http://alcor.concordia.ca/~mingli
1.
“To Disclose
or Not to Disclose? Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases,” first version, 08/2003, revised:
06/2005. Supplementary
Material.
Abstract.
I
study strategic information transmission when biases are uncertain. A perfectly
informed expert advises a decision maker. The expert has biases whose direction
is unknown to the decision maker. I show that all equilibria are of partitional
forms in Crawford and Sobel (1982). It never benefits the decision maker or the
expert to have the bias of the expert disclosed. The decision maker is better
off if the bias distribution is more balanced or if the bias size is smaller.
This paper has been combined with Kristof Madarasz’s parallel working
paper into a new paper entitled “When
Mandatory Dislcosure Hurts: Expert Advice and Conflicting Interests,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 139 (2008), no. 1, 47-74. Supplemental
material.
2.
“Two (Talking)
Heads May Not Be Better than One,” 08/2008. Supplement.
Published in Economics Bulletin, (2008), Volume 3, no.
63, 1-8.
Abstract. This paper discusses a scenario
in which second expert opinions may not benefit decision-making. The
introduction of a second expert creates the possibility of partisan bickering,
which hurts information transmission.
3.
“Combining Expert
Opinions,” revision submitted, 01/2009. Supplementary
material.
Abstract. I analyze a model of advice
with two perfectly informed experts and one decision maker. The bias of an
expert is her private information. I show that consulting two experts is better
than consulting just one. In the simple “peer review” mechanism, the decision
maker receives just one report, and the second expert decides whether to block
the first expert's report. A more rigid peer review process improves
information transmission. Simultaneous consultation transmits information
better than sequential consultation and peer review. However, peer review achieves
significant information transmission, with the decision maker receiving only
one report. There is an asymmetric equilibrium that is more efficient than the
symmetric equilibrium. When given the chance to discover experts’ biases, the
decision maker may prefer not to do so.
4.
“Information
Collection in Bargaining,” revision submitted, 12/2008.
Abstract. I analyze a bilateral
bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The
uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain
additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of
preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he
is quite sure about his opponent's type. There exist preference settings in
which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure
about his opponent's type, as long as the information source is accurate
enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to
draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate.
5.
“A
Psychologically-Based Model of Voter Turnout,” with Dipjyoti Majumdar,
revision submitted, 11/2008.
Abstract. We analyze a model in which
potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote. This motivates them to
participate in elections. The regret is inversely related to the margin of
victory. Voters on the winner’s side experience less regret than those on the
loser’s side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter
turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter
turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the
competitiveness of the election.
6.
“Credibility
for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission,” with Tymofiy
Mylovanov, under review, revised: 12/2008. An older version of the paper was
entitled “Indifferent
Public, Passionate Advocates, and Strategic Media.”
Abstract. We study the effect of
disclosure on information acquisition and transmission in a dynamic reputation
model. In each period, to make a report to a client, an expert chooses between
conducting a costly investigation or channeling a message from an interest
group. We show that not disclosing the source of the expert's report may
increase the frequency of investigation by the expert. Nevertheless, it
decreases the quality of the clients' decisions and the profits of the expert.
We show, however, when the importance of decisions varies across time, or when
the interest groups are long-lived, nondisclosure may improve the quality of
the clients' decisions.
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