of legitimacy and efficiency demands in conflict with each other. Organizational hypocrisy should be most likely in organizations in the international environment that are highly political in nature, existing largely to represent conflicting perspectives. Organizational hypocrisy is more likely in institutional environments, in which measuring the efficiency of organizational outputs is difficult or impossible. Therefore, it is more likely to be evident in the case of an organization for which no clear or accepted method of evaluating task performance exists.

Organizations involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief face just such conditions. For example, humanitarian relief IGOs and NGOs simultaneously confront a logic of appropriateness requiring them to safeguard their independence and neutrality, and an immediate need for military protection. Too close a relationship with their military protectors, however, endangers their independence and perceived neutrality. The organizational cultures of militaries involved in peace operations and NGOs involved in humanitarian relief constitute deeply divergent logics of appropriateness. Intergovernmental organizations involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief must represent conflicting perspectives such as North-South debates or cultural differences between member states. And within the United Nations system, different organizational components—DPKO, UNHCR, etc.—will have different priorities and interests. And measures of effectiveness for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief are problematic, to the extent that doubt often exists about whether activity in these areas is reducing or exacerbating the problem.  

D. Peacekeeping, CIMIC, and Organized Hypocrisy

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) involves actors with very different — sometimes diametrically opposed — organizational cultures. According to one observer, “Differences in organisational culture are a formidable barrier to NGO-military

\[\text{101} \text{Scott 1998, 82-100.} \]
\[\text{103} \text{This section draws upon my 2001 APSA poster presentation “Transnational Organizational Fields and International Security,” (op. cit. note XXXX) and my 2002 APSA paper, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy.”} \]
\[\text{104} \text{However, Byman (2001, 104) points out that there are notable similarities as well. He points to idealism, bravery, mission-focus, flexibility, and experience with foreign cultures as common characteristics. Hugo Slim (1996, 124-25) refers to a “strange mimicry” between military and humanitarian organizations in their language, security practices, and activities.} \]
Of course, organizational cultures vary across and within organizations (different IGOs will have different cultures, and a military civil affairs unit will differ from an airborne assault unit). But generally speaking, military units involved in peacekeeping will be characterized by organizational cultures that are more hierarchical, less individualistic, more socially conservative, and more accepting of the use of violence. They will also be highly gendered, valuing characteristics associated with masculinity and devaluing those associated with femininity. Military cultures are generally characterized by a sense of distinctiveness from civilians, a propensity for worst-case planning, a high value placed on training according to standardized routines, a clear chain of command, and promotion of small-group bonding and of initiative among junior officers. By contrast, humanitarian relief NGOs are characterized by personnel with more socially liberal values, and organizational cultures that value decentralization and independence, reject violence and militarism, and place greater value on transparency and on activities constructed as “feminine.” Also, the U.S. and other militaries tend to regard peace operations and complex emergencies as a distraction from their core mission, while for NGO’s, complex emergencies are their raison d’être. These organizational cultures constitute conflicting logics of appropriateness.

In addition, these logics of appropriateness can conflict with the logics of consequences facing organizations in complex emergency settings. NGOs need to obtain and maintain funding from outside sources, public or private. And they often see publicity as necessary in order to do so. These requirements can conflict with, and even undermine efforts to improve the humanitarian situation. As Alexander Cooley and James Ron have described, principal-agent problems, inter-NGO competition for contracts, and the playing off of NGOs against each other, have produced dysfunctional outcomes in settings such as the Goma refugee camps and the Balkans. These factors are driven by an economic logic of consequences facing NGOs working on humanitarian relief and democratization that is in conflict with the logic of appropriateness of humanitarianism.

Similar problems can confront militaries. For example, the logic of appropriateness of peacekeeping, defined in terms of traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and non-use of force, is inconsistent with the logic of consequences governing military operations, which dictates that forces deploy with capabilities sufficient to deter potential adversaries, and failing that to defeat them. This tension is evident in the language of the August 2000 Brahimi report which, on the one hand,

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105 Byman 2001, 103.
109 Nagl and Young 2000, 34. Dane Priest writes “As the U.S. Army’s experience in Kosovo shows, the mind-set, decision-making, and training of infantry soldiers rarely mixes well with the disorder inherent in civil society. The mismatch in culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country.” Priest 2003, 19, quoted in Archer 2003, 33.
110 Cooley and Ron 2002; Pollick 2003; Bob 2002.
111 Cooley and Ron 2002.
112 Ruggie 1998; Betts 1997; Crawford 1998.
asserts the continued importance of the “bedrock principles” of consent, neutrality, and non-use of force, and on the other hand calls for robust force structures and an interpretation of impartiality more open to the use of force.\textsuperscript{113}

\textit{E. Decoupling as response}

A standard response by organizations facing such inconsistent pressures is to decouple responses to conflicting external pressures. For example, an office may be created or an organization chart redrawn for symbolic purposes, but with little connection to actual organization behavior. Byman describes an example of such discrepancy between formal structures and actual conduct:

On paper, the United Nations appears to have solved the problem of coordination by creating a new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Agencies (OCHA), but in face OCHA’s budget was slashed after other agencies rebelled in reponse to the threat it posed to their autonomy. It lacks the budget, personnel, or bureaucratic authority to impose coordination. Morover, in recent years a rival concept to OCHA has emerged...[T]he UNHCR has played the role of lead agency within the UN family...[T]his de facto role supplants or disrupts the United Nations’ formally declared arrangements.\textsuperscript{114}

The “formally declared arrangements” served the purpose of ritually demonstrating an organizational commitment to greater rationalization and coordination of humanitarian affairs. However, practical and political factors dictated that action in this area take place by other channels. Similarly, Thomas Weiss argues that the 1997 restructuring of UN humanitarian agencies was a “shell game,” produced by the fact that “both member states and organizations speak out of two sides of their mouths to reflect politics in the UN goldfish bowl and operational reality in the field.”\textsuperscript{115}

The decoupling of coordinated activity to produce products or outputs from symbolic action to represent competing interests, or in Brunsson’s formulation, of action and politics, is the defining feature of organized hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{116} Brunsson identifies four ways in which this decoupling is manifested: separation in time, separation by topic, separation by environments, and separation by organizational units.\textsuperscript{117} In the first, norm-driven symbolic action takes place in one period, and norm-violating action in another. In the second, an organization deals with some issues symbolically without taking practical action, and conversely for others. Through separation by environments, organizations act politically in some settings, and bypass politics for the sake of efficient production in others. And in separation by organizational unit, one office or bureau serves primarily symbolic function, while another actually gets things done, without much attention to political or normative pressures. This raises several possibilities for civil-military cooperation in complex emergencies. Organizations may proclaim humanitarian norms at one time, and violate them at another. They may act differently on different issues, or in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} United Nations 2000, 9-10.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Byman 2001, 102.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Weiss 1998, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Brunsson 1989, 33.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Brunsson 1989, 34-38.
\end{itemize}
different settings, or different units of the same organization may serve different functions, exhibiting organized hypocrisy.

This perspective raises the possibility that organizational responses to coordination problems in complex emergencies may serve symbolic more than practical or action-generating functions. For example, civil-military operations centers (CMOCs)—a developing standard practice among militaries for coordinating with humanitarian actors—may in some circumstances serve a ritualistic function of symbolically demonstrating concern with humanitarian issues or NGOs’ interests, with little actual effect on the behavior of the military actors.\(^{118}\)

U.S. military doctrinal publications use refugee relief operations after the Rwandan genocide as illustration of the value of CMOCs.

During Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC responsibilities to the United Nations.\(^{119}\)

Yet, as Daniel Byman notes:

Poor planning and coordination were the hallmark of both the military and relief operations [during Operation Support Hope]. Military officers did not know the capabilities of various NGOs, ignoring their knowledge of sanitation, water purification, and other essentials. Over 100 NGOs were active, yet they did not inform the international community or one another of their activities or presence.\(^{120}\)

Cooley and Ron’s examples of dysfunctional behavior by humanitarian and democracy-promoting NGOs—continued funding of failed democracy-promoting efforts, provision of aid that strengthened genocidal Hutu militias in the Goma refugee camps, and NGO undercutting of ICRC prisoner visitation rights in Bosnia—all appear to constitute instances of organized hypocrisy.\(^{121}\) In each case, NGOs within interorganizational networks acted in ways that undercut their stated principals, due to material pressures such as the need to obtain aid contracts.\(^{122}\) These would appear to be instances of organized hypocrisy by separation in time or environment.

\(^{118}\) Eisenhour and Marks 1999 argue that the US military regards CMOCs as tools for controlling other actors, and approach they see as insufficiently flexible.


\(^{120}\) Byman 2001, 325. However, Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) characterize the Rwandan CMOC as having been effective overall.

\(^{121}\) Cooley and Ron 2002. In this interpretation, Cooley and Ron’s theoretical argument based on the new economics of organization identifies a logic of consequences in conflict with the logics of appropriateness governing the NGOs, and identifies institutional conditions that enable the former to trump the latter.

\(^{122}\) Sarah Tarry’s analysis of NGO-donor interactions suggests that susceptibility of NGOs to such pressures should vary according to factors such as NGO size, and extent of dependence on either public or private funding sources. Tarry 2000, 2002-03.
Different organizations and agencies within the UN system may also work at cross-purposes due to organization hypocrisy through separation by organizational unit. Stuart Gordon notes that various organizational units of the Secretariat face conflicting requirements:

The UN specialised agencies have their work rooted in a humanitarian mandate reflecting humanitarian rather than political imperatives, whereas the work of the DPKO and DPA [Department of Political Affairs] reflects the political realities of the Security Council and the General Assembly to a much greater degree. Consequently, turf battles between the DPKO and the DPA on one side and the DHA on the other have represented something deeper than simply a battle for bureaucratic influence.123

To the extent that this “something deeper” is constituted by inconsistent logics of consequences and appropriateness, efforts such as those of the Brahimi Report to minimize such conflict through better coordination should not generate high expectations. The much-touted concept of regional subcontracting could also serve the function of separation by organizational unit, though in this case it could involve units not formally part of, or ambiguously affiliated with, the United Nations.124 In this case, the UN Security Council would serve a primarily political role as authorizer of the mission, while regional organizations such as NATO would play the role of action organization. The action produced is likely to conflict with the norms espoused by the UN, particularly to the extent that NATO peace operations doctrine calls for actions that violate the core UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense. By contracting out actual field operations, the UN, however, would resolve the pressures of inconsistent logics of consequences and appropriateness.125

F. Implications of an Organized Hypocrisy Perspective

An organized hypocrisy perspective on organizations involved in peace and relief operations offers insights that might otherwise be overlooked. First, inconsistencies between rhetoric and action is often condemned or regarded as at best unfortunate. But it is rarely viewed as a functional response to irreconcilable conflicts between external demands faced by organizations such as the UN. Organized hypocrisy, therefore, may allow peace and relief organizations to take actions necessary for operational success, even where such action conflicts with powerful norms and expectations to which the organizations must conform. It may therefore help organizations caught between an institutional rock and a technical hard place manage the predicament. On the other hand, decoupling may allow peace and relief organizations to pay lip service to norms such as inclusiveness and humanitarianism without actually giving NGOs a greater voice, or providing aid more efficiently. Additionally, structural reforms in the UN and other peace

125 These problems were, of course, not resolved by NATO’s role in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Accords. However, that they were so problematic—as exemplified by the now infamous difficulties of the “dual key” system—was in large part due to the fact that the UN’s and NATO’s roles were not sufficiently decoupled.
and relief organizations may have a primarily symbolic function. They may represent the ritualistic display of formal organizational structures consistent with prevailing cognitive scripts, while actual organizational decisionmaking and action takes place within informal structures and processes.

IV. Issues for Future Research

This paper laid the groundwork for further research, which should undertake several tasks. This paper has presented a preliminary assessment on the basis of secondary studies and loosely formulated propositions. In subsequent research, explicit, empirically testable propositions, applicable to interorganizational networks in peace and relief operations, should be derived from both organizational field theory and organized hypocrisy theory.

Due to the nature of the research questions, which address causal mechanisms, a case study approach would seem to be the most appropriate method of research. The most suitable case study method is process-tracing. However, further preliminary investigation will be necessary to ensure that the data required for process tracing — including interviews with organizational officials and personnel — is available. Failing that, it may be necessary to develop alternative case study tests, such as controlled comparison or congruence tests.  

For testing correlation between relevant independent and dependent variables—i.e., organizational field development and isomorphism, or inconsistent environmental pressures and organized hypocrisy—cases should be selected, where possible, for either extreme values or large within-case variance on the technical/institutional nature of the environment, the extent of organizational field development, the action/political nature of the organization, or the extent of decoupling between talk, decisions, and action. Finally, alternative explanations, which might include a modified bureaucratic politics model (Allison’s Model III) or transaction cost analysis should be evaluated.

Complex humanitarian emergencies present morally and politically urgent challenges, in which success is heavily dependent upon the ability of very different actors to work together. Organization theorists have developed a rich understanding of the role of cognitive and normative frameworks in the management of such coordination. The conditions under which these models are expected to apply appear to characterize the fields of peace operations and humanitarian relief. Therefore, greater attention to the organizational and interorganizational dynamics highlighted by institutional theory holds the potential to yield powerful insights into the urgent problem of coordinating the disparate actors involved in peace and relief operations.

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126 See Van Evera 1997, Ch. 2.
127 Van Evera 1997, p. 88. Care must be taken, however, that high or low values on these variables in the cases selected are not due to the cases being outliers. These cases should fall at the high or low ends of typical variation within the peacekeeping field. I thank Page Fortna for raising this issue.
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