Authority Orientations and Political Support: 
A Cross-national Analysis of 
Satisfaction with Governments and Democracy.

Neil Nevitte and Mebs Kanji 
Department of Political Science, 
University of Toronto, 
Canada

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, Research Grant # 829991010. The 
Research Council is not responsible for the interpretation of the findings reported in 
this article.
Introduction:

In the mid 1970’s Samuel Huntington predicted that the new middle classes in many advanced industrial states would become more restless and “post-industrial politics” less benign (1974; also Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975). The accumulated evidence provides some support for that prediction; citizens in a number of states have become more inclined to publicly express their dissatisfaction with governments (Inglehart 1997; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999). Occasional citizen dissatisfaction with a particular government is neither unusual nor necessarily problematic. More problematical is the possibility that deep and sustained dissatisfaction might corrode regime support. The worry is that dissatisfaction with particular governments might turn into dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy more generally.

What are the determinants of dissatisfaction with governments? And, what is the connection between citizens’ evaluations of government performance and their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy more generally? This analysis examines these two separate but closely related questions. Neither research question is new, but we depart from conventional approaches in three respects. First, we argue that contemporary explanations for dissatisfaction with governments may pay insufficient attention to the structure of authority patterns. Following Eckstein (1966,1969), we explore the possibility that discrepancies in authority patterns have significant independent effects on levels of citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction with governments.
Second, prevailing explanations of variations in diffuse support focus primarily on the importance of institutions (Newton and Norris 2000). Citizens’ assessments of their political systems may not always be “of a piece.” As Norris observes, publics can, and do, “distinguish between different levels of the regime, often believing strongly in democratic values, for example, while proving critical of the way that democratic governments work in practice” (1999a: 9). Public confidence in political institutions undoubtedly is crucial to the vitality of democratic life, but so are political actors. What is less certain, and what is open to investigation, is whether it is outlooks towards political institutions rather than political actors that are more important determinants of citizen satisfaction with the workings of democracy.

Researchers investigating these two broad questions have relied primarily on empirical evidence from advanced industrial states. There is no reason to suppose that the dynamics driving citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction in wealthy well established democratic states would be the same as those driving citizens’ evaluations of their governments in poorer countries with briefer experiences with democratic practices. The third goal of this analysis, then, is to broaden the field of investigation and to use data from the 2000 World Values Surveys to test the extent to which hypotheses derived from different theoretical perspectives hold up in both advanced industrial states and less wealthy ones.
**Theoretical Orientation:**

Most analysts of contemporary democratic life in western states do not claim that democracy is in crisis (Norris, 1999; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Kaase and Newton, 1995), but they do suggest that most citizens believe that all is not well (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000:27). A variety of explanations have been suggested to account for the most critical sources of citizen discontent.

Some explanations focus on value change. In one of the most prominent variations of this line of reasoning, Ronald Inglehart argues that “mass values and attitudes are a major influence on whether or not democratic institutions survive in a given society” (2000: 225). Much of Inglehart’s research indicates that the core values of publics are changing and these changes have consequences for what people want out of life and what citizens expect of governments. raised under conditions of material and physical security have shifted away from a preoccupation with these basic material needs towards postmaterialist concerns (Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Postmaterialist values embrace a variety of “higher order” concerns including a preference for more open government. The sheer volume and consistency of the evidence in support of this value change theory is impressive. The same basic finding emerges in nearly every country for which there are systematic data: those segments of the publics holding postmaterialist values are more critical of traditional hierarchical institutions and consistently more likely to engage in elite challenging behaviors. Moreover, Inglehart’s account goes considerable distance towards explaining why the relationship between levels of material wealth in a society and levels of public satisfaction with governments is not a simple linear one.
A second explanation focuses more on how structural changes (Clarke and Rempel, 1997) have contributed to rising levels of cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984, 2002; Inglehart 1990). The cognitive mobilization explanation draws attention to how the accumulation of skills and resources of an increasingly well educated middle class and the combined effects of these changes is promote rising levels of citizen engagement (Dalton 1984: 267). Wider access to higher levels of formal education is particularly significant because higher levels of formal education have important consequences for citizen outlooks and behavior (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996). One is that they provide individuals with a greater capacity to organize information and to be more independent in the interpretation and use of that information (see also, Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993) Higher levels of formal education are also associated with greater interest in politics, and greater interest supplies the motivation to seek out more information. These publics are not only more interested in, and knowledgeable about, their civic worlds, they are also more inclined to be active and critical.

A third socio-cultural explanation for why public satisfaction with governments and politics might be in short supply is the erosion in levels of social capital (Putnam, 1995, 2000; Norris 2001). Social capital concerns both social networks and the norms of reciprocity that lubricate those networks, in particular interpersonal trust. Putnam argues that it is the technological transformation of leisure that is responsible for declining levels of civic engagement and undermining social trust, and the effects of these transformations have made it even more difficult for governments to govern. Regardless of whether the erosion of social capital is directly attributable to new modes of leisure, the evidence showing that citizens with weak social capital, low interpersonal trust,
exhibit levels of satisfaction with government that are significantly lower than those where people enjoy higher levels of social capital is remarkably consistent (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000).

These three accounts of the changing dynamics between citizens and government have become well-established explanations for good reasons. They are plausible, they are firmly grounded in well-established theory, and each is backed by an impressive body of empirical evidence. Even so, it is not clear that these accounts exhaust all of the explanatory possibilities and, in our view, there is a fourth possible explanation that warrants some consideration. The origins of this alternative explanation reach back to the seminal work of Harry Eckstein (1966, 1969).

Eckstein’s theorizing began with the observation that authority orientations are a fundamental axis of political life. Drawing upon configurative case studies of Norway, Britain and Germany, Eckstein argued that an explanation for the presence of democratic stability in some countries, but not others, is attributable to the presence or absence of congruence in the authority patterns in society.¹ Eckstein’s initial preoccupation was in demonstrating the roots of democratic stability could be explained by extent to which family and political authority patterns were congruent. Pateman (1970) later demonstrated that this general line of reasoning could also be extended and applied to the link between authority patterns in the workplace and those in the polity. And other research more recently suggests that authority patterns in the workplace are also systematically connected to those in the family (Nevitte 1996).

¹ As Eckstein and Gurr put it later “a government will tend to be stable, if its authority pattern is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part (1975: 234).
It is Eckstein and Gurr’s (1975) later investigations that turned to focus on what consequences discrepant authority patterns might have for support for governments and legitimacy, and these directly inform the core hypothesis explored here. Congruent authority patterns, Eckstein and Gurr contend, foster allegiance to governments whereas inconsistencies in authority patterns have the potential to undermine public satisfaction with governments and imperil that allegiance (Eckstein and Gurr 1975:450). This innovative theorizing about authority patterns represented an important advance in empirical democratic theory, but the empirical foundations of these claims were almost entirely grounded in case studies. While quite specific hypotheses about variations in citizen satisfaction can be readily deduced from this theory, these hypotheses have not, to our knowledge, been subject to rigorous empirical testing with systematic cross-national evidence. Our goals are to draws on the insights from this earlier body of theory, to recast the central propositions in the form of testable hypotheses, and to investigate those hypotheses using recent WVS data from multiple countries. We evaluate the contribution of this alternative perspective by placing the empirical findings inspired by the Eckstein perspective in the context of those coming from the three more contemporary theories outlined above.

**Data and Methods:**

The World Values Surveys (WVS) are a useful data source for testing hypotheses about authority orientations, views about government performance and democratic satisfaction for a combination of reasons. First, these surveys contain data from multiple
countries and the same core set of questions asked in each country has been designed to ensure cross-national equivalence. The WVS include well-tested measures for each of the theoretical concepts that are central to this analysis. Furthermore, the WVS use the same standard methodologies for sampling and data collection techniques, and the timing of the data collection was deliberately coordinated to maximize comparability. Consequently, we can be reasonably confident that the WVS yield data that meet the necessary standards of cross national comparability.

Eckstein and Gurr’s claim that discrepancies in authority orientations contribute to dissatisfaction in citizen evaluations of a government’s performance is not a proposition they limit to advanced industrial states. And to test the generalizability of that claim, we examine data from eight countries (n= 11,739) that vary significantly with respect to their institutional make-up, the extent of their experience with democratic practices, and levels of wealth: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States. The details of how each variable is operationalized are documented in Appendix A. The baseline measure of people’s orientations to political authority is operationalized by using the five-item political action index (Marsh and Kaase 1979). The assumption is that people’s views toward political authority are reflected in their willingness to challenge political authority. For comparative purposes, the scale scores are standardized (range from 0 to 1, where 1= a strong willingness to challenge political authority). To compare whether, and how, citizens’ orientations towards authority vary across different domains we consider five additional measures all of which are standardized (0= a high level of deference, to 1= low level of deference).

---

2 The results reported here are based on the unweighted data. In all cases, the unweighted results are virtually identical to the weighted results; they produce no substantive differences in interpretation.
These codings correspond to that used in the baseline index. The first indicator, is greater respect for authority in the future would be a good thing or a bad thing, taps general orientations toward authority. Two indicators tap attitudes toward authority in the family: Do respondents feel it is important to teach children about obedience in the home? And should one always love and respect their parents, or only when they have earned it? The two remaining indicators measure orientations toward authority in the workplace: Who should own and participate in the management of business and industry — owners and government, or employees? And, when should one follow instructions at work — always, even when one does not fully agree with them, or only when one is convinced they are right?

**Findings:**

The place to begin is with the basic aggregate data. As Figure 1 shows, there are significant cross-national variations with respect to citizens’ orientations towards the baseline measure of political authority. The willingness of publics to challenge political authority is positively related to aggregate income levels. In effect, every $10,000 increase in GDP/capita, corresponds to a .3 increase on the willingness to challenge political authority index. These results are entirely consistent with other findings (Welzel and Inglehart, 2001; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2001) and they suggest that citizen inclinations to challenge political authority is a basic trait of open societies, and open societies tend to be more prosperous. Significantly, however, the willingness of publics to challenge political authority is not just a proxy for public satisfaction with democracy. These WVS data show, for example, that the highest levels of public
satisfaction with democracy are found in Spain, but the Spanish rank fourth, well behind publics in the United States, Canada and Japan, on their willingness to challenge authority. Similarly, Japan ranks third on willingness to challenge authority but they rank well below publics in six other countries in their levels of satisfaction with democracy.

**Se Figure 1**

Variations in aggregate outlooks toward authority clearly do distinguish publics in less developed countries from their counterparts in advanced industrial states, but the core component of the Eckstein and Gurr hypothesis that relates authority orientations to levels of satisfaction with authority is primarily concerned with discrepancies between political authority orientations and authority orientations in other domains. The first point to establish is: To what extent, in each of these eight countries, is there evidence of discrepancies between orientations towards political authority and such other authority orientations as those in the family and the workplace? Figure 2 reports the aggregate mean differences between each country’s average score on the baseline index — willingness to challenge political authority — and their national average scores on each of the five additional indicators of authority orientations. Several relevant findings emerge.

**Se Figure 2**

First, the presence of discrepancies in authority orientations is clearly not atypical. In fact, there are statistically significant differences between orientations towards political authority and other authority domains in about 95% of the cases examined.
Figure 1: Willingness to Challenge Political Authority by GDP/capita

$y' = .2 + .00001x$
$r^2 = .09$

Note: willingness to challenge political authority is measured using a standardized 5-item additive index.
See Appendix A for question wording and coding.

Figure 2: Aggregate Discrepancies – Willingness to Challenge Political Authority Compared to Authority Orientations in General, in the Family, and in the Workplace by Country

(Average score on authority orientations in general, in the family and in the workplace MINUS the average score on willingness to challenge political authority)

**POLITICAL**

Willingness to challenge political authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>WORKPLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater respect for authority in the future would be a good thing</td>
<td>Teaching children about obedience at home is especially important</td>
<td>Owners and government should own and participate in the management of business and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater respect for authority in the future would be a bad thing</td>
<td>Teaching children about obedience at home is not especially important</td>
<td>One should follow instructions at work only when one is convinced they are right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>US*</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BASELINE MEAN DIFFERENCE = 0**

*p > .05; all other differences are statistically significant.

Note: see Appendix A for question wording and coding.

Source: 2000 World Values Surveys.
Second, the data indicate significant cross-national variations in the scale of these discrepancies. The greater the distance between each mean score and the intersection of the vertical axis, the greater is the discrepancy. Equally significant is the clear evidence indicating that not all discrepancies in authority orientations operate in the same direction. Mean scores arrayed to the left of the vertical axis, \textit{negative} discrepancies, indicate that most citizens in that country are less deferential in their political authority outlooks than they are in their general, workplace and family authority outlooks. Points distributed along the right side of the vertical axis, \textit{positive} discrepancies, signify precisely the opposite; most citizens are more deferential to political authority than they are in their outlooks to authority in the other domains.

Third, given the wide variations in cultural settings and regime styles of the eight countries, there are some remarkably consistent cross-national patterns with respect to the distributions of some outlooks. For example, regardless of national setting, most people exhibit greater respect for parental figures, and for authority in general, than they do for political authority. When it comes to child rearing and workplace participation, however, the opposite pattern typically holds. There is also some evidence of cultural affinities. The American and Canadian cases, for example, are nearly always closely clustered together, and in these two instances nearly all of the discrepancies have a negative valence. The Mexican and Argentinean findings also typically cluster together but more often than not they cluster towards the positive polarity; they are positive discrepancies.

These aggregate mean scores, of course, mask the extent to which there are variations in distributions of authority within national populations. A more detailed

\footnote{Eckstein and Gurr supply no empirical guideline for indicating when authority orientations do, or do not qualify as “congruent” or “discrepant.” For that reason, we rely on the convention of statistically}
portrait of national variations, however, points to important nuances (see Appendix B). In every society, regardless of which combination of authority patterns are considered, there is usually a balance of positive and negative discrepancies. Thus, although most Spaniards are generally more inclined to support greater employee participation in workplace decision-making than they are likely to challenge political authority (Figure 2), there is nonetheless a healthy proportion of Spaniards (16%) who indicate that they less supportive of greater worker participation in the workplace (Appendix B). In no country is there complete unanimity on these authority dimensions.

These findings provide empirical grounding for the claims made by Eckstein and others that authority patterns vary significantly across different domains. But significantly, Eckstein and his colleagues provide no commentary about the possibility that there may be different varieties of discrepant authority patterns. Consequently, they provide no guidance on the possible that different kinds of discrepancies might have different consequences.

It is quite conceivable, for instance, that qualitative differences in the disjuncture of authority patterns could have quite different effects on citizen evaluations of government performance. For example, citizens who are less deferential outside of the polity (multiple positive discrepancies) may be more likely than others to express greater dissatisfaction with government because political authority patterns are more constraining than those experienced in the family and workplace. Conversely, citizens who are more inclined to defer to authority in their everyday lives (multiple negative discrepancies) may be less inclined than others to feel, and express, their dissatisfaction with
governments or challenge the status quo. The implication is that there are at least two variations of the core hypothesis worth investigating:

**Hypothesis 1a:** Citizens with a pattern of multiple positive discrepancies (who are less deferential in the workplace, the family, and in general authority outlooks, than in the polity) will express less satisfaction with the performance of governments.

Alternatively:

**Hypothesis 1b:** Citizens with a pattern of multiple negative discrepancies (who are more deferential in the workplace, the family, and in general authority outlooks, than in the polity) will express greater satisfaction with the performance of governments.

The findings reported in Figure 3 provide support for both of these hypotheses. The 2000 WVS asked respondents about their satisfaction with the way that people in (government) were handling their country’s affairs. The data show that variations in citizens’ satisfaction with governments depends not only on the scope but also on the direction of the discrepancies in authority patterns. The greater the number of positive discrepancies the less satisfaction there is with government performance, and the greater the number of negative discrepancies, the greater the level of satisfaction with government performance. Indeed, the magnitude of these differences is striking; multiple
discrepancies of in either direction appear to have the potential of influencing evaluations of government performance by as much as 20-40 percent. These results is striking consistent in two respects. First, the very same patterns emerge regardless of which combination of authority orientations are compared. And second, these findings consistently hold up regardless of whether citizens live in wealthy advanced industrial states with long democratic traditions or in poorer countries with briefer experiences with democratic practices (see Appendix C).

What is required, however, is a direct test of the second hypothesis, namely, that discrepant authority patterns contribute to variations in levels of public satisfaction with governments. But the clear evidence indicating that the two different types of discrepancies have identifiably different effects, suggests that separate hypotheses, one for each type of discrepancy, should be specified and tested. As follows:

**Hypothesis 2a:** Positive discrepancies in authority patterns will have an independent effect that decreases citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments.

And,

**Hypothesis 2b:** Negative discrepancies in authority patterns will have an independent effect that increases citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments.

It is possible, of course, that the apparent links between discrepancies in authority patterns variations in satisfaction with governments are confounded and mediated by, or
just derivative of, other sources of variation in levels of satisfaction with governments. For instance, the bivariate relationships between discrepant authority orientations and dissatisfaction with government might simply be attributable to more complex relationships between authority orientations and the distributions of postmaterialist value orientations, cognitive mobility or social capital. The only convincing way to show that authority orientations provide a credible alternative explanation for variations in satisfaction with governments is to demonstrate that discrepant authority orientations have significant net effects on variations in satisfaction with governments. That is, it must be demonstrated that discrepancies in authority patterns must have a significant impact on citizen satisfaction with governments after the effects of such other explanations as postmaterialist orientations, cognitive mobility, and social capital, have been taken into account. To evaluate that proposition we turn to a multivariate model to isolate the impact of discrepancies in authority patterns on levels of satisfaction with government performance. The model controls both for the effects that might be attributable to other explanations and for such other individual attributes as age, sex and income.

Table 1 about here

The results reported in Table 1 indicate a number of important findings. First, both positive and negative discrepancies turn out to have significant effects on evaluations of government performance, after the impact of other explanations and various socio-demographic factors are taken into account. In effect, with each additional positive discrepancy, the odds of that individual being satisfied with their government’s performance decrease by as much as 39%. Conversely, with each additional negative
discrepancy, the chances of being more satisfied with government performance more than double. Second, when the model is unpacked and the same tests are performed separately for both publics in advanced industrial states and less developed countries, the same general findings emerge. Not surprisingly, there is some evidence of variation in the extent to which the same predictors have an impact on satisfaction with governments in wealthier or poorer settings. But the general finding is quite clear. The absence of congruence in authority patterns consistently emerges as a significant predictor of variations in support for governments even after the effects of other explanations and individual socio-economic characteristics are accounted for. In short, these data provide substantial support for the Eckstein and Gurr theory that authority patterns shape citizen satisfaction with governments.

To this point, the analysis has focused on sharpening our understanding of what factors explain variations in a certain type of specific support, citizens’ levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of people in government. But to what extent do variations in this type of specific support help to account for variations in citizens’ diffuse support (Easton, 1965; Kornberg and Clarke, 1992; Norris, 1999; Nevitte, 2002)? The prevailing perception is that citizens’ evaluations of how people in government perform is less important to their satisfaction with the workings of democracy than is confidence in government institutions. The argument is that because political actors transient, what really counts when it comes to regime support is strong public confidence in government institutions. According to Norris and Newton, “politicians come and go with swings of the electoral pendulum,” but a “loss of
confidence in institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society. If they begin to crumble, then there is, indeed, cause for concern” (Newton and Norris 2000, 53). The hypothesis expressing this expectation would be:

**Hypothesis 3:** *Citizen confidence in governmental institutions is a better predictor of their satisfaction with the way democracy works than are citizen evaluations of how well people in government handle the affairs of the country.*

The WVS 2000 data allow us to test that hypothesis and, once again, the appropriate test requires a multivariate test. In this model (Table 2), government satisfaction becomes a key independent variable, along with confidence in government institutions. Two additional controls are imported into the model. The “life satisfaction” control is introduced to minimize the variation attributable to generalized feeling of satisfaction, and the “feelings towards democracy” control is entered for similar reasons (see Abramson and Inglehart 1998).

**Table 2 about here**

The results reported in Table 2 show public confidence in political institutions is a significant predictor of democratic satisfaction. They also show that satisfaction with how people in government “handle the country’s affairs” also has a significant effect on democratic satisfaction overall. Indeed, the impact of the “people in government” variable turns out to be a much stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction than is
citizen confidence in various governmental institutions (parliament, the civil service and parties) after contextual and sociodemographic factors are taken into account. Satisfaction with government officials increases the chances of democratic satisfaction by more than five times, more than three times the impact of confidence in institutions. Moreover, these same general patterns hold when the same tests are conducted separately for advanced industrial states and for less developed countries albeit with minor variations. Some intriguing differences emerge when the data for advanced industrial states are compared with those for Less Developed Countries (LDC) are probed in greater detail. The confidence in institutions variable is routinely used as an additive index of responses to questions about confidence in three different governmental institutions - parliament, civil service, and political parties. When the index is disaggregated and multivariate tests are conducted separately for each institution, the results show that confidence in political parties is a significantly stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction in LDCs whereas confidence in parliament is a stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction in advanced industrial states. The implication is that party building is a more effective strategy for promoting general regime support in LDCs. On balance, however, these findings lead us to reject the third hypothesis.

**Concluding Discussion:**

We began by indicating that theories of value change, cognitive mobilization, and social capital, all provide compelling explanations for the changing dynamics between citizens and their governments. But we also suggested that another explanation for citizen dissatisfaction with governments can be deduced from an earlier theoretical framework
developed by Eckstein and his colleagues, and that this explanation requires some investigation. Eckstein’s core expectation was that citizens will be less satisfied with government when political authority patterns are not congruent with the authority patterns elsewhere in society.

Our empirical test of that proposition provides general support for Eckstein’s theory. Using WVS data from eight countries, it is clear that there are significant discrepancies in the authority orientations of publics in these countries. But the evidence also suggests that the original formulation of Eckstein’s theory requires respecification in at least one important respect. The findings indicate there are two different kinds of discrepancies in authority patterns; negative discrepancies and positive discrepancies. In the case of negative discrepancies, citizens are less deferential in their political authority orientations than in their authority orientations towards the family and workplace. In the case of positive discrepancies, citizens are more deferential in the political domain than they are in others. It is not clear that Eckstein and colleagues anticipated these qualitative differences in types of discrepancies, but they turn out to have substantively important consequences for citizens’ evaluations of governments.

The second set of significant findings indicate that where there positive discrepancies in authority patterns, citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments declines. And where there are negative discrepancies, citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments increases. These results are remarkably consistent. They apply equally to publics in advanced industrial states and LDC’s, and each pattern has the same impact on citizen’s evaluations of government performance regardless of whether the national
setting is more or less prosperous. The implication is that the re-specified theory is a
generalizable one.

The results indicate, generally, that the value change, cognitive mobilization and
social capital explanations for variations in public support for governments work as one
would predict. The findings are not identical in every detail in every national setting, but
the overall pattern is consistent. The evidence also suggests that discrepant authority
orientations is an explanation that does not compete with others; it is an explanation that
complements others. Empirically, discrepant authority orientations clearly account for
significant additional variation in citizen dissatisfaction with governments even after
other explanations are taken into account.

There is virtually no conclusive evidence indicating that public support for
democratic principles has eroded (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Stevensson 1995; Fuchs and
Klingemann 1995). Nonetheless, many analysts continue to express concern about public
support for, and confidence in, the core institutions of democratic government ( Newton
and Norris 2000; Norris 1999a; Nye, Zelikow and King 1997). The reasonable
presumption is that these institutions mediate citizens’ evaluations of regime support.
One inference that might be made from our findings is that public satisfaction with the
quality of democratic life might be improved by institutional design, by adjusting
governmental institutions to correspond with social authority patterns. The prospect is an
intriguing one. But it is not at all clear that priming public confidence in governmental
institutions is a sufficient remedy. Confidence in governmental institutions does shape
citizen satisfaction with democratic life. But our data also show that citizen satisfaction
with the quality of democratic life is affected even more powerfully by their evaluations
of how “people in government are handling the country’s affairs”. The implication is that while institutions matter, but so do political actors.
REFERENCES

ABRAMSON, P. and R. INGLEHART

CLARK, T. and M. REMPEL

CROZIER, M., S., HUNTINGTON, and J. WATANUKI.

DALTON, R.

DALTON, R. and M. WATTENBERG

EASTON, D.

ECKSTEIN, H.
1969 "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance," Comparative Political Studies, 2: 269-325.

ECKSTEIN, H. and T.R. GURR
1975 Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

FUCHS, D., G. GUIDOROSSI and P. SVENSSON

HUNTINGTON, S.

INGLEHART, R.

KAASE, M. and K. NEWTON

KLINGEMANN, H. and D. FUCHS

KORNBERG, A. and H. CLARKE

LIPSET, S. M. and W. SCHNEIDER

MARSH, A. and M. KAASE

NEWTON, K. and P. NORRIS

NEVITTE, N.
2002 *Value Change and Governance in Canada.* Toronto, ON.: University of Toronto Press.


NIE, N., J. JUNN and K. STEHLIK-BARRY

NORRIS, P.


NYE J. S. Jr., P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King

PATEMAN, C.

PHARR, S. and R. PUTNAM

PUTNAM, R.


PUTNAM, R., S. PHARR, and R. DALTON,


THE WORLD FACTBOOK


WELZEL, C. and R. INGLEHART


WELZEL, C. R. INGLEHART and HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN

Appendix A: Question Wording and Coding

**Dependent Variables**

**Indicator:** Willingness to Challenge Political Authority

**Question wording/coding:**
I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.
- Signing a petition (have done/might do = 1; never do = 0)
- Joining in boycotts (have done/might do = 1; never do = 0)
- Attending lawful demonstrations (have done/might do = 1; never do = 0)
- Joining lawful demonstrations (have done/might do = 1; never do = 0)
- Occupying buildings or factories (have done/might do = 1; never do = 0)

**Index reliability:**
All countries merged (Alpha = .7); Spain (Alpha = .8); United States (Alpha = .6); Canada (Alpha = .7); Japan (Alpha = .7); Mexico (Alpha = .8); Argentina (Alpha = .7); Nigeria (Alpha = .7); Chile (Alpha = .8).

**Indicator:** Satisfaction with the Government's handling of Affairs

**Question wording/coding:**
How satisfied are you with the way the people in the federal government are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?
- (very satisfied and fairly satisfied = 1; fairly dissatisfied and very dissatisfied = 0)

**Indicator:** Democratic satisfaction

**Question wording/coding:**
On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?
- (very satisfied or rather satisfied = 1; not very satisfied or not at all satisfied = 0)

**Independent / Control Variables**

**Indicator:** Authority Orientations in General

**Question wording/coding:**
I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind?
- Greater respect for authority (bad thing = 1; don’t mind = .5; good thing = 0)
**Indicator:** Authority Orientations in the Family

**Question wording/coding:**
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.
  - Obedience (not mentioned = 1; mentioned as important = 0)

With which of these two statements do you tend to agree?
A. Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them
B. One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior and attitudes
   (agree with statement B = 1; agree with statement A = 0)

**Indicator:** Authority Orientations in the Workplace

**Question wording/coding:**
There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion?
1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers
2. The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers
3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers
4. The employees should own the business and should elect the managers
   (statements 2 or 4 = 1; statements 1 or 3 = 0)

People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one should follow one’s superior’s instructions even when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one’s superior’s instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of these two opinions do you agree?
   (must be convinced first or depends = 1; should follow instructions = 0)

**Indicator:** Number of positive discrepancies

**Note:**
- A 5-item additive index compiling the aggregate number positive discrepancies per respondent.
  (multiple discrepancies = 1; 1 or less positive discrepancies = 0)

**Index reliability:**
All countries merged (Alpha = .6); Less developed states (Alpha = .53); Advanced industrial states (Alpha = .6)
Indicator: Number of negative discrepancies

Note:
- A 5-item additive index compiling the aggregate number of negative discrepancies per respondent.
  (multiple negative discrepancies = 1; 1 or less negative discrepancies = 0)

Index reliability:
All countries merged (Alpha = .8); Less developed states (Alpha = .8); Advanced industrial states (Alpha = .8)

Indicator: Value change

Note:
- Inglehart's standard 4-item materialism/postmaterialism index.
  (postmaterialism = 1; mixed = .5; materialism = 0)

Indicator: Cognitive mobilization

Note:
- A 3-item additive index measuring respondents' level of interest in politics, the frequency with which they discuss politics and their level of education.
  (highly cognitively mobile = 1; moderately cognitively mobile = .5; low level of cognitive mobility = 0)

Index reliability:
All countries merged (Alpha = .55); Less developed states (Alpha = .52); Advanced industrial states (Alpha = .6)

Indicator: Social capital

Interpersonal trust

Question wording/coding:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
  (need to be very careful = 1; most people can be trusted = 0)

Voluntary association membership

Question wording/coding:
Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?
  Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people
    (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
  Religious or church organizations (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Education, arts, music or cultural activities (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Labor unions (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Political parties or groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Third world development or human rights (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Professional associations (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs etc.) (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Sports or recreation (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Women’s groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Peace movement (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Voluntary organizations concerned with health (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)
Other groups (belong = 1; not mentioned = 0)

**Index reliability:**
All countries merged (Alpha = .7); Less developed states (Alpha = .6); Advanced industrial states (Alpha = .7)

**Indicator:** Political institutions – parliament, civil service and political parties

**Question wording/coding:**
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- Parliament (a great deal or quite a lot = 1; not very much or none at all = 0)
- The civil service (a great deal or quite a lot = 1; not very much or none at all = 0)
- Political parties (a great deal or quite a lot = 1; not very much or none at all = 0)

**Index reliability:**
All countries merged (Alpha = .7); Less developed states (Alpha = .8); Advanced industrial states (Alpha = .7)

**Indicator:** Life satisfaction

**Question wording/coding:**
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

- (high level of satisfaction = 1; moderate level of satisfaction = .5; low level of satisfaction = 0)
**Indicator:** Feelings toward democracy

**Question wording/coding:**
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a democratic political system (very good = 1; fairly good = .66; fairly bad = .33; very bad = 0)

**Indicator:** Age

**Question wording/coding:**
This means you are _______ years old?

(51yrs+ = 1; 31yrs-50yrs = .5; 18yrs-30yrs = 0)

**Indicator:** Sex

**Question wording/coding:**
Sex of respondent (1 = male; 0 = female)

**Indicator:** Income

**Question wording/coding:**
Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions.

($50,001+ = 1; $27,501-50,000 = .5; $27,000 or less = 0)

**Indicator:** Education

**Question wording/coding:**
What is the highest education level that you have attained?

(post-secondary = 1; secondary = .5; primary = 0)
Table 1: Logistic Regression – Determinants of Government Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>All countries merged</th>
<th>Less developed countries</th>
<th>Advanced countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Exp (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discrepancies:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of positive discrepancies</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of negative discrepancies</td>
<td>.85**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multiple = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative explanations:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value change</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(postmaterialism = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognitive mobilization</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(high = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social capital:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- interpersonal trust</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(low = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- voluntary association membership</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(no involvement = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(senior = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sex</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(male = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(high = 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Chi-Square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>346.33;</td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7,827</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at p < .05; **significant at p < .01
Note: see Appendix A for question wording and coding.
Source: 2000 World Values Surveys
Table 2: Logistic Regression – Determinants of Democratic Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>All countries merged</th>
<th>Less developed countries</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Exp (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political authorities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction with the government’s handling of affairs (satisfied = 1)</td>
<td>1.75**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political institutions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliament, civil service and political parties (confidence in all three = 1)</td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life satisfaction (high =1)</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feelings toward democracy (very good system =1)</td>
<td>1.35**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (senior = 1)</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sex (male = 1)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income (high =1)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education (post-secondary = 1)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.27**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Chi-Square</td>
<td>2129.70; p&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8,784</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant p < .05; **significant p < .01

Note: see Appendix A for question wording and coding. Source: 2000 World Values Surveys
Appendix C: Satisfaction with the Government’s Handling of Affairs by the Number of Positive and Negative Discrepancies by Domain

Source: 2000 World Values Surveys